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In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent
In Contradiction advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions (dialetheism), a view that flies in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The book has been at the center of the controversies surrounding dialetheism ever since its first publication in 1987. This second edition of the book substantially expands upon the original in various ways, and also contains the author's reflections on developments over the last two decades. Further aspects of dialetheism are discussed in the companion volume, Doubt Truth to be a Liar , also published by Oxford University Press in 2006.
327 pages, Paperback
First published November 30, 1987
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
September 28, 2013
Warning: This is a book about formal logic, and it really isn't readable if you don't have a background in logic. Priest does spend a fair amount of time illustrating his proofs and some of the central points in the book turn on Priest's evaluation of technical problems.
Overall, Priest is an enlightening and engaging writer, which is pretty rare in contemporary logic. The ideas in this book are hotly controversial, but becoming more widely entertained, and this book (and Priest more generally) is the primary reason why, as the champion for dialetheism as a view. The book lays out Priest's case for the truth of some contradictions in strong terms, and makes clear exactly what it is that Priest has in mind. There are a number of points in the text that are useful as far as general philosophical discussion, like observations about the structure of disjunction and the failure of ex contradictione quodlibet (out of contradiction comes everything/anything) as a general logical principle.
He doesn't mince words about the history of logic since the 50s, simply pointing out that he (and most professional logicians) take the defeat of Aristotle's classical logics to be pretty much definitive, at least on points like the excluded middle. Priest does a very good and fair job at hashing out the areas of logic where he is stating a majority opinion (like the importance of multi-valued and/or supervaluational logics of some kind or other) and then clarifying where he is saying something radical. It makes the book slightly more readable to those who aren't up on some of the disputes that are going on at the time that Priest was originally writing; many are still around, especially the supervaluationist material, but some of the debates are less heated now then they used to be.
The book presents its own historical context thoughtfully; it engages seriously with extensive criticisms of its position; it lays out its own argument clearly, and shows the work where necessary. Whether or not you come away agreeing with Priest's positions, and most folks don't, you'll find yourself more respectful of a view that many who have only encountered it superficially think is just weird and laughable. The case and the interpretation is excellent, and this book is a must read for logicians who are considering how they want to evaluate contemporary systems, especially those interested in paraconsistency or supervalutaionism. My only point of concern with the book is that there are several later chapters that explore some implications of the view that seem a bit out of place in Priest's discussion, but those seem to be responses to pretty direct comments, so they do seem to have a pretty explicit function.
Overall, Priest is an enlightening and engaging writer, which is pretty rare in contemporary logic. The ideas in this book are hotly controversial, but becoming more widely entertained, and this book (and Priest more generally) is the primary reason why, as the champion for dialetheism as a view. The book lays out Priest's case for the truth of some contradictions in strong terms, and makes clear exactly what it is that Priest has in mind. There are a number of points in the text that are useful as far as general philosophical discussion, like observations about the structure of disjunction and the failure of ex contradictione quodlibet (out of contradiction comes everything/anything) as a general logical principle.
He doesn't mince words about the history of logic since the 50s, simply pointing out that he (and most professional logicians) take the defeat of Aristotle's classical logics to be pretty much definitive, at least on points like the excluded middle. Priest does a very good and fair job at hashing out the areas of logic where he is stating a majority opinion (like the importance of multi-valued and/or supervaluational logics of some kind or other) and then clarifying where he is saying something radical. It makes the book slightly more readable to those who aren't up on some of the disputes that are going on at the time that Priest was originally writing; many are still around, especially the supervaluationist material, but some of the debates are less heated now then they used to be.
The book presents its own historical context thoughtfully; it engages seriously with extensive criticisms of its position; it lays out its own argument clearly, and shows the work where necessary. Whether or not you come away agreeing with Priest's positions, and most folks don't, you'll find yourself more respectful of a view that many who have only encountered it superficially think is just weird and laughable. The case and the interpretation is excellent, and this book is a must read for logicians who are considering how they want to evaluate contemporary systems, especially those interested in paraconsistency or supervalutaionism. My only point of concern with the book is that there are several later chapters that explore some implications of the view that seem a bit out of place in Priest's discussion, but those seem to be responses to pretty direct comments, so they do seem to have a pretty explicit function.
