Competing Principals: Committees, Parties, and the Organization of Congress

by Forrest Maltzman

Since Woodrow Wilson, political scientists have recognized the importance of congressional committees in the policy-making process. Congressional committees often determine what legislation will reach the floor of the House or Senate and what form that legislation will take. In spite of the broad consensus on the importance of congressional committees, there is little agreement on what explains committee action. Committees are alternately viewed as agents of the chamber, the party caucuses, or constituencies outside the institution. Each theory suggests a different distribution of power in the policy-making process.
Forrest Maltzman argues that none of these models fully captures the role performed by congressional committees and that committee members attempt to balance the interests of the chamber, the party caucus, and outside constituencies. Over time, and with the changing importance of a committee's agenda to these groups, the responsiveness of members of committees will vary. Maltzman argues that the responsiveness of the committee to these groups is driven by changes in procedure, the strength of the party caucus, and the salience of a committee's agenda. Maltzman tests his theory against historical data.
This book will appeal to social scientists interested in the study of Congress and legislative bodies, as well as those interested in studying the impact of institutional structure on the policy-making process.
"This specialized study, of value to congressional scholars and partisan activists, enriches an understanding of the increasingly predictable patterns of committee variety." -- Choice
Forrest Maltzman is Assistant Professor of Political Science, George Washington University.

216 pages, Paperback

First published June 1, 1997

Reviews

[Ericka Clou · Rating 2 out of 5]

There are two major contending theories of congressional committees, either they are autonomous decision-making agents that ignore those not on the committee, or that they are agents of the political parties that control Congress. Maltzman thinks the theory that committees become better agents of the political parties when the parties’ strength increases. This book seems overly quaint even for 1997 when it was published. The party system is now a complete monolith, but we were most of the way there already in the 90's.

Committees with more salient issues have additional rules so that they can be more closely controlled. These rules include some that are intended to make the committee clarify what they are doing so that non-committee members can understand it. It is important to understand how congressional reforms can drastically alter the balance of power and change outcomes. Non-committee members in the Senate have more opportunity to affect the relevant policy, and committees are less responsive to
leaders than in the House. Committee power l cannot explain behavior in the Senate as well as it can in the House. To get legislation passed you must then take a more holistic approach in the Senate.