1775: A Good Year for Revolution by Kevin Phillips is an ambitious book that fulfills its ambitions. Phillips demonstrates in documented detail that the critical mass of the American Revolution came together in 1775, not 1776. Indeed, he traces the development of revolutionary sentiment and action well back into the 1760s and spends a good bit of time on 1774.
Like many histories, this book isn’t for everyone because it is so full of detail and information, designed to bolster its argument, that is difficult for the non-specialist to keep track of who did what and when.
Phillips’s point in one sense can be summarized as follows: we date our birth as a nation on July 4, 1776; indeed the birth had been going on for some time; there is little in the Declaration of Independence that had not been said repeatedly in previous years; King George III already had declared the colonies in rebellion; a great deal of fighting already had taken place...and most importantly....most importantly...the colonies had begun long since a process of coming together by means of committees of correspondence and conventions so that a political compact among them, and in defiance of the King, was inevitable.
What is described here wavers between civil war, insurrection, rebellion and outright war. Most importantly there was a meeting of the minds in the colonies and a muddle in London. Many more colonists were loyal to the King than commonly thought, and many more rebels were amenable to a new arrangement of affiliation with England than one might suspect. Phillips documents this. But there was preponderance of mistrust and resentment in the colonies that the King kept inflaming. Each time the colonies did something offensive, the King did something more offensive. The English attitude was that the colonies were there to support England economically and geopolitically; the English intruded upon and controlled almost all of the colonies’ commercial arrangements; they gave no weight to the colonies’ political sentiments. The colonies, viewed from London, were independent of one another; London did not see that they were coming into a form of union that would ultimately bring independence.
The importance of this book today is threefold: 1) we really ought to know our own history; we ought to know the key roles of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia and South Carolina; we ought to understand the ambivalence of New York and Pennsylvania; we ought to understand the religious divisions within the populace, and so forth; 2) we ought to recognize the difficulty of conducting small-bore wars thousands of miles from home where we don’t know the shoals, be they cultural or maritime, much less the ethnic and sectarian divisions that can aid or defeat us, and 3) England had alienated most of the European continent in the previous twenty years; it had no allies or sympathizers; this set the stage for France and Spain and Holland to provide the rebels with indispensable assistance, the lesson being that if your more general foreign relations are roiled, you’ll suffer through indifference, the provision of arms and money, and assistance through diversionary disruptions.
There are some little known heroes in this book. Connecticut governor Jonathan Trumbull comes to mind. There are some well-documented boobs. Virginia governor John Murray Dunmore comes to mind. There are generals who didn’t know how to fight, and of course, there are fighters like Benedict Arnold who was an exceptional fighter, but also a traitor. The descriptions and quotes relating to George Washington are impressive without exception. He spent much of the prelude to 1776 tied up in Massachusetts, far from Mt. Vernon, but he seems seldom to have made a miscalculation. The English, by contrast, made a terrible miscalculation by concentrating on Boston in the pre-1776 years. If you stand almost anywhere on the rim that surrounds Boston today, you will see it is a kind of bowl. It is not a good idea to fight from the bottom of a bowl. The English ultimately gave up on this idea and then spread their forces north and south and ended up being defeated in the middle, in Yorktown.
At the time--1774 to 1775--no one could be sure of anything, just as no one can be sure today of what will happen in Syria or Tunisia. One might have thought, erroneously, that Canada would be brought into association with the colonies. This proved not to be the case, and in hindsight we can see it could never have been the case. Phillips’ triumph in 1775 is looking back through the fog of war and picking out the key facts and major muscle movements that made it, more than 1776, the critical year of Revolution for the colonies.
Since this is a dense, data-rich, closely argued book, I think its audience will be limited. Readers fascinated by the American Revolution will find it fascinating. Others won’t. The question is whether it ultimately will broaden our understanding of the complex commercial, legal, military, cultural, geographic and other factors that led to what we think of as a war of political principle more than anything else; political principle, codified in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, played its role, but its enactment was much, much less clear cut than we tend to think. The fact is, we don’t even get the year right. By 1775 we were shedding blood to become independent, lots of it. 1776 was an important year, too, but it wasn’t the year when the birthing pains were beginning to yield a new nation.
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