September 1, 2019
This is a challenging and persuasive defense of dialetheism; an important (perhaps the most important) work on a subject I think is very important.
A dialetheia is any true statement of the form "P and it is not the case that P", and dialetheism is the position that there are dialethia. Perhaps the oldest example is the Liar Sentence: "This sentence is false.".
Priest argues that attempts to preserve consistency in the face of such semantic paradoxes, as well as various mathematical (set-theoretic) paradoxes, are all unsatisfactory. Furthermore, the only serious defense of the Law of Non-Contradiction (which essentially rules out dialethia by fiat, on pain of triviality (i.e. everything being true)) is ancient (Aristotle's); it is not a cogent or compelling defense, and there seems to be no strong reason to tie inconsistency to triviality by asserting the Principle of Explosion. (In fact, the paraconsistent logics discussed in this book do validate the Law of Non-Contradiction - it's just that they are also (inconsistently!) able to assert particular instances of contradiction.) Thus, inconsistent-yet-nontrivial solutions to paradoxes are worth investigating.
Priest makes it clear that dialetheism really does offer a way to make sense of semantic closure (the fact that langauge can assert its own truth predicate), unrestricted comprehension in set theory, and other paradoxical notions, and that dialetheism avoids the unsatisfactory features of consistent solutions to the same paradoxes. The technical (i.e. mathematical) features of the kind(s) of logic that allow for this are spelled out in great detail. This includes an account of the notions of truth, falsity, assertion, rejection, rationality, and belief, subjects which are treated in more detail in Priests's book "Doubt Truth to Be a Liar".
In addition to semantics and set theory, Priest also considers paradoxes associated with change, motion, time, norms, and legal obligations. The whole class of paradoxes related to limits (of what is knowable, expresable, thinkable, iterable, etc.) is discussed in greater detail in Priest's book "Beyond the Limits of Thought".
The second edition includes valuable new work on time, arithmetic, set theory, responses to critics, and an account of how Priest's views have changed since the first edition.
A dialetheia is any true statement of the form "P and it is not the case that P", and dialetheism is the position that there are dialethia. Perhaps the oldest example is the Liar Sentence: "This sentence is false.".
Priest argues that attempts to preserve consistency in the face of such semantic paradoxes, as well as various mathematical (set-theoretic) paradoxes, are all unsatisfactory. Furthermore, the only serious defense of the Law of Non-Contradiction (which essentially rules out dialethia by fiat, on pain of triviality (i.e. everything being true)) is ancient (Aristotle's); it is not a cogent or compelling defense, and there seems to be no strong reason to tie inconsistency to triviality by asserting the Principle of Explosion. (In fact, the paraconsistent logics discussed in this book do validate the Law of Non-Contradiction - it's just that they are also (inconsistently!) able to assert particular instances of contradiction.) Thus, inconsistent-yet-nontrivial solutions to paradoxes are worth investigating.
Priest makes it clear that dialetheism really does offer a way to make sense of semantic closure (the fact that langauge can assert its own truth predicate), unrestricted comprehension in set theory, and other paradoxical notions, and that dialetheism avoids the unsatisfactory features of consistent solutions to the same paradoxes. The technical (i.e. mathematical) features of the kind(s) of logic that allow for this are spelled out in great detail. This includes an account of the notions of truth, falsity, assertion, rejection, rationality, and belief, subjects which are treated in more detail in Priests's book "Doubt Truth to Be a Liar".
In addition to semantics and set theory, Priest also considers paradoxes associated with change, motion, time, norms, and legal obligations. The whole class of paradoxes related to limits (of what is knowable, expresable, thinkable, iterable, etc.) is discussed in greater detail in Priest's book "Beyond the Limits of Thought".
The second edition includes valuable new work on time, arithmetic, set theory, responses to critics, and an account of how Priest's views have changed since the first edition.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews