Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power

by Karl A. Wittfogel

Starting from a Marxist analysis of the ideas of Max Weber on China and India's "hydraulic-bureaucratic official-state" and building on Marx's sceptical view of the Asiatic Mode of Production, Wittfogel came up with an analysis of Oriental despotism which emphasized the role of irrigation works, the bureaucratic structures needed to maintain them and the impact that these had on society, coining the term "hydraulic empire" to describe the system. In his view, many societies, mainly in Asia, relied heavily on the building of large-scale irrigation works. To do this, the state had to organize forced labor from the population at large. This required a large and complex bureaucracy staffed by competent and literate officials. This structure was uniquely placed to also crush civil society and any other force capable of mobilizing against the state. Such a state would inevitably be despotic, powerful, stable and wealthy.

Genres: History, Politics, Sociology, Nonfiction, China, Economics, Anthropology

556 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1957

Reviews

[Joe · Rating 5 out of 5]

Marxist Geopolitics

Since this book is long out of print let me start with the (abbreviated) table of contents:

Contents:
Preface
Introduction
1. The natural setting of hydraulic society
2. Hydraulic economy,- a managerial and genuinely political economy
3. A state stronger than society
4. Despotic power, - total and not benevolent
5. Total terror, total submission, total loneliness
6. The core, the margin, and the submargin of hydraulic societies
7. Patterns of proprietary complexity in hydraulic society
8. Classes in hydraulic society
9. The rise and fall of the theory of the Asiatic mode of production
10. Oriental society in transition
Notes
Bibliography
General index
Index of authors and works

Politically Incorrect Marxism

This book could be (and indeed has been) understood as an attempt to marry a marxist understanding of modes of production with a geopolitical understanding of history. It is very sharp, but of course very dated. I believe it has been tossed down the memory hole because the reigning left-liberal political correctness won't allow any discussions of world politics that might discomfort non-westerners. (And you can only mock certain westerners to boot!) If the author had been worried about political correctness he might have titled this book indifferently either 'hydraulic society' or 'hydraulic empire' rather than the indignation provoking 'Oriental Despotism'. The book I have read is the 1967 sixth printing, not the 1957 first printing. We are told in the Preface that the "present volume reproduces the original text of 'Oriental Despotism' with a few additions and corrections from the third American printing and the German edition." And since that is all he says, I am assuming that the additions and corrections were of no great import.

That said, the book is almost certainly damaged by its Cold War perspective. Wittfogel, a strong anti-Stalinist, likely purposefully exaggerated the "hydraulic-empire" nature of the USSR/Russia because of the (perceived) necessities of the times. And it is not impossible that he exaggerated how bad (i.e., unfree) historic hydraulic societies actually were for the same reasons. But nevertheless, I do think he is on to something. While this book has a deep anti-Soviet / anti-Stalinist animus, I believe it is too much to say it is anti-marxist. There are simply too many marxist categories, notes and tools that he utilizes to say that.

Yes, Marxist! A whole chapter (8) is dedicated to the fate of classes in hydraulic society! And the next chapter, "The Rise and Fall of the Theory of the Asiatic Mode of Production" concentrates quite single-mindedly on the twists and turns of this theory at the hands of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. The strongest criticism, in this regard, is reserved for Lenin and Stalin. Indeed, one could say that Wittfogel is attempting to set the Marxism of his time (and ours) aright regarding the Asiatic Mode of Production [AMP]. At the beginning of chapter 9 our author indicates that contemporary Marxists were even referring to pre-modern Russia, China and India as feudal! (More about Marx and the AMP below.)

But with the above problems in mind, I still say that this book desperately needs to be reprinted! This book, in many ways, reminds me of the younger Pirenne's 2 volume study "The Tides of History". The Pirenne book took the account of the non-AMP side of pre-modern history in order to write a history of sea trade (cum freedom) from antiquity, through feudalism, to modernity with many geo-political points stressed. Of course, the Pirenne book too was written with Cold War realities in mind. But like this Wittfogel book it too deserves a rereading. Together, they present the smartest geopolitical, as opposed to merely ideological, understanding of the cold war written at the time that I have seen.

Why is geopolitics important today? Well, I believe that it is a self-inflicted blindness to geopolitical realities that leaves both Marxists and liberals helplessly lost when trying to understand post-Soviet Russia. Right now (= from spring 2014 -> early 2015) Russia is trying to annex parts of the Ukraine. Only an understanding of the geopolitical significance of Ukraine from the Russian point of view can make sense of this. The notion that this annexation is a return to the ideologically driven situation of the cold war is either silly, or an exercise in propaganda - at best. I believe the annexation is a return to nineteenth century 'Great Power' geopolitics pure and simple. In the nineteenth century 'the Great Game' was played between Great Britain and Russia in central asia regarding their respective 'spheres of influence'. Now it seems it will be played between America and Russia in eastern europe and the middle east. And who knows? - Perhaps elsewhere too.

When this book was first written our author was doubly a heretical Marxist. He was an ex-communist and a fierce anti-Stalinist who could go to extremes to attack those who defended the USSR. In spite of that, he remained enmeshed in Marxist thought and defended the AMP at a time when most Marxists had abandoned it. I suspect that the reason they ultimately abandoned it is that the form of exploitation that occurred within the AMP (in its original form) indicates that private property is not necessary for workers and peasants to be exploited. I am sure that at the height of the cold war this was far too important a point to concede. Now, let's take a brief look at chapter 9 to see how the Marx's early understanding of AMP developed and laid the groundwork for its rejection.

The Asiatic Mode of Production in Marx

The biggest problem that Wittfogel has with Marx regarding the AMP is that Marx doesn't think of this as rule by a class (i.e., the state bureaucracy) but rather as rule by a despot/state. Why doesn't Marx find a ruling class in the Asiatic mode of production? (Note that he unfailingly finds classes in all other modes of production.) I suspect that ultimately (but perhaps unconsciously?) Marx gets this from Hegel and his characterization of the East as the Rule of One. Of course, our author finds other problems with the Marxist understanding of hydraulic societies too. But I believe that Marx's inability to find classes in the AMP is, for our author, the most egregious. I suspect that another reason that Marx doesn't find classes in the AMP is that the mere existence of classes would imply dialectical movement; and oriental despotism does not appear to change.

There are other problems. Most importantly, Wittfogel also suspects that both Marx and Engels were responding to the withering criticism of the anarchists that Marxist communism "would inevitably involve the despotic rule of a privileged minority over the rest of the population, the workers included. (p. 387-388)" Wittfogel thus suspects that Marx/Engels watered down their understanding of the 'Asiatic mode of production' for practical, not theoretical, considerations. And of course he wants us to infer this too.

Yes, yes, I know; one can criticize Wittfogel of exactly the same thing. His book was written to tie 'really existing' socialism to the tradition and practices of Oriental Despotic regimes. We all need to get over this. (Wittfogel included.) All important books are written with a purpose in mind. They want to convince people of a certain time and place of something that they are (at least) not entirely convinced of yet. Evidence is shaped and cut to achieve that specific purpose. This shaping and cutting (which necessarily happens) will always eventually present opportunities at a later date for much indignation and consternation. I have always found trying to understand authors in their specific situations with their specific purposes more enlightening than throwing a fit because the necessities of yesterday were unlike those of today.

What was the Asiatic Mode of Production to Marx? Broadly speaking, dispersed villages required a central authority to take charge of irrigation and canal projects. And this permitted the central authority to perpetuate itself indefinitely. With this term Marx / Engels are most usually thinking of China and India, Russia was called semi-Asiatic; but of her Engels (1875) said, "Such a complete isolation of the individual [village] communities from each other, which in the whole country creates identical, but the exact opposite of common, interests, is the natural foundation of Oriental despotism, and from India to Russia this societal form, wherever it prevailed, has always produced despotism and has found therein its supplement. Not only the Russian state in general, but even its specific form, the despotism of the Tsar, far from being suspended in mid-air, is the necessary and logical product of the Russian social conditions. (cited pg. 376)" Note that Russian conditions do not seem to be especially promising ground for a socialist revolution.

[I want to digress a moment and underline that Marx and Engels, even with their mistaken (according to our author) understanding of the AMP, are very aware of the problematic nature of revolutionary prospects for Russia. For the 1882 Russian edition of the "Communist Manifesto" they write:

-The Communist Manifesto had, as its object, the proclamation of the inevitable impending dissolution of modern bourgeois property. But in Russia we find, face-to-face with the rapidly flowering capitalist swindle and bourgeois property, just beginning to develop, more than half the land owned in common by the peasants. Now the question is: can the Russian obshchina, though greatly undermined, yet a form of primeval common ownership of land, pass directly to the higher form of Communist common ownership? Or, on the contrary, must it first pass through the same process of dissolution such as constitutes the historical evolution of the West?

The only answer to that possible today is this: If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist development.

Karl Marx & Frederick Engels
January 21, 1882, London-

So you see, there were strong marxist grounds for the rejection of the USSR. Without european proletarian revolution the jump from peasant society to socialist society, skipping capitalism, seemed to Marx & Engels highly unlikely. Perhaps we can say that, avant la lettre, Marx & Engels were anti-Soviets