Against Method

by Paul Karl Feyerabend

Modern philosophy of science has paid great attention to the understanding of scientific ‘practice’, in contrast to concentration on scientific ‘method’. Paul Feyerabend’s acclaimed work, which has contributed greatly to this new emphasis, shows the deficiencies of some widespread ideas about the nature of knowledge. He argues that the only feasible explanations of scientific successes are historical explanations, and that anarchism must now replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge.

The third edition of this classic text contains a new preface and additional reflections at various points in which the author takes account both of recent debates on science and on the impact of scientific products and practices on the human community. While disavowing populism or relativism, Feyerabend continues to insist that the voice of the inexpert must be heard. Thus many environmental perils were first identified by non-experts against prevailing assumptions in the scientific community. Feyerabend’s challenging reassessment of scientific claims and understandings are as pungent and timely as ever.

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Nonfiction, History, Theory, History Of Science, Psychology

296 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1975

About the author

Paul Karl Feyerabend was an Austrian-born philosopher of science best known for his work as a professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, where he worked for three decades (1958–1989).

His life was a peripatetic one, as he lived at various times in England, the United States, New Zealand, Italy, Germany, and finally Switzerland. His major works include Against Method (published in 1975), Science in a Free Society (published in 1978) and Farewell to Reason (a collection of papers published in 1987). Feyerabend became famous for his purportedly anarchistic view of science and his rejection of the existence of universal methodological rules. He is an influential figure in the philosophy of science, and also in the sociology of scientific knowledge.

Reviews

[Manny · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a challenging book to review. The obvious problems are bad enough: Feyerabend quotes extensively from a multitude of authors that I know poorly or not at all, including philosophers of science (Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Carnap, Duhem), other philosophers (Protagoras, Aristotle, Plato, Kant, Heidegger, Marx, Lenin), scientists, most of whom he claims to have read in the original (Galileo, Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Newton, Einstein, Bohr) and classical literature (Homer, also in the original). Thank goodness that I had at least read Wittgenstein thoroughly, so I didn't feel like a complete ignoramus. But if it were only the extensive range of sources, I wouldn't feel so worried. The worst part is that Feyerabend is obviously teasing you a lot of the time: in case you were in any doubt, he says so in the introduction, and then reminds you again every now and then in case you missed it. He wants you to read him critically, not just slavishly agree with him when he shows you the stone tablets he brought down from Mount Sinai. They could as easily have been picked up from the props department at Universal Studios, you know.

Ow! O wise Zen Master, please don't hit me again. I am doing my best to get with your book. And stop calling me Grasshopper!

If you're into deconstruction, you might, at peril of your life, say that Feyerabend is deconstructing scientific method. Be warned that he's waiting for you. Here's his putdown of Derrida (he's a master of the elegant putdown):

It is one of the merits of deconstruction to have undermined philosophical commonplaces and thus to have made some people think. Unfortunately it affected only a small circle of insiders and it affected them in ways that are not always clear, not even to them. That's why I prefer Nestroy, who was a great, funny and popular deconstructeur, while Derrida, for all his good intentions, can't even tell a story.

So I'm going to forget about deconstruction and other kinds of fashionable nonsense, and try to explain in more commonsense terms what I got out of Against Method. One of the central themes is that philosophers of science are grossly misrepresenting what it is that scientists actually do, or at least misrepresenting the worthwhile parts of it. All this stuff about observations and theories and falsification is, quite possibly, beside the point.

Feyerabend has some interesting arguments to back up his claims. First of all, new scientific theories frequently don't have the logical structure they're supposed to. The official picture is that you have an old theory, and some observations which won't fit into it. The new theory comes along and explains the anomalous observations. It also predicts some new phenomena that no one has yet has had a chance to examine. People go and look for them, and, lo and behold, they're there. The old theory is thrown out, and the new one is installed in its place.

Feyerabend says that this is a fairy story, and that new theories are often weaker than the old ones they are trying to replace. They are typically riddled with holes that you could drive a truck though, which their proponents airily ignore, explaining that these little technical problems will be fixed later. Sometimes, there isn't even any new experimental evidence to support the theory. However, the clever people who made it up have warm, fuzzy feelings for it, and are good at arguing their case. The theory gains ground, not because of its logical merits, but because its champions are running an effective propaganda campaign.

Feyerabend's central example here is Galileo and the Copernican Revolution. Like most people, I had this vague image of Galileo as a noble martyr with Truth on his side, cowed into silence by the evil and reactionary forces of the Inquisition. Feyerabend paints a more nuanced picture. In fact, the evidence supporting Galileo's ideas turns out to have been surprisingly patchy. Much it consisted of thought-experiments and other hand-waving; what you were able to see through his primitive telescopes was hard to interpret, and could have been used to support many possible theories. Feyerabend argues that, if Science really did play by its official rules, the Vatican would have been correct to suppress this dangerous heresy. Galileo fudged his data and used emotional arguments, but, all the same, he turned out in the end to be right. Feyerabend says this is normal for a major new theory. It is no accident that Smolin quotes him, apropos string theory, in The Trouble with Physics.

One parallel that occurred to me from my own experience should be familiar to anyone who works in software engineering. Sometimes, you feel you need to replace a major piece of software that's been around for a while and has had a lot of effort invested in it. It still does the job, more or less, but you're not happy with it. An enterprising person puts together a prototype of a possible successor. Unless a miracle has occurred, the prototype will only be able to do a tiny fraction of the things that the established system can do, if indeed it can do anything. (There's this well-known software engineer's joke: "Apart from the fact that it doesn't work, what do you think?") None the less, people do sometimes look at a shaky software prototype, and decide that they're going to try to build it up to the point where it can replace the established system. Why? Well, I think Feyerabend has a point. It's a combination of an attractive dream (perhaps some design principle that impresses people with its cleanness and elegance), and persuasive marketing on the part of the people championing it. Perhaps major scientific theories get started in the same way. It's not as logical a story as you'd like it to be, but it could well be true.

Another large part of the book is about theories and data. This time, the official picture is that they are quite different kinds of animal. You have the uncontested data. You make up theories, and see how well they fit that data. The theories change, but the data stays the same. Again, Feyerabend says that this is a fairy story. He argues that, in general, you can't cleanly separate data from theories. A lot of the data only makes sense in the context of theories, which may be extremely elaborate. Once you bring in a new theory, you see the data in a different way, and it may be difficult even to reconstruct how you originally thought of it. Feyerabend discusses an argument which was widely held to refute Galileo's claim that the Earth moved. You drop a stone from a high tower; if the Earth were moving quickly though space, the stone would land hundreds of metres from the base of the tower, which it plainly doesn't. The fallacy in the argument is that the stone was already moving in the same direction as the tower when it was dropped, so it will continue to move along with it. This is obvious once you have a theoretical framework which includes the concepts of inertia and relative motion. But people before Galileo didn't have these concepts, and it requires an effort of will even to try and imagine a world-view that lacks them. We can't truly reconstruct the original data.

Another interesting segment contrasts the archaic Greek world-view, which lies behind Homer's works, with the classical world-view of Plato and Aristotle. Feyerabend, in arguments which I found startlingly reminiscent of Julian Jaynes in The Evolution of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, claims that the archaic Greek view of consciousness was fundamentally different from the classical one. In particular, the distinction between "being" and "appearing", which we now take for granted, was weaker, and may not have existed at all. Like a lot of the book, it's speculative, but thought-provoking. Again, I looked for parallels in my own experience. I've wasted a dismaying part of my life playing various games, and have reached a reasonably high level at several of them, in particular Chess and Go. As you get better at a game of this kind, there are several points where you reconceptualize your mental picture. You realize that you were looking at it in completely the wrong way, and that there's a much better one available. For example, there's a point in your Go development where you suddenly see that you shouldn't think of stones so much as enclosing territory, but rather as exerting influence. After you've made a shift of this kind, it's very hard to recapture your original way of seeing the game. Perhaps it feels a bit like that to experience a major paradigm shift in science.

In general, Feyerabend's arguments are directed towards undermining the idea that science, and reason in general, have a privileged position in the scheme of things. He claims that science, where it succeeds, often does so precisely because it isn't rational, and only claims to have been rational when it turns out later to have been right. Another case of history being written by the victors, in fact, and Feyerabend frequently says how dangerous it is to divorce the philosophy of science from its history. To him, they are both part of the same thing. He also reminds you how often the language of rationality is used to justify arguments which really derive from use of coercive force: might makes right. As he points out, science is far from exempt. Scientists are usually at the mercy of whoever it is that controls their funding. It takes courage to pursue unfashionable research directions, even though the danger of actually being burned at the stake is less acute than it used to be. This stuff resonated with my own experience.

I'm in danger of giving the impression that I loved everything about the book, so let me correct that now. There were plenty of things I didn't like at all. I hated his arguments that it's sometimes good for science to be controlled by the State, which were largely based on Mao's revival of traditional Chinese medicine. I was appalled at his opportunism in appearing as a witness when Cardinal Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI) reopened the Galileo case: Feyerabend's claims that the Church had arguably been right came in very handy. Sometimes he came across as boastful or whiny or slightly mad - assuming, of course, that he isn't feigning madness, Hamlet-style, to show up the weaknesses in the King's position. But even if he can be infuriating and obscure, he writes well, and he's funny. I love the way he juxtaposes incongruous elements to jolt you out of your established thought-patterns. I think my favourites were "science and prostitution" and "quantum mechanics and Nubian sand divining" - no, I'd never heard of it either.

I could go on longer - it's a rambling book that prompts a rambling review - but I'd better wrap up. Here are two thoughts that I keep returning to. First, given that the official story is a rather threadbare myth, what do scientists really do? Why hasn't more been written on the sociology of science? I thought this was an excellent question. And second, it's inspirational to see someone who's perfectly capable of working within the system, but who chooses not to and still succeeds brilliantly. Last night, I saw The Mask of Zorro on TV: it's one of my favourite films. I suddenly saw the author of Against Method as a sort of intellectual equivalent of Zorro, sword in hand, cape fluttering in the wind, a smile on his masked face, brazenly romancing the lovely Catherine Zeta-Jones. One of the book's many unanswered questions: what exactly was the nature of his relationship with Elizabeth Anscombe?

Viva Feyerabend! You were a worthy adversary to the positivists, and they won't forget you in a hurry. Now where is Young Zorro?

[Philipp · Rating 4 out of 5]

This took forever to read, not because the contents were boring, but because most of it went way over my head. Sometimes, entire pages seem to have been machine-translated from German, to which Feyerabend added Greek and Latin quotes, and cites ten different philosophers and forgotten authors to make the confusion complete. I had to look up quite a few English words (incommensurable, counter-inductive, etc.). But then suddenly, the next 5 pages are crystal clear and genius!

To summarize his points: Scientific conduct and progress is much more chaotic and "law-less" than proponents and practitioners of science realize. He makes his point by showing how Galileo didn't win Europe over to Copernicanism by showing a theory that explained reality "better" (as one would assume), Galileo won everyone over by inventing a few tools, hiding a few inconvenient datapoints, being a good propagandist, and a lot of trickery.

For me as a scientist reading Against Method is freeing. There is a break in between how we do science and how we present it to the public - for example, the structure of a scientific publiction has absolutely nothing to do with how the actual results were obtained. In my case with bioinformatics, I start to play around with data, and walk down 500 paths of which 499 don't work. I get some interesting results, and try to make sense of them by looking through the literature, and I finally find some biological phenomenon that might fit. Using that phenomenon as a start, I think how I can prove or disprove it - find one way to prove it - and write the paper. This has nothing to do with the scientific method of hypothesis -> prediction -> testing with data, yet the publication I write follows this structure (I also do not list the 499 things I tried, thereby "inventing" a story that is cleaner than reality). PHDComics had this fitting comic a few years ago.

Feyerabend correctly sees that stringent application of the "rules" of science would make science impossible. For example, if falsification were to be applied stringently we simply couldn't have bioinformatics. Play around with one of the settings in your genome assembler, and you get a slightly different genome - which one is the correct one? If I computationally predict genes in a genome, I get around 400,000 genes. Which ones do really exist?

There are surely ways to falsify this, but the technology does not exist (or it's a tedious, expensive and literally life-consuming work). As long as the technology does not exist, we proceed and publish: "anything goes". This makes science much more a field of play than people realize. Schools do not teach this: according to what I learned in high school about science, I should be much more stuffy and strict. Yet a large part of my work is playing around in an R console, looking for fun things, making pretty pictures, and drinking free coffee.

Where I don't agree with Feyerabend in the slightest is his demand to split science from politics - I can understand where he's coming from, I guess up until the 80s the results of science where set in stone. What the scientist said was "true", to the detriment of science itself; Feyerabend says that there are other systems alternative to science that are as good as, or even "better" than "Western science" - he makes the case for traditional Chinese science & medicine, which by now is known to be mostly Placebo effect. I can't agree with him at all. The split of science and politics has (partially?) caused the mess we're in now.

Maybe by now, statistics has done the job Feyerabend wanted other systems to do. The introduction of rigid tests, the spreading awareness of problems like the multiple comparisons problem, too small sample sizes and more, the availability of online anonymous comments etc., has helped to "dethrone" scientific results.

I also can understand why scientists rarely read philosopy of science. Large parts of this book serve as counter-arguments to Popper and Lakatos, I rarely understood anything there, since I've read very little philosophy of science.. Plus I, like most scientists, don't understand Latin or Greek.

Recommended for: Practitioners and "fans" of science, it's eye-opening.

[knig · Rating 4 out of 5]

Feyerabend, Kuhn and Edward de Bono published within short intervals of each other circa 1970s, with practically indistinguishable platforms. I find this co-occurrence not insignificant, and ironical given the premise of their ‘new philosophy’. Ironical, in that their call for a variant of ‘anarchistic’ epistemology, by virtue of arriving simultaneously, implies reliance on sequential, table-top deduction (the very methodology they are trying to discredit).

The idea is to discredit empirical methodology as means of progress, call for multi-disciplinary unification and to a certain extent accommodate mutually exclusive concepts within the paradigm of discovery/invention. That this has merit is indisputable: most serious inventions in the 20c are a product not of ‘top table’ (de bono) rationalism, but accidental and even irrational stray into alternative paradigms. How then, are we to harness this understanding of the non linear nature of progress to any purpose?

Fayerabend proposes anarchistic epistemology: an unfortunate coinage of terminology, more so for the negative associated connotations with that term than anything else. As existing methodologies are predicated on falsified facts (agreed) , scientists must take a step back and re-examine and re-construct the so called building blocks of theorems in order to arrive at a new experience of reality, even if recontextualizing methodological qualia means introducing irrational alternatives. De Bono has more success with this platform since his primary audience seems to be the business world: the task there is infinitely more tangible than science, where even he thought of such an undertaking can make one break out into a cold sweat. Which facts, exactly are we meant to discard? And which to keep? How many irrational hypothesis are to be accommodated, numbers please, in this quest for anarchistic epistemological solutions? Feyerabend acknowledges that science doesn’t develop as a pro bono exercise: sponsors (the state, companies, etc) have to fund these follies. Which chimera do you fund with the hope of making, say, teleportation a reality? Funding aside, how does one come up with these irrational ideas in the first place? Feyerabend is silent on this subject. De Bono tries much, much harder, but even his findings do not validate an approach or method of being creative/innovative: at best, he comes up with a few ideas/methods of preventing the being of non-creative: which is a very different thing altogether.

However, in as much as scientific progress has been the product of non-linear sidestep rather than top bottom ‘leaps’, then even without the learned triple axis’s postulations, this ‘anarchistic’ epistemology is already naturally occurring. It is erroneous in fact to consider taking any steps back whatsoever to re-evaluate scientific facts: they already carry a ‘full’ value with the errors embedded in them. In essence, they are accredited failures. Why should I discount them so I can start making the same mistakes again through trial and error? It seems to me, (although I am no scientist), that once a plethora of non theory compliant data and facts accumulate, a tipping point is reached when the brain can no longer justify falsification and paradigm shifts occur. Is it a coincidence, then, that Feyerabend, Kuhn, and De Bono are flogging the same horse at the same time? Why did no one have this eureka moment one hundred years ago? Because the facts didn’t exist then. I’ve often thought of the uncanny coincidence that most significant discoveries do not spring up as Lone Rangers on the scene : there are always any number of competing scientists hovering in the background, fully engaged in the race, but just didn’t make it first past the post. I personally can not discount a sequential as well as a tangential element in scientific quest.

[Christopher · Rating 5 out of 5]

Reading Feyerabend was recommended to me because somebody who has heard me criticize the way "Science" (with a capital S) claims to be, one system, objective and free of cultural bias, as well as saying it can set standards for ethics and political thought, said I pretty much have the same view as Feyerabend about how the way science interacts with the current society is totally fucked. This person was right and so is Feyerabend, though I don't agree with him on everything.

A lot of my thought on this has come from how debates about science and religion have been going of late. Feyerabend argues that a lot of the stuff that religion is so good at illuminating are things that science has nothing to say about and if it did try to invade these domains we would be worse off for it. I've been screaming this for years, despite not being a religious person. When Sam Harris refers to religions as "failed sciences" this not only shows an alarming ignorance of what religion is, but an alarming ignorance of what science is. Science, Sam Harris seems to believe, is the only system that produces knowledge. The fact so many people believe this is more frightening to me than Donald Trump being president, and I'm pretty frightened by that.

Feyerabend takes a cue from Kuhn about how science progresses. Kuhn claimed that there are periods of "normal science" that are upset by revolutionary shifts. When a new paradigm takes over, we go back to "normal science" until a new paradigm shows up in the form of another revolution. Feyerabend explains how this actually happened and his claim is that the idea that science is this rational enterprise that gives us more and more a view of objective reality is false. According to Feyerabend, scientists behave more like artists when they create a revolution and behave counter-inductively. They start to wonder that if everything we know might be wrong and only by messing around do they begin to come up with a revolutionary theory.

I think this is true in science, and especially true of physics. I see it less in biology, the scientific field I studied, but it is hard to look at the history of physics and not get what Feyerabend is talking about. Most people who argue against him make appeals to his arguments helping "the enemies of science," which is the kind of argument that pretty much proves Feyerabend's point in the first place.

[Andrew]

I read Feyerabend because I know he's a critical figure in the philosophy of science, not because I expected to agree with anything he said. But not only does he make a fair number of persuasive points, he does so in a remarkably clear, straightforward style.

Some points I happen to agree with... First, there is no one scientific method, but rather a multiplicity of methods preferred by multiple disciplines. And that a lot of science is simply grasping in the dark.

Where I happen to disagree is when he takes this to its logical extreme. Namely, when he states that there is no one scientific method, and therefore there is no scientific method-- it's a little more complex than that. Similarly, his claims about the lack of use-value for science are honestly a bit of a cop-out.

While his analyses of science are fairly lucid, despite my disagreements, the problem arises when he tries to put forth positive solutions. Feyerabend's line of thought seems to be that if "anything goes" (as he glibly puts it) in science, science has no special claims to knowledge and that other ways of knowing should be respected. I would claim that this argument is self-defeating because if anything goes in science, anything can be construed as science and therefore no line can be drawn between science and not-science.

In addition, his claims that society must be "protected from" science are largely bolstered by Mao's program of replacing Western medicine with traditional Chinese medicine. Did that really work? Arguments like this-- many fiercely anti-hierarchical New Left arguments, for that matter, fall into this same category-- were well and good in the days of massive state-sponsored research by both the Americans and the Soviets. But in an era where workers' rights have been massively eviscerated, scientific research grotesquely corporatized, and in which a radically anti-rational American right has used its influence to prevent environmental justice and declare unilateral war in the Middle East, the argument that science fails to serve society just doesn't stand.

Oh my! That was a long review with a lot of anger. But I have great respect for Feyerabend as a thinker and researcher, and reading him is a bit like having a good intellectual sparring partner. I honestly would read more by him.

[Coop · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book attacks the scientific method by using Galileo's promotion of heliocentrism as a reductio. If that piques your interest, you should read it. The historical particulars can be really hard to follow in this text though, so it's a good idea to take notes. I recommend it for fans of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michael Polanyi, and Hannah Arendt.

Feyerabend argues that the scientific method is an inadequate and even stultifying rule, because it demands that new theories be supported by facts. Feyerabend believes that facts are intersubjective, defined by human acts of perception (just as a measurement is defined by the tool used to gather data). The example that he explores throughout the book is the Copernican Revolution. In order to convince the world that the Earth moves, Galileo had to contend with both scientific fact and natural interpretations of everyday sense perceptions. The moon seems to walk along the street with you. Venus doesn't get any bigger throughout its cycle, despite Copernicus' predictions. Elites and astronomers agreed that Galileo's telescope seemed to work perfectly on terrestrial objects but very poorly on celestial ones.

Feyerabend argues that Galileo had to use "counterinduction" to support his theory. He formulated a theory that contradicted contemporary facts. He built a new way of perceiving the world (without having a great understanding of optics) that changed the facts. And he used propagandist/sophist tactics to root his arguments in common sense. Thus, Feyerabend claims, scientists in general must create theories that blatantly contradict fact in order to advance scientific knowledge.

The really meaty philosophy starts late in the book, in Chapter 16. Here he clears the slate and deliberately gives the reader a picture of why facts are intersubjective. First he shows a Wittgensteinian insight: that our perception of the world involves resolving seeming contradictions, like an optical illusion (Wittgenstein's classic example is a drawing that can be seen as either a duck or a rabbit.) These resolutions leave us with an "after-image" that offers a chance to see the thing differently [This passage is particularly difficult so I'm not sure I'm interpreting this correctly. But the author's reference to a change of basis in the mathematical sense seems to support my interpretation]. I believe Feyerabend is referring to paradigm shifts that, once seen, "cannot be unseen".

Other examples he gives in Chapter 16 come from archaic visual art and poetry. In Stone Age and Egyptian art, one might see 6 men posed in a way that resembles bookkeeping rather than storytelling. One of the men smiles with his eyes open, but he is turned 90 degrees to indicate that he is dead. Likewise, in Homer's Iliad, epithets are analytic aspects of the characters, so "sweetly laughing" Aphrodite is tearfully complaining, and "swift-footed" Achilles is sitting in discussion. These forms of representation indicate not a lack of skill, but a deliberate repeated choice that emanates from one's worldview. Feyerabend (while thankfully rejecting the strong "Whorf hypothesis") argues that different worldviews are composed of different facts, which leads to incommensurability (theories that contradict despite being internally consistent). He even goes so far as to say that newer worldviews can express facts from previous ones, but the reverse is not true. That seems trivially true in the case of differing Hellenic worldviews in the book. But taking it as a general fact also strikes me as weirdly non-relativistic for him, and I'm not sure why he comes to that conclusion.

While reading this book I made my best presentation of its contents to some physicists and engineers I know. It was honestly hard to tell what part of it upset them. It could be they haven't grokked the Gödel/Wittgenstein Eldritch Truth yet, or maybe Feyerabend's thesis just seems too dangerous to promote. One really good criticism arose that I couldn't answer: Why did Galileo come to believe in heliocentrism in the first place? This is hinted at in the text somewhere that I unfortunately cannot locate. But it probably deserved its own chapter.

In any case, I feel a little bit crazier for having read this book, and I look forward to revisiting it after I have more experience.

[Alex Lee · Rating 5 out of 5]

Feyerabend writes a difficult book here, but one which is necessary. Taking a radically different perspective on the aesthetics of what theory is, Feyerabend attack one of the scared cows of science and mathematics -- that of consistency.

In some ways, Feyerabend could have raised objections more metaphysically -- that ideas have at their germination roots outside of a given domain -- that culture plays a role in utilizing domains in one area to influence another -- that science is a socially generated practice, on that mistakes methodology for reality -- but in other ways, Feyerabend does well by sticking very close to his topic. His use of Galileo as an example is of interest, since he returns to it often but it is in his later chapters that his critique really stands out.

Basically Feyerabend shows us that knowledge is always procedural. Knowledge and theory are generated through processes of agency. By attempting to manipulate or influence a specific phenomenon, we generate procedures to gain access to that phenomenon. This requires that we calibrate our actions to an appropriate cut. Nonetheless, any cut we calibrate to is simultaneously a distortion of the very object of study, because it casts it in a certain relationship. Thus

Expressing it differently, we may say that the assumption of a single coherent world-view that underlies all of science is either a metaphysical hypothesis trying to anticipate a future unity, or a pedagogical fake; or it is an attempt to show, by a judicious up-and downgrading of disciplines, that a synthesis has already been achieved. This is how fans of uniformity proceeded in the past (cf. Plato's lists of subjects in Chapter vii of his Republic), these are the ways that are still being used today. A more realistic account, however, would be that '[t]here is no simple "scientific" map of reality--or if there were, it would be much too complicated and unwieldy to be grasped or used by anyone. But there are many different maps of reality, from a variety of scientific viewpoints'

One should be quick to realize that Feyerabend is not against science at all; in fact he encourages it in his "irresponible" and "anarchist" ways. What Feyerabend is objecting to is the imagined consistency/consensus of science, a "sacred cow" of science all the more because science doesn't need such a "petit object a" in order to function. One of the underlying criticisms that Feyerabend levels is that all social institutions (including science) are in fact first and foremost, social institutions. We understand this to be even more true when we realize that the academic/scientific community often operates as a ranking system more than as a theory generating procedure; that grants and individuals are awarded more for position than they are for work. That the entire procedure of science is one of self promotion (through the modality of whatever science they are using) more than anything else.

In some ways, Feyerabend does well to criticize past methods in order to highlight inconsistencies in how they are aestheticized and presented. But this of course, will stop no one, because past procedures are in the past. After all, aren't we better now?

I cannot stop praising his book, because there is so much in here. I appreciate the clarity and freshness with which Feyeraband approaches this topic. On a more abstract level, one that I think Feyerabend would appreciate, is that we should approach all polemics and theories understanding that they are generated through the auspices of their own consistency and meaning. We often reject theories and ideas just like we reject people -- they either don't make the cut due to some personal inclination, or they are competitors for the same social capital. Often, these are the same thing. I whole heartedly agree with Feyerabend. With the lack of any "true" authority, one that "naturally" supersedes whatever authority we could imagine here on Earth (as there is none like that), we ought to utilize any theory that allows us to increase our agency. Should we not desire any particular agency, we should embrace any idea for what it is worth, at the time that we need it. Of course, some ideas will become undecideable should the foundation for that idea be incommensurable with our own foundation. But that is not a fault of that idea. This is merely the fault of our own localization. Sometimes, a question simply isn't available from a given point of view because its context is not available.

This is of course, in a big way, where Kant's Critique of Pure Reason steps in, and it is at this point that Feyerabend stops short. He doesn't wish to get into the logistics of what is reasonable. He only wishes that we set ourselves free of the chains by which we adhere to an image of what good science ought to look like so that we can do better science. And for that, I find that there is a resonance with martial arts, or with music or any other technicality/agency. We must learn the basics to define what the modality is. From that point on, mastery begins when we start to release ourselves from technique in order to be more appropriate to whatever situation we find ourselves in, simply because technique is a pedagogical tool, and its rigid organization will make certain acts impossible because they are incommensurable with that technique.

Ultimately, consistency is how we make sense of a localization for the purposes of ordinance (organization). We must never mistake the map for the territory since the territory is always changing as our desires/designs and agential relations change -- so we too change.

[Oliver Wood · Rating 1 out of 5]

Feyerabend spends nearly half a book on Galileo and his astronomical observations as a paradigmatic example of how science is in fact anarchic rather than methodical. The trouble is, compared to more modern discoveries like DNA, we don't actually know that much about Galileo when it comes to his celestial deductions. Given the thesis, it would have made more sense to focus on half a dozen discoveries from the c20th. Not only would this have built a much more comprehensive (hence: firmer) case, it would have made Feyerabend's task much easier - this is where most of the sociological data lies.

By the time we leave Galileo and his telescope (which, contra to Feyerabend's claim on p.78, was not invented by Galileo) the main argument gives way to broad metaphysical issues which don't really impinge on the master-thesis, and then there's quite a lot of stuff about Aristotelian logic. Since it can be observed that all human projects deviate from their own rules, making it up as unforeseen obstacles emerge, there isn't actually anything contentious at all about Feyerabend's thesis. What is debatable is to what extent rules can be broken, and how often this actually occurs, but no where are these issues resolved.

What Feyerabend has done is similar to what many philosophers do when presented with writing a book: throw into 300 pages every paper he's ever published about a given topic hoping it will all add up to a coherent master-thesis. To help sign-post what's significant and what isn't along the way, the author has also relied heavily on italics, but this doesn't really work either – if it isn't obvious what's relevant and what isn't by the content itself, then what's been produced just needs rewriting.

[Ben · Rating 4 out of 5]

Relativist polemic against scientific monopolies. Feyerabend is a physicist and astronomer as well as a philosopher by training. His anti-positivist arguments are made with care and humor. Using Galileo as a case study, he demonstrates that so-called scientific revolutions also invariably break with pre-given logical structures, such that the scientific method is violated as a matter of course, and re-written each time. As a consequence, propagandists (like Galileo) fare very well. Propagandists are, in fact, necessary for scientific progress.

As a conclusion, he suggests that there should be a separation between state and science, as between state and religion. My only beef is that he assumes that ideas are politically neutral, or that all ideas are equally non-neutral, which I think ignores their motivations. In that sense I'm not entirely ready to accept his program of "scientific anarchy," but his points on method are well taken nevertheless, and he's 100% right about the messy, social world of scientific discovery.

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 4 out of 5]

Paul Feyerabend examined the history of science, and was led to deny that science is genuinely a methodological process.

In his 1975 book Against Method he argued that no description of scientific method could possibly be broad enough to include all the approaches and methods used by scientists, and that there are no useful and exception-free methodological rules governing the progress of science.

In essence, he said that for any specific method or norm of science, one can find a historic episode where violating it has contributed to the progress of science.

He jokingly suggested that, if believers in the scientific method wish to express a single universally valid rule, it should be 'anything goes'.

As has been argued before him however, this is uneconomic; problem solvers, and researchers are to be prudent with their resources during their inquiry.

A more general inference against formalised method has been found through research involving interviews with scientists regarding their conception of method.

This research indicated that scientists frequently encounter difficulty in determining whether the available evidence supports their hypotheses.

This reveals that there are no straightforward mappings between overarching methodological concepts and precise strategies to direct the conduct of research.

...........
...........

I'll simplify all that that
There really isn't much of a method

............
............

down to the essence

did an experiment show some idea was garbage?

okay that's it
lets go home

............

Ask good questions

See what works
See what doesn't work


Thus Einstein was a great man for showing that his hypothesis that hitting flamingos with a crowbar causes thunderstorms......

......was wrong

[William Bies · Rating 2 out of 5]

To a certain widespread albeit superficial mind-set, anarchy can be very attractive. This will be so especially for free-wheeling spirits discontent with the settled way things are. Indeed, often enough faulty and stale customs will have crept in and the stasis cries out to be overturned, radically if need be—an observation that holds not only in cultural affairs of political economy or religion or literature but also in the intellectual world of established science, what forms the legitimate basis of Paul Feyerabend’s concern in his ambitious manifesto, Against Method (first published 1975, third edition 1993). Such realities of the human condition one must keep firmly in mind when approaching this classical statement of an anarchist theory of knowledge.

Rather than paraphrase, let us adduce the two foundation stones of Feyerabend’s anarchist standpoint via a pair of succinct quotations:

This is shown both by an examination of historical episodes and by an abstract analysis of the relation between idea and action. The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes. [p. 14]

For example, we may use hypotheses that contradict well-confirmed theories and/or well-established experimental results. We may advance science by proceeding counterinductively. [p. 20]

What can we, or anyone committed to the reasonability of science, rejoin? In our judgment, anything goes is but a prescription for mediocrity (more on this below in this review). Counterinduction unfortunately resembles too closely the random guessing in the dark we have today which is largely responsible for the lack of progress in fundamental physics witnessed by recent decades. For, counterinduction needs to be informed by a critical awareness of the state of the art and of where and why it falls short if one’s thesis is to have any probability of being productive. The quantum physicist Wolfgang Pauli’s ‘not even wrong’ dictum applies here.

Is [pp. 24-33] proliferation of theories beneficial? Yes, in principle, but one also has to weight them by their inherent plausibility and discard them when they fail to show promise (cf. what André-Marie Ampère does in honing down a welter of theoretical possibilities so as to fasten upon the true law of electrodynamics; for an excellent treatment of this celebrated episode by a good historian of science, see Friedrich Steinle, Exploratory Experiments: Ampère, Faraday and the Origins of Electrodynamics (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016), our review here). So perhaps in theory if one had unlimited resources and time one could afford to explore every possible pathway but in practice one is limited and has to employ a critical judgment as to where to devote one’s energies. Usually one has a guiding intuition that needs to be schooled. If one refuses to set aside one’s initial conception after it runs up against either an irremediable theoretical flaw or an experimental disproof, one winds up being a crank. Great scientists are those whose initial idea happens to alight upon what is called for in the historical moment. But observe i) they always have to refine it until eventually finding its proper place of application; ii) as part of the process of self-education, it means growing out of childish notions that won’t work, hence unremitting self-critique. For a humble illustration, consider what it takes to solve a homework problem as an undergraduate. This reviewer recalls one very instructive occasion when, attempting a problem in Courant and John’s textbook on the calculus, he spent hours trying to prove something that wasn’t true (continuity of a function in two variables separately implies its continuity). He was able to solve the original problem only when he realized that the approach he was following was entirely mistaken, after all, and had to be abandoned. As a better example from the history of real analysis in the twentieth century, Nikolai Lusin in the 1920’s raised the question of almost everywhere convergence of Fourier series for continuous functions. Subsequently, Lennart Carleson proved in 1966 the spectacular result that the Fourier series of a square-integrable function converges almost everywhere—but what is often overlooked, he started out trying to show the opposite! So conversion of one’s intellectual point of view can indeed occur if one be willing to face squarely a lack of success, or what makes for the distinguishing mark of erudition (as in the popular saying, an expert is someone who has made every possible mistake in his field). Feyerabend’s anarchist viewpoint is simply unrealistic since unwilling to acknowledge the existence and necessity of an objective standard.

Let us address the example of Aristotle and Galileo [pp. 54-77]: is Feyerabend missing something? Galileo didn’t just have a new idea of inertial motion, he demonstrated it by a new methodology (isolate the relevant degrees of freedom, idealize the problem, obtain a mathematical solution in the idealized case, apply to the real world, verify experimentally). In other words, the approach most apt to lead to solution of a problem is analysis followed by synthesis. Feyerabend neglects the role of synthesis, in which deductive reason functions as a necessary counterpart to the inductive reason of the analytical stage; his inept picture is one of a stroke of genius that just happens to be right, and moreover does not have to be shown to be so!

Now, Feyerabend wants to abolish the tired distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification [pp. 147-159]. Anyone can grant that Karl Popper seems a rather dull rationalist, and calling his position ‘critical’ adds little or nothing (see our review of Popper’s Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), here). Yet, beyond questioning what was always a somewhat artificial distinction by philosophers of science in the first place, Feyerabend’s design aims at a greater prey to quarry. The header to chapter eleven reads:

Such ‘irrational’ methods of support are needed because of the ‘uneven development’ (Marx, Lenin) of different parts of science. Copernicanism and other essential ingredients of modern science survived only because reason was frequently overruled in their past. [p. 106]

Anyone conversant with current historiography will agree that a scientific discovery cannot adequately be understood solely ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ but has to be judged in the light of contemporary views of the participants in the debate leading up to its eventual acceptance. Innumerable studies by historians of science have taken this historicist methodological dictum to heart and contributed greatly to the elucidation of intellectual history; if anything, they could be accused of going too far in the direction of a strict historicism. Yet sensitivity to conceptual development and historical context amounts to far from the same thing as Feyerabend’s contention here to the effect that the sole factor behind the transmission or modification of received knowledge comes down to nothing but propaganda.

To evaluate such a sensational claim, note merely that it equates reason with blind adherence to a rule but one should recognize (with Kant) that the faculty of judgment brings the particular under the general, subject to spontaneity (hence admitting the possibility of reform). Also Bernhard Riemann’s natural philosophy develops a similar perspective (see his inaugural lecture of 1854, reviewed by us here).

For sensibility is the faculty of intuition while the understanding is the intellective faculty, which
operates with concepts. Here, the conceptual function resides in ‘die Einheit der Handlung, verschiedene Vorstellungen unter einer gemeinschaftlichen zu ordnen’ (KrV B93), but spontaneity, or the ability to generate representations themselves, falls into two headings, viz., invention (Begriffsbildung) and judgment in particular cases (Urteil). For Kant, however, the functions of the intellect seem to be fixed for all time and he does not allow the possibility of feedback between judgment and invention. Thus, space as the form of outer intuition will forever remain Euclidean, whereas we, who seek to integrate spontaneity with poetic reflection, as intellective and hence active not passive, allow that through the formation of a novel and more adequate concept of space our very receptivity of the objects of outer intuition could be modified towards what is the goal of the understanding, namely the ordering and synthesis of the manifold of sensibility in experience. In other words, even though presented with the same sensible figure, we may now intuit more knowledge from it than before by means of an altered schema which connects the image in space and time to the categories (KrV B176-187), hence among other things one could perceive an instance of causation where he would not have before—it bears remembering that every representation has a host of implicit judgments built into it and it is evident that an understanding schooled by poetic reflection should be able to draw forth from the manifold of sensibility a greater degree of order in experience of what are, after all, the same data.

Feyerabend, on the other hand, has no concept of Begriffsbildung; i.e., he thinks we just snatch our concepts whole-cloth out of the air, as it were, rather than construct them (an exercise of reason). This is what his irrationalism means in practice, an inability to appreciate how reason actually functions. Regrettably, moreover, he has no sense whatever of correctness in an intellectual or poetic endeavor. For genius lies not in ignoring the rules of art indiscriminately but in attaining a sublime mastery over them, so that one can know how to prescribe a new rule that will prove to be fruitful.

To close, let us attempt a balanced assessment:

1) To do justice to his critiques of rationalism: after all, rationalists of every age do tend to be unimaginative and rule-bound. For instance, the early German Romantics Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel understood very well the deficiencies of foundationalism as exemplified in their day by Fichte, is there anything worthwhile that Feyerabend has to add? Not much, in that to recognize the deficiency of rationalism is not in itself the same thing as to know how to criticize it effectively, i.e., to show how to overcome it. For to be productive, thought has to be deployed intelligently, what Feyerabend fails to appreciate. A sketch of the stages of problem solving will indicate why: first, there has to be an acknowledgment that the problem exists and stands in need of solution. The second task is to understand the problem in its own terms and then to brainstorm. Having reached a few trial solutions (by whatever means), one has to evaluate the trials, and reject those that fall short until one hits upon a promising approach. The latter once found, one has to follow it up and confirm that it is indeed a solution of the problem at hand. Thus, in these terms Feyerabend doesn’t really get anywhere beyond the brainstorming stage and so cannot be our guide if we want to bring the process to completion.

2) It is well to peruse Against Method to sharpen one’s eye for what constitutes proper method, for it is indeed true that the exercise of reason in its highest sense does go beyond a childish attachment to a given received idea. So our firebrand latches onto something at least even if he himself can’t articulate what he should want to say. Still, two stars for its inflammatory rhetoric and lack of discernment. Feyerabend purveys the cheap but empty pleasure of believing whatever one wishes to, without regard to objective truth.

[Marcel Santos · Rating 4 out of 5]

Can chaos and anarchy produce anything useful and contribute to the advancement of knowledge and the society?

In a world where rationalism, a product of the Enlightenment, lies at the heart (or better yet, the brain) of Western civilization's thought and values elevating science as the bastion of progress, Paul Feyerabend’s “Against Method” could easily be read as an insult. Or even be dismissed and ridiculed as a juvenile philosophical delirium with no real purpose — nothing short of an inconsequential provocation against the status quo.

One cannot accuse him of intelectual dishonesty, though. The author is candid and explicit in laying bare his motivations and Weltanschauung (worldview).

Feyerabend is the most famous exponent of so-called Epistemological Anarchy or Methodological Pluralism. His fierce criticism of rationalism in science methodology — especially the one supported by the likes of its supreme leader Karl Popper — seems a genuine product of his time.

Western culture in the 1960s and 1970s was undergoing a moment of heavy questioning of conservativeness in society represented by corporations and governments in the eyes of the countercultural movements demanding peace after so many wars. The “age of the Aquarius” generation was in search for “alternative” ways of life and thinking, including a romantic and certainly naive — and cosmetically distant — welcoming of cultures from parts of the world thus far considered peripheral and underdeveloped like the Asian (especially Indian) and South American. All of this, of course, from the comfort of their homes and while benefiting from all the achievements of Western civilization, by the way. Despite its now naive and even somewhat corny image and manners, the movement without a doubt influenced the Western culture from arts to philosophy.

Feyerabend’s views expressed in this book is a product of that time. At the beginning and the end of the book, he explicitly mentions his sympathy for the knowledges of the so-called “peripheral cultures” then considered delayed by Western civilization. He narrates his experience teaching Philosophy at the University of California at Berkley to Mexicans, blacks and American Indians recently admitted in US Universities due to new laws welcoming students from multiple origins as an influence for his way of thinking.

Another important influence he acknowledges comes from his artistic background — in this case precedent to his countercultural, “peace and love” phase. Before World War II — in which as an Austrian he fought and got wounded — Feyerabend had voice lessons and also almost got a part in Brecht’s theatrical group as assistant producer.

The result is rather intriguing and instigating. “Against Method” is a fierce attack on rationalism in science. One of his preferred theories to demolish is Popper’s falseasionism. He sees no single patterns in scientific development and defends methodological pluralism.

As his perfect antipode (and friend) Imre Lakatos recognizes in his “The methodology of scientific research programmes” (see my review here: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...), Feyerabend’s views of science are among those more difficult to counter-argue. Lakatos’s way of explaining science is probably amongst the most sophisticated theories of science methodology. No one after Popper could better defend a more precise, rational and well defined method of science than Lakatos, who reconciled Kuhn’s and Popper’s theories.

In fact, both Lakatos and Feyerabend agreed on writing a book together in which the former would defend the method and the latter would advocate against the method. They couldn’t finish it as Lakatos died, so Feyerabend wound up writing his part alone, which became this book.

Feyerabend added different pieces he wrote in different times together with the main book in its 1993 edition - which is the one I read. The result is a strongly varied reading experience. There is sobriety and the characteristically dry, sometimes even tedious, language of philosophy throughout much of the book, but elsewhere the reader encounters emotional, lucid, and autobiographical narratives. It is not possible to leave Chapter 16 unnoticed, for example, when the author suddenly launches into a long dissertation on incommensurability, seeking probably unnecessarily the profound sociological, historical and artistic roots of it. The point relates to the irreconcilable concepts and even languages used by different scientific theories. There is simply no need for that long digression in the middle of the book. The author could have left it for an article and shortened it in the book to better connect with the rest.

All that said, Feyerabend’s got a point - and a very serious one in my opinion. For him, there is simply no single rational method in science. To the contrary, science is the product of different methods and cannot be standardized. The attempts to frame science methodology as a single phenomenon is simply incorrect — it is reductive and inconsistent with real science. If extremely rigorous rational thought was really applicable, science would have never produced anything — it would have been killed at birth.

As a human activity, science is inseparable from human features in all its good and evil. Emotions, biases, and prejudices are part of scientific activity. Talent, creativity and corruption contribute to its development — and he provides convincing examples of it. Among other cases, Feyerabend throughly investigates Galileo Galilei’s process of discovery to point out his series of deviations from consistent criticism and his propagandistic vain.

Feyerabend’s point of view is no doubt grounded and puts one seriously to think. As any bold provocation, though, his focused dismantling of the rational method against all arguments makes his critique also subject to sustainable criticism. The most polemic idea he defends is certainly that “anything goes” when it comes to scientific method. This expresses his commented admiration and openness to knowledges produced by other peoples and cultures (he explicitly mentions voodoo, for instance). The problem with such a vast criticism of rationalism is that it opens the door to all kinds of craziness in science which is often not welcome.

Feyerabend’s relativism could easily be seen as right and wrong at the same time. His theory seems well grounded in identifying how human rationality and also imperfection in fact made science advance in History.

In the realistic, “positive” level, it is certainly possible to identify flaws in scientific process with the knowledge we have today, as he did in Galileo’s case. His argument that there is no such fixed pattern in science activity is indeed compelling.

Though this is just one part of the question. The problem seems to lie on the “prescriptive” level of it. The actual historical mess in method does not eliminate the fact that another essential feature of human nature — and in relation to science probably its main driving force — is the willingness to understand, to get things right, and obtain certainty and improve life conditions to ourselves and to other human beings — what includes other human passions as extremely opposite as greed and compassion in the process.

Even if certainty has always been among the most profound problems in philosophy — with maybe the unanimous sentencing that it is never possible to achieve it —, science is probably the field where human attempts to reach it is best reflected. This illusion of control is crucial to the scientific development and the enhancement of technology providing advancement of reliable knowledge and human comfort — and, yes, human exclusion and inequality too.

Probably the clearest criticism to Feyerabend’s support of pluralism and methodological anarchy refers to the problem of pseudoscience — which Popper is obsessed with when proposing objective demarcation criteria.

A negative consequence of Feyerabend’s sympathy for all kinds of “methods” is that it legitimates also all kinds of pseudoscience. Apart from more inoffensive things like astrology, pseudoscience can be a very serious problem. It often takes money and time away from individuals and society. This is especially relevant in medicine, where fake science proliferates. People using all kinds of unproven, alternative treatment can deviate them from effective treatments and aggravate their health problems. At the same time it contributes to diminishing the prestige of serious treatments with deplorable criticisms of the likes of conspiracy theories everywhere.

A Feyerabend-inspired critique comes back here with grounds when one speaks about real and serious scandals involving the “Big Pharma” industry. But such criticism also fuels and overspreads irrational suspicions undermining the broad trust in science, which is certainly not wanted and even bad for society.

The Feyerabend critique also comes back with force when looking at human innovation. It is true that creativity seems to require free environment to result in new achievements. Feyerabend expressly cites John Stuart Mill’s “On Liberty” (my review here: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...) when defending this idea. Great inventions and ideas often arouse from accident or from the works of people with courage to challenge the status quo. But they can also come from pure abstract or mathematical work like certain works of physics. To temper the excessive romantic view of the issue, it seems that more and more significant achievements in modern society result from tons of money — and government expenditure — deliberately dedicated to improving technology in global competition, for instance.

As iconoclastic as Feyerabend’s book is, the points it raises are inescapable and the discussions it instigates contribute to the debate on how science works, even if subject to just criticism.

One thing that cannot be said is that “Against Method” is a bland book. Provocative in essence, the views expressed by Paul Feyerabend in it can awake feelings as extreme as passion and disdain. With a realistic and commendable criticism of scientific arrogance, but also some exaggeration regarding the absolute lack of method in science, it is certainly impossible to get out of this experience indifferently.

[Artemis · Rating 5 out of 5]

His ideas are super similar/complimentary to those of Quine and Putnam so obviously I loved this.

“Even an ‘objective’ enterprise like science which apparently reveals Nature As She Is In Herself intervenes, eliminates, enlarged, produces and codifies the results in a severely standardized way - but again there is no guarantee that the results will conceal into a unified world. This all we apprehend when experimenting, or interfering in less systemic ways, or simply living as part of a well-developed culture is how what surrounds us responds to our actions (thoughts, observations, etc.); we do not apprehended these surroundings themselves: Culture and Nature (or Being, to use a more general term) are always entangled in a fashion that can be explored only by entering into further and even more complicated entanglements.
...
What we find when living, experimenting, dong research is therefore not a single scenario called ‘the world’ or ‘being’ or ‘reality’ but a variety of responses, each of them constituting a special (and not always well-defined) reality for those who have called it forth. This is relativism because the type of reality encountered depends on the approach taken. However, it differs from the philosophical doctrine by admitting failure: not every approach succeeds. In my reply to my critics I called this form of relativism ‘cosmological’ relativism, in an article published in Iride I spoke of ‘ontological’ relativism”
(284-285)

In my interpretation this is the same as Putnam’s conceptual relativism, and the incommensurability of language and theories explanation is very similar.

[Brian Griffith · Rating 2 out of 5]

Okay, so Feyerabend shows that institutionalized science gets directed to institutional ends, ignores questions that are deemed irrelevant, and sometimes presumes that its answers are final rather than preliminary. But this sustained attack on the biases of scientific enterprise seem to invalidate self-interest in the process of problem solving. It seems to label science as an enemy of greater understanding, the way many people label religion as an enemy of self-discovery.

[Trodeponent · Rating 2 out of 5]

sabíeu q dir-te paul karl feyerabend es com dir-te pol carles vespreig??? no es krisseig (ala mireu rima i per cert si no sabeu q vespreig es tardeo sou espanyols)

te coses molt interessants com la idea de la contrainducció o el principi d'autonomia o la relació entre la justificació de recerca i resultat però mentre llegia el llibre estave una mica carrie bradshaw perque no podia evitar preguntar-me si el "tot s'hi val" (anything goes a l'original) no era una idea de fet com a molt liberal i justament a l'altre capítol parlant de teatre a l'alemanya de la postguerra equipara el teatre nazi amb el teatre de la resistència nazi lol lmao lèl vaig exclamar!! anything goes es el laissez-faire cientific

per cert ok que a l'època que va escriure el llibre l'adquisició del llenguatge no estava tan estudiada i la lingüística no tenia tanta pluralitat de veus i tal però me fa gràcia q vulgui relacionar l'anarquisme científic amb això quan està estudiadíssim q l'adquisició del llenguatge se fa molt per imitació jeje justament el que ell critica que fa la ciència quan replica mètodes teories etc

la filosofia de vegades és com tindre un pòdcast no?? que vas yappejant amb tu sol fins que algú diu "odm vessares"

i per cert ell diu anarquisme científic jo més bé en diria anarcocapitalisme científic el "tot s'hi val" avui dia ens ha portat a tindre gent arreu del món investigant les mateixes coses amb paraules diferents i no té sentit!!!

[Bradley · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great book dealing with the way in which science loses something by rigidly adhering to antiquated methodologies and theories. No theory can make sense of every fact within its domain. There are usually incommensurable facts that must be taken into account, and this challenges the basis of the theory itself. A wise scientist will then challenge the theory and assert something new, and when science fails to accomodate new facts it becomes stagnant and stifles progress. Anarchistic in his approach, Feyerabend argues that progress can only occur by separating science from the state, much in the same way we hope to separate the church from the state, because unfair influence from political forces can only serve to corrupt the procurement of new untimely facts that might be socially and politically unpopular.

For instance, he takes a provocative position that actually swayed me to rethink my view on whether or not Creationism should be taught in public schools. His theory is that we should allow all sides of this scientific issue to be debated, not censor unsavory opinions, and then make sure schools remain a place for the open forum of all ideas, and eventually if we do this, the position with the stronger factual basis will win out. By censoring creationism, we assume that the state is taking control of the educational process, and this closes off our inherent desire to weigh every option before making a decision. Censoring creationism, he says, would be just as bad as the Catholic Church censoring the views of Galileo because his work did not appeal to the popular consensus at the time. Any attempt to censor an idea, however unpopular it is, will result in stifling human progress. As an analytical philosopher, with a 'rationalist' bend, he may be too idealistically attached to a conception of human reason. Someone like Slavoj Zizek (who I am also reading at this time) would possibly say that ideology always trumps factual evidence to the contrary. Opening up the door for creationism to be taught in school, will lead to mystical thinking, and lead to playing language games in science class instead of sticking to facts, evidence, and solid qualitative/quantitative research... I am not sure who to side with.

Several other points worth mentioning, but I do not want to take up too much time and space. Great book, really interesting, and surprisingly easy to digest. Those analytical philosophers with their clear writing! What a breath of fresh air!

[Aung Sett Kyaw Min · Rating 4 out of 5]

An indispensable book for any science enthusiast. Feyeraband does science a tremendous service by dismantling the standard, simplistic account of science as a unified enterprise, exposing the alleged rational-methodological unity of science as a mere chimera constructed by abstracting science from its historical, life world context.

There is not one science, but many; not one overarching method, but many methods, including tricks such as propaganda, conceptual sleight-of-hand, and ad hoc rationalizations, exactly the 'irrational' procedures condemned and repressed by the standard narrative of science. In contrast, Feyeraband argues that these procedures should be condoned, preferred even, for they form the backbone of science as we know it today. He demonstrates through historical examples that the results of scientists who veer off from the dictates of reason and methodology (e.g. Galileo when vindicating Copernicus) later crystallize and become part of the established scientific canon itself. Along these lines, Feyeraband makes a compelling case that "anything goes" is the only methodological prescription that does not inhibit scientific progress.

The merit of the book lies in the fact it is a potent antidote for scientism, though it is not without its minor defects. In section 4 where Feyeraband takes a stab at the hegemony of Western science, for instance, one might wish he had elaborated his thoughts on the ethical implications of say, condoning, for the sake of plurality of perspectives, the charlatans (*cough* Deepak Chopra *cough*) who reap exorbitant profits from peddling less than dubious medical advice dressed up in the veneer of scientific veracity to the credulous public.

[Antonio Fanelli · Rating 1 out of 5]

Una critica sconclusionata al metodo scientifico fatta da uno che non ha la minima idea di cosa sia la scienza.
Purtroppo libro fortunato e citatissimo da fuffari vari :(

[T · Rating 2 out of 5]

Feyerabend should, undoubtedly, be praised for providing a scathing critique of the status of the scientific enterprise within contemporary society. It wasn't a popular position to take at the time it was written, and it's still not much of a popular position today (except among Creationists, perhaps). It couldn't have been easy to step outside of the imposing influence of the day and say something that nobody wanted to hear. He made people--scientists, philosophers, and laymen alike--critically examine their respective positions towards science and reevaluate their sometimes uncritical conclusions. Yet, in considering this and similar philosophy historically, it's impossible to ignore its blatant irresponsibility, its disastrous effects on thought and objectivity.

Getting down to the main positions Feyerabend takes in this work it's easy to sum them up pretty briefly: There's no set of unwavering and indubitable rules or methods that science actually utilizes in practice; Scientific theories are often incommensurable in that they are composed of fundamentally different concepts that are not reducible to a common measure; Science as a whole has unduly been given a special status in society that it does not deserve, and it's just another ideology and should consequently be separated from the state like religion.

Okay--I'll say at the outset that the incommensurability of scientific theories is a fascinating concept and one that I'm really not informed enough to have any substantive opinion. So I'm not going to comment on it except to say in passing that it seems less of an intractable problem than it's made out to be.

As for method, I think Feyerabend makes gross exaggerations and doesn't sufficiently argue away the difference between contexts of discovery and justification as well as he thinks he does. If we have a theory that is not even theoretically falsifiable because it's claims are compatible with all observable phenomena, it's going to have a difficult time surviving the context of justification. It will eventually wither away in not being able to face empiric criticism. If we have a theory that turns out to be self-contradictory, it will have a difficult time surviving the the context of justification. Yes, it may, for a time, prove its utility in various ways, but it will never be thought of as "right" unless it can reconcile its internal contradictions. Standards are more than arbitrary, historically determined, totalitarian-like, rationalist schemes. Although I obviously can't get into acceptable standards in this space, they do have the function of time and time again successfully removing the crap from science (psychoanalysis, for instance). Feyerabend is right to reject "naive falsification." Of course theories can't explain all the facts in their domain and may be in conflict with some of them. This is fine. But when theories are conflicting with most of the facts in their domains, providing minimal utility, and clashing with very well corroborated theories they are right to be rejected. And it's important to remember that, especially when critiquing Feyerabend, this is a rational rejection.

Now, the separation of science and state. Ridiculous. Absolutely terrible. One of the worst ideas ever put forth. Stop giving tax dollars to scientifically-minded institutions like the National Institute of Health, effectively abolishing it altogether? Or how about having the FDA start endorsing homeopathy, voodoo, and witchcraft for dealing with medicinal concerns? Excellent! Have departments of transportation pay no attention to the physics of bridge building? Yes! Start teaching astrology and magic as viable alternatives alongside astronomy and biology in school? Perfect! Society will be improved immensely! We'll be free of the corrupting influence and ideology of Science! (Feyerabend doesn't explicitly make these claims--except, I think, saying that we should teach "magic" in public schools--but they are natural consequences of his view, nonetheless.)

Feyerabend says, concerning the utility of science, "The questions reach their polemical aim only if one assumes that the results of science which no one will deny have arisen without any help from non-scientific elements, and that they cannot be improved by an admixture of such elements either . . . Science alone [this is sarcasm, here] gives us a useful astronomy, an effective medicine, a trustworthy technology. One must also assume that science owes its success to the correct method and not merely to a lucky accident [italics in original]."

The "non-scientific elements," methods inherent in homeopathy, voodoo, witchcraft, and astrology which lack the rationalism and critical reflection of the sciences are assuredly not going to improve the human condition. They've been tried, and they failed terribly. Certainly science needs to stay creative, but the solution must not be looked for in the practices just mentioned. There's a reason why science is successful. It would be quite a coincidence if, instead of having the "correct method," science hit upon hundreds and hundreds of "lucky accident[s]," over and over again throughout history, continually making life better for people through such "accidents."

Some further comments: Feyerabend is also critical of Lakatos and his "research programmes." I guess originally this work was supposed to be the two each going back and forth, F defending irrationalism in the sciences and L defending rationalism. But then Lakatos died. Shame, because he would have probably thoroughly put Feyerabend in his place. Feyerabend's argument is that, essentially, Lakatos' more liberal versions of some of Popper's ideas are so liberal that, "in so far as the methodology of research programmes is 'rational,' it does not differ from anarchism." Or, to put it another way, that Lakatos is arguing the same thing as Feyerabend himself, but cloaking it in the language of rationalism. Interestingly, Feyerabend says, only a few pages later, that, "Lakatos does not really differ from the traditional epistemologists. . ."

In regards to Feyerabend's own philosophy of science he says, "There is not a single rule that remains valid under all circumstances and not a single agency to which appeal can always be made," and that, "Anything goes." Yet he also says, paradoxically, that the "essence of empiricism" and the "important part of all theories of confirmation and corroboration" is "counterinduction [italics added]." He goes on to conclude that, "Counterinduction is therefore, always reasonable and it always has a chance of success [italics added]." In other words, scientists would be stupid not to use counterinduction with the introduction of every new theory. Counterinduction sounds strangely like "a rule that remains valid under all circumstances," no?

[William Ngiam · Rating 5 out of 5]

Paul Feyerabend writes a thought-provoking argument against treating science as a singular entity from which its knowledge should be elevated because it is believed to be grounded on rationality. Feyerabend achieves this refutation by relying primarily on the historical example of Galileo and his championing of Copernican heliocentrism despite inconsistencies and an incomplete understanding, as well as other detailed examinations into the process of science related to accepting and refuting theory.

Reading this as an early-career cognitive neuroscientist, currently engaged with the 'reproducibility crisis' and subsequent science reform movement, I feel that this book is a must-read for anyone who is themselves a scientist or currently studying a science. In it, I find are many applicable lessons for the modern-day scientist – for example, "the idea that 'scientific' knowledge is in some way peculiarly positive and free from differences of opinion is nothing but a chimaera", and that counterinduction plays an important role in challenging scientific theories (to me, this means that those conducting model comparisons or hypothesis-testing should bring formidable, developed opponents to the competition rather than theories or models that rely on ad hoc assumptions.

This book was dense and rambling in parts, and it took a lengthy amount of time to read and digest. However, I found it a worthwhile read, and believe to be one that will hone how I conduct and wield science in the future. I recommend it to any reader interested in the philosophy of science, especially to any scientists or scientists-to-be, who can withstand the challenging (and sometimes extreme) read to engage and potentially reconsider their beliefs around science and how it may (proclaims to) achieve progress.

[Rafael Almada · Rating 5 out of 5]

Finally I've finished this one and I finally understood Feyerabend's whole argument/thesis. Right now, I'm not at home, but there's a whole treatise I have planned for this review. The short summary I can give now is that we like to imagine a universe where we travel back in time and we become like gods amongst men due to our knowledge of the world. Feyerabend argues that for the people of the past, rather than deities, we would be perceived as lunatics. However contrary to a naive surface level reading of Feyerabend (what he calls naive anarchism), he is not actually arguing for a "anything goes" for scientific practice or knowledge in general.

[Richard Thompson · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a great book that got me thinking about a lot of things. My best reading experiences are ones that give me the pleasure of well presented new ideas when I am reading, get me thinking about my own ideas in the subject area of the book and in related fields, stimulate further areas of reading and inquiry and then linger with me after I finish reading them. It's too soon after completing this book to know about the lingering part, but it passed all of the other tests.

I have read and enjoyed Popper and Kuhn, so I was worried that I would get upset at Feyerabend for being anti-Popper. He is a little disrepectful, but I think upon reflection that his criticisms of Popper are justified. I still think that Popper has a lot of valid points, but Feyerabend puts him in the context of a bigger universe where Popper becomes one of many ways of looking at the world of science.

I love how Feyerabend shows that there are different valid approaches for doing great science and, in general, for solving problems and advancing knowledge. He shows how it can be productive to start from theories instead of facts and to sometimes pick theories that seem improbable and that contradict observations and known facts. He shows how facts and their interpretation are in the eyes of the observer, and how scientists only see (sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciously) the facts that fit their models. And he shows how great scientists may use non-rational techniques of argument and persuasion to effectively advocate for their positions in ways that are more familiar in lawyers and politicians than in scientists. He certainly has the courage of his convictions in taking his positions to their logical extremes, arguing that rationality is just one way of looking at the world, which is not necessarily the best way, and that it may sometimes be in the best interests of human society and the advancement of knowledge to have politicians interfere with science. The problem I see here is that tossing out rationality or allowing political interference may have good results in a few situations, but those situations are rare. I don't want to be overly paternalistic, but I am concerned that opening the door to thinking in these ways is more likely to be damaging than productive. But this is a very small bone to pick with a book that in almost every respect smart, original and stimulating.

[Michael A. · Rating 4 out of 5]

A unique perspective on how science is done. Feyerabend posits that historically speaking scientific advances are often made by going AGAINST prevailing reason and being counterinductive and constructing ad hoc hypotheses to fit phenomena that is later on explained in a better way. He uses plenty of historical examples but mainly focuses on Galileo supporting Copernicus. He also makes an interesting claim that Galileo was not purely rational: he used propaganda - not only that, but the Church was closer to the reason of the day than Galileo was and were pretty much justified in censuring him. There is no one scientific method, and there is a lengthy discussion about incommensurability that is blithely summed up with "it's more of a problem for philosophers than scientists". Interesting of him to use the Marxist-Leninist concept of uneven development for scientific theories, and cites Lenin, Marx, and Mao a couple times (though later on claiming he was never fully convinced by Marxism). One thing that I don't really get is his "tradition" theory which seems relativist (he has a whole appendix defending it). He says traditions are neither good nor bad, they just are.... to me that's pretty relativist. Perhaps a tradition isn't bad, but certainly some traditions are better than others. Perhaps the point he was trying to make was there is no Archimedean point for us to survey which tradition is better than which. Towards the end he calls the Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge "deconstruction gone mad" which makes me question if he's ever read Derrida or if he's just hitching onto Kuhn's (and philosophers of science) at large's opinion.

Other than that though, read this for a counterintuitive yet fascinating look at how science is and has been historically done.

[Rita · Rating 5 out of 5]

I had been waiting so long to read this, and wow, it did not disappoint!

There's certainly a lot one can criticise about Feyerabend — his quips against other philosophical schools can come across as more arrogant than amusing; his uncritical acceptance of Mill's marketplace of ideas seems ignorant at best; and as he admits himself, Against Method can be quite disjointed in places and some aspects of his argument are much more developed than others.

But as my rating of this book has already indicated, I couldn't help but love it! Feyerabend's critique of different scientific schools really resonated with my own experiences within scientific communities, where other conceptual frameworks are often completely dismissed. Questioning scientific authorities is a social taboo, and a contentious political issue in a wide range of areas from public health to environmental policy. Yet unlike the simplistic "trust science" vs. "I've done my own research" type of debates, Feyerabend's perspective adds a nuance to the different priorities that are at stake when it comes to theoretical debates in science.

I'm too tired now to formulate my thoughts fully, but needless to say I'll be returning to this volume in my future research, and I will definitely be reading more from Feyerabend in the future.

[Pablo · Rating 5 out of 5]

"La idea de que la ciencia puede y debe regirse según unas reglas fijas y de que su racionalidad consiste en un acuerdo con tales reglas no es realista y está viciada. No es realista, puesto que tiene una visión demasiado simple del talento de los hombres y de las circunstancias que animan, o causan, su desarrollo. Y está viciada, puesto que el intento de fortalecer las reglas levantará indudablemente barreras a lo que los hombres podrían haber sido, y reducirá nuestra humanidad incrementando nuestras cualificaciones profesionales."

Estas conclusiones son incontestables. Sin embargo, aunque dice que no es un relativista y que es un realista, no queda muy claro como se articula eso dentro de su propuesta. Aun así, su propuesta de una Epistemología Anarquista es lo más coherente que y seductor que leí.

[Ethan]

I expected to dislike this book very much for whatever reason, though I always liked Feyerabend's mode of presentation and general dispositions. I was pleasantly surprised to find that I enjoyed the text and found much of it fairly well-argued.

Feyerabend distinguishes between the dogmatic science of contemporary times and the historical anarchic science which is practiced through irrationality, counter-induction, mistakes, and so on. It is crucial to the enterprise of science that one methodology, or picture of the scientific method, predominates, and indeed, it is also a requirement that falsified methodologies be retained precisely in the counter-inductive activity. He gives an illuminating example in Galileo, who advances a Copernican view against the dominant Aristotelean picture of the motion of the earth. Galileo proceeds both irrationally and counter-inductively, he questions the idea of "motion" dominant in the scientific ideology of the time, which is only possible as consequence of his holding so strongly to a Copernican view. He then proceeds through propaganda, replacing observation-statements more sympathetic to a Copernican view: like how a line drawn of a ships complete journey across the sea will look straight despite minute movements left and right in the journey, because the relative size of the whole makes the minor motions appear small. This is used to replace ideas of motion implicitly in his dialogues, but it is never advanced by argument.

This view of science is interesting, fun, fruitful, but Feyerabend does suffer from a kind of impotent liberalism which he attempts to make more radical than it probably is, by naming it "anarchism". Really, the over-reliance on Mill is middling. Further, the references to Lenin and Marx, for the use of "pragmatism" in Lenin's vanguardism, and Mrax's "uneven development of science" is less-than-scholarly, often the only reason for referencing them seems to me to be an association of words, and less because it has much to contribute to the text.

Following Appendix I, the book is considerably weaker. Though a rather interesting discussion of the archaic worldview and the transition out of it is interesting, and provides a good reading list, there are large ramblings on Whorff, who is now, as far as I am familiar, rather discredited. Many of the linguistic arguments therefore, which I think Feyerabend places far too much importance on since his argument survives without it despite his own proclamations, are weak. Incommensurability does not need Whorff.

Overall, glad to have finally read this.

[Fábio · Rating 5 out of 5]

Como você se sentiria caso um artigo publicado na Nature lhe tachasse de “o pior inimigo da ciência”? — “Muito bem, obrigado”, é o que deve ter respondido Paul Feyerabend, em 1987. Dono de uma prosa ágil e cáustica, em “Contra o Método”, Feyerabend delineia o que passou a ser conhecido como o “anarquismo epistemológico”. Como o próprio título acusa, trata-se de uma clara cisão com a ideia cartesiana de que a ciência se caracteriza pela Razão, e que esta, por sua vez, é garantida pela adesão ao Método. “A ciência não é nem uma tradução isolada nem a melhor que há, exceto para aqueles que se acostumaram com sua presença, seus benefícios e suas desvantagens. Em uma democracia, deveria ser separada do Estado exatamente como as igrejas ora estão dele separadas”.

Muitas vezes mal interpretado, Feyerabend não está advogando pela irracionalidade. Ele se opõe ao uso de palavras vazias (Razão, Método… Fé… Humanidade) a fim de fornecer corpo a uma tradição (Ciência… Religião…), capacitando-a a subjugar o outro. Por trás de seus argumentos inflamados, existe muita indignação. “Indignação diante da destruição de conquistas culturais das quais poderíamos todos ter aprendido, diante da ousadia presunçosa com que alguns intelectuais interferem na vida das pessoas, e desdém pelas frases traiçoeiras que usam para embelezar suas iniquidades foram, e ainda são, a força motivadora de [seu] trabalho”.

Existe indignação e uma profunda consideração à humanidade — não a uma Humanidade idealizada, mas a uma humanidade com “h” minúsculo, materializada, contingente. E isso se atinge com o reconhecimento da natureza humana de todos e todas que somos personagens na epopeia social técnico-científica (ou seria uma tragédia?). Para ficar com uma das passagens que mais me fez rir (e essa é uma marca da boa filosofia!): “[…] Não há garantia de que os cientistas resolverão todo problema e substituirão toda teoria que tenha sido refutada por uma sucessora que satisfaça as condições formais. A invenção de teorias depende de nossos talentos e de outras circunstâncias fortuitas, como uma vida sexual satisfatória. […]”

Qual a diferença entre uma teocracia e uma tecnocracia? Apenas duas letras. “Contra o Método” é um texto libertador e, creio eu, fundamental para eu repensar minha prática enquanto engenheiro, professor de engenharia e pesquisador em pleno século XXI.

[DJ · Rating 4 out of 5]

Truth and meaning are perhaps two of the most polarizing issues one can write about. Humans are generally quite defensive about their core beliefs and unwilling to accept direct criticism on them. Most books that attempt to do so simply end up pandering to their already faithful disciples (just how many evangelicals do you think have read The Gold Delusion?). Those who back "science" often declare it the absolute monarch of knowledge, place it atop an unassailable throne, and condemn all who refuse to bow as mentally bankrupt. Given that I was a staunch royalist, finding a book that probed me on these issues was surprising and enlightening.

To irresponsibly sum it up in one sentence, Against Method's message is: "Science is not a particular set of values, rules, or methods; it's simply whatever works." This argument has two main parts. First, how we actually do science has very little resemblance to how we say we do science. Second, how we say we do science would be an awful method anyways.

Below are my notes while reading. They are not necessarily from the book but they are certainly inspired by it. Following, I present a few issues with the book (though if you've read the book yourself, you'll notice I take issue with the book in my notes as well).

EDUCATION
-Scientific theories are passed on naked of their historical context. Argument occurs and only the results are passed on. The strengths of opponents and weaknesses of the idea are lost and what once had to be qualified and carefully argued as an "enemy theory" is now taken for granted and may even be taken as platitude.
-Mainstream theory is so crystallized in education that it becomes taken for granted and no longer carefully examined or criticized.
-Like the humanities, science must encourage debate and theory in class (for example, a TA might lead with "Can you explain inheritance without genetics in an attractive way?).

ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE
-Experience and observation are colored by perceptual tools, prevailing theory, culture, and the intricacies of the human brain, at the very least.
-Intellectual play makes science more productive and more fun.
-Adventurers consult maps but also ignore then "correct" them.
-Results are starting points for further explanation. In science, you never "arrive" at your destination.

NATURAL INTERPRETATIONS
-Natural interpretations are biases so common they are "natural."
-They can arise from ubiquity in education, continual human sensory experience, and historical precedent.
-They are extremely difficult to detect. One way is to assume a competing theory is correct and discuss what must change.

OBSERVATION LANGUAGES
-Observation languages, like verbal ones, seem absolute until you encounter others.
-Certain observation languages are great for basic survival but the goal of the scientist is not survival; it is discovery.
-Unfamiliar and counterintuitive observation languages are often great vehicles for discovery.


COMPARING THEORIES
-Prevailing scientific theories are a product of politics, history, power, economics, religion, culture, philosophy, evolution, neuroscience, memetics, and many other influences. Divorcing them from their stories discards a great deal of important information.
-Ideas are often presented before the means or modes of thinking to verify them are available and are therefore often prematurely disposed of. For this reason, we cannot ignore old passed-over ideas on the assumption that they are wrong.
-Historical precedence is not a virtue. Yes, we may need to print new books, change university courses, etc but perhaps we must rethink such rigid investments instead of compromising on the ideas.
-No theory agrees with all the facts available, so disagreement with facts is no criterion for disregard.
-New theories are like grains of sand in a clam and can, though seen as an irritation at first, seed an aggregate of new ideas that form a pearl of science.
-New theories don't necessarily have to solve or adhere to the old problems of old theories. Theories describe their own problem spaces.

OTHER DISCIPLINES
-We cannot ignore the "non-sciences." People believe in them for some reason and by investigating this reason, we, at the very least, learn something about memetics and the human mind.
-Other disciplines may also discover productive world views capable of framing observations long before those observations are actually possible. Looking to them for assistance, particularly in times of new or unexplained data, could prove to be helpful.
-One major goal of science is personal pleasure. Attacking other disciplines for their focus on personal pleasure is indefensible for science.

ISSUES
-The anarchistic approach to science is particularly compelling for the individual scientist because it is free of restrictions. It grants him the freedom to study whatever he likes in whatever way he pleases. Scientists as individuals then might be necessarily biased towards it.
-The anarchistic approach to science also, however, grants credence to fields traditionally outside science (like Chinese traditional medicine and homeopathy). This approach challenges science's unassailable claim to the purveyor of all knowledge. Science as an institution then might be necessarily biased against it.
-I believe science can be defined, not by method but by intent: Science, united under the shared goal of discovery, is the open and continuous questioning of nature accompanied by predictions and, to the greatest extent possible, their verification. (Alternatively, science is a bundle of current and possible procedures unified under the shared goal of understanding and predicting.)
-This book does not stand alone particularly well. Significant parts of it are responses to debates and other books that aren't always introduced. I'd highly recommend reading "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" by Thomas Kuhn first. It presents much of the backstory for "Against Method" in a more self-contained and accessible way.

[Jayesh · Rating 4 out of 5]

Captures the chaos and "law-less"-ness actually involved in science that most proponents and practitioners fail to realize and accept. For example, goes into heavy detail about how Galileo won wasn't because he came up with a theory and explanation that was strictly "better" than the previous one on all accounts. Rather it was because he was good at propaganda and inventing new tools, while also being willing to ignore any inconvenient data points.

As a researcher a lot of this rings true. How we actually do science and how we present it are completely different enterprises. There is no clear set of rules that make the method scientific. There is a lot of play and coffee involved. Even with empirical results there are a lot of degrees of freedom in how to interpret them.

Some parts of the book feel very dated, so much so that it's funny when you are almost agreeing with everything the author is bringing up and suddenly he starts talking about alternate medical systems like traditional Chinese medicine which can be even "better" than "Western medicine" that makes you question everything he said previously (good thing in my opinion). To be fair, in my copy Feyerabend accepted that some of the stuff should be taken as a product of its time in the 70s and since then with the change in time, we need to be more careful:

This was my opinion in 1970 when I wrote the first version of this essay. Times have changed. Considering some tendencies in US education ('politically correct', academic menus, etc.), in philosophy (postmodernism) and in the world at large I think that reason should now be given greater weight not because it is and always was fundamental but because it seems to be needed, in circumstances that occur rather frequently today (but may disappear tomorrow), it create a more humane approach.

[Noa MacDonald · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Reading Feyerabend is like taking a cold shower. One steps in and is froze; one exits stimulated, invigorated, and agreeing with more of what he says than one is inclined to admit publicly."
- Philip J. Davis, Professor Emeritus of Applied Mathematics at Brown University

tl;dr: Against Method ("AM") was a stellar, entertaining book, and offered a refreshing synthesis. I thought it was a clear, creative account of how science operates, and measured up to what I see in my job and in what I read in the literature, as well as the expansive deification people afford science that comes out in discourse and everyday life. The book's historical backbone struck me as rich and helpful, and its philosophical thesis was thorough and compelling, and like the rest of the book, often rousing. AM is evidently often misread, which is a shame: PKF is a funny, brilliant guide, even when he's being a provocateur. On a slightly more personal note, the intellectual freedom and self-education the book advocates is something I value deeply.

The long version:

“The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious…in addition, the idea is detrimental to science…every rule is associated with cosmological assumptions, so that using the rule we take it for granted that the assumptions are correct…”

I found this a stimulating indictment of exactly the sort of ideas about science I was taught in school and took for granted most of my life, perhaps until my early 20s. Indeed, my own history with these ideas made the read extra interesting: I think if I had read the dust jacket 10 years ago, I’d scoff at it and not even read the Table of Contents. I would’ve accepted a repudiation of AM as axiomatic for science. It is certainly curious how one's beliefs and commitments change.

Now I can’t credit PKF with having cut down my commitment to what he calls the “fairy-tale” (viz., science as Science: a superior domain of knowledge grounded in some Rational Method) — in fact I think this image and its constituents was dead and gone for me before picking this book up. Still, this is maybe the most sustained, clear, and comprehensive attack on the fairy-tale I’ve yet read. And PKF's positive thesis, that epistemological anarchism* ought to replace rationalism** as a theory of knowledge, supplemented by engaging ideas like counterinduction, “anarchism in disguise,” and the paradigmatic instance of incommensurability being cosmologies, add to an otherwise tremendous book. PKF is funny and wry and glib; he hopes we remember him as a "flippant Dadaist." He jabs at historians, philosophers, scientists, all while marshaling a rather staggering command of a number of disciplines and a creative bend to his ideas.
*The etymology of "anarchism" has two rather different meanings: "without [authority]" and "disorganized." AM only explicitly means the second when historicizing (which comes up in the book's most famous slogan, more on that below), yet the second is a more common read of the word and presumably leads to many an unwitting misread.
**PKF takes rationalism to mean the general use of reason, not "the general theory of knowledge often set opposite empiricism."

I felt as though the historical thrust was particularly strong: PKF’s description of how science proceeds was, I think, the most accurate birds-eye description I’ve read across 20th century history of science. Looking around my workaday scientific activities is looking at something described in Against Method: often messy, anarchistic, dogmatic and ideological, sociologically pressured, flippant and unpredictable, sometimes still exceedingly rational and productive. Rhetoric, polemic, force, pro-Western bias, and politics are all wrapped up too. PKF’s analogizing the publication of a set of scientific results to the writing of a political treaty was a clever, instructive example. It doesn’t follow from all of this that there is something wrong with these activities, or that they aren’t scientific, and I think PKF is right that the inputs and outputs to science’s epistemological ad-hockery and opportunism is a boon for human knowledge and value. Incidentally, PKF has a bone to pick with the fact/value dichotomy, and, in a short but penetrating analysis, ends up with a deflationary treatment of “value-free science." To focus on these issues is to foreground a point made by many others in PKF’s genus of thought, including those whom he chastised (like Popper): to understand science is to understand its practitioners and its sociology. Lest one practices what the prominent philosopher of science Nancy Cartwright apparently called "know-nothing philosophy of science" (where one is such a clever philosopher that scientific practice needn't feature in one's analysis; thinking better than the rest does the job). One wonders if PKF in fact agrees with the roughly Kuhnian intuition that the set of toolboxes and its users, complete with their goings-on and history, constitute the best one can do in demarcating science from non-science…

Lots of philosophers write dryly and won’t even look at a bullet much less bite it, but Feyerabend is like the philosophers Jerry Fodor or David Lewis; he’ll, to quote Fodor's peer John Searle in a book review, “swallow an entire arsenal.” I think PKF earns the treatment he gives the fairy-tale, and his analysis is quite rigorous. The nature of his tone can make him easy to misunderstand or strawman, but he evidently denies strong relativism, workaday deconstructionism, and epistemological nihilism, and clarifies that he in no way means “throw away the toolbox” with “anything goes,” (a rather unfortunate slogan, but as was alluded to above, this is a historical proclamation made by the stunned rationalist, not a prescription offered by the anarchist). Indeed, PKF rather encourages the idea of a diverse toolbox -- including, say, rhetoric, argument, falsification, empiricism -- that isn’t broadly legislated from outside or inside science according to some Unifying Method. In part because that fiction is ahistorical, in part because it lacks philosophical cogency, and in part because PKF has a positive thesis, as noted above. This book is one that seems likely to be remembered for its negative thesis, but for me the productive work is likely to persist the longest.

I didn’t love every little bit: the mind-body problem chapter felt like an odd, rushed inclusion — the Churchlands adopting PKF’s anarchism as a tool to push connectionism and eliminativism is an interesting oddity itself. I thought, as many others seem to, that PKF's points about the state’s precedent (in religion) to divorce itself from science, thus allowing scientific-nonscientific commerce while losing science's "totalitarian pretensions" needed more work; though I agreed with him on his diagnosis of the power science wields and how often unjust its products can be, enforcing such separation -- ("separation" actually read to me more as "distancing"; PKF seemed to accept that some commerce between science and the state is necessary and non-unique) -- starts to look like it needs a totalitarian or other unseemly mechanism, which PKF rejects. I also found the segment of the book that, as Kuhn did in Structure, tried to marry the psychology of perception with the philosophy of science to be more detailed than Kuhn, but also didn't cut any ice for me: PKF needs something stronger than even Sapir-Whorf to tie this chapter to his cosmological instance of incommensurability (recall Kuhn's notion was less specific and also traded on different ways to use "world-view," whereas PKF is more clear). I would've liked more explanation as to how he sees e.g. voodoo operating in science; there is an enormous range of ways to read his epistemological domain-mixing, spanning the banal to the inconceivable.

So I wonder if AM goes through just as well (or better) without mind-body, Sapir-Whorf, and the political material, perhaps instead swapping these segments for more exploration and instances of how he'd see scientific practice without the fairy-tale and with his epistemological thesis in the minds of investigators, citizens, youth, etc. (after all, his book is not just historical, and means to suggest a path forward). For instance, what does grant review look like with a separation of state and science? What to say to the scientist who accepts anarchism and freely outsources their thinking to the local standards of their scientific school, defending them ardently throughout their career? To Kuhn the latter is normal science and is how puzzles get solved; to me it seems exceedingly common in practice; to PKF the issue is presumably not with the scientist, and not with each scientist in the school taken individually. Presumably his issue is with the standards of the school and its enforcers as a group, insofar as some in the school are naïve to anarchism and associated free choice (e.g. a trainee perhaps). Kuhn had plenty of this sort of scale-wise analysis of scientific practice and I wish PKF had better developed that — schools and societies and organizations and specialized journals and the like; his main target was general big M Method and general big S Science (when the Copernican and Aristotelian schools came up, I recall more focus being placed on key players and rival cosmologies and practice than on the relation between key players and the schools themselves, though he lays out quite well how deftly Galileo maneuvered).

Aside: I think it’s ironic to class PKF as an enemy of science, when his analysis may help contextualize the relationship between science and the press, funders, and other aspects of its sociology and history, and may in turn help disinhibit science and promulgate the freedom of its practice. He’d probably scoff at his thesis being lionized, but I don't find his negative thesis (fairy-tale) or positive thesis (epistemological anarchism) rare in practice. Something like them is not only to be found but also is sometimes explicitly prescribed; some examples are the more interdisciplinary and conceptually oriented swaths of the explanatory/epistemic pluralism bend in psychiatry (local "toolbox" example) or the response to the Trump administration's encroachment on scientific practice, e.g. constraints on geographical recruitment of talent and thereby constraint on epistemological richness (global example).

PKF closes with the image of a mature (scientific) citizen who, in having assessed science as a historical phenomenon and plumbed the epistemic options available to them, might choose the ideology of science without self-delusion, and wield it and other tools as opportunistically as they are able. Insofar as “anything may continue to go,” this citizen’s choices may deviate from behaviors we condone, but the key here is twofold: one, this is how things have been and already are, and so won't obviously limit the discipline more than it already does; two, ideally, everyone else has a toolbox too, so one deviant citizen's use of tool A can be met with another's use of tool B; three, the truly (vs. mostly) free having-and-using of epistemological tools (ie. anarchism tout court) is a) not how things currently go and b) would make science even better than its current "lite" anarchism/relative disinhibition (I consider PKF's extra-scientific prescriptions as evidence he thinks there is still a bit of a gap to be filled). More importantly still: both the deviant and the nondeviant citizens' beliefs in the validity of their choices and their consequent actions, PKF thinks, are unlike the beliefs and actions defenders of the fairy-tale possess, in that ironically, they are much more rational: being less deceived about one's epistemic situation and plausibility of goals is a surer way toward logical, well-reasoned belief and action. Of course, logical and well-reasoned belief and action aren't authorities for the non-fairy-tailed the way they are for the Believers...

EDIT 8/4: started the Last Days of Socrates a few days ago, which led me to the entry on Socrates in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Here Socrates' trial is referred to as the "founding myth of the academic discipline of philosophy." The entry cites how enigmatic Socrates was, how he never wrote anything, how all that is known about him is second-hand, and despite this, how he was afforded "adulation and emulation ordinarily reserved for religious figures" and forever changed philosophy, morphing through secondary source into a litany of different "Socrateses," while Socrates qua Socrates stayed inscrutable. In reading about this foundational myth, and comparing it to the myth PKF attacks here -- the "fairy-tale" -- I am reminded of Vonnegut in Cat's Cradle, and how he (or PKF) may respond to those who allege that the success of science cannot be if one does away with the fairy-tale: "anyone unable to understand how a useful religion can be founded on lies will not understand this book either." Is Feyerabend a Bokononist?

EDIT 8/6:
First: interesting to note parallels in growing calls for lived (cf. learned, loved, labored) experience and participatory action research as extensions of PKF on “non-experts," and examples of his thesis (or a version) in practice, to sometimes quite popular effect.

Second: came across interesting details from Feyerabend’s SEP entry (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fe...) and a short biography page (https://cs.nyu.edu/~davise/personal/P...). Issues include: reflections of his, including his admission that he may have created his own systematic rule(s) in attempting to rid all others, and his observation about the temptation to systematize. (The Scylla of no-rule regress and the Charybdis of a weaker thesis? Motte-and-bailey seems the natural crutch, though I thought it was obvious he was suggesting a rule/principle, but that it was a "rule of negative space" or something. Seems he wanted a true non-rule, insofar as he reports "admitting" he couldn't square anything goes, as that either is a rule or is self-defeating and must accept its negation in its quantifier).

Apparently when asked, PKF was allergic to his views being classed, despite defending (in the political realm too, which I didn’t know) a subjectivist “Protagorean” relativism (my review incorrectly notes that he denies this in AM, at least nominally). I read AM as contextualist (“anything goes” standing in for the basement context), but apparently that is not how many read AM, which is taken plainly relativistically — where claims like “the Earth spins” is not taken to encode one’s standards, cf. their ontology and cosmological allegiances; one’s epistemological standards being a "further (subjectivist) fact." And I see how grafting epistemological anarchism on top of this Protagorean freedom generates the regress issue mentioned above.

Finally, the SEP entry mentions PKF assuming that science has the same goals as non-scientific disciplines: if this is wrong, some of AM is more tenuous -- the polemic against scientism and the political and epistemic prescriptions, for instance. I’m not sure PKF assumed this (an evocative counter-example is found with Galileo and the Church), but anyway, he is clear that he thinks science also has non-epistemic goals that overlap with non-scientific domains, like the distribution of products. Even still, an interesting complaint to add to other rich complications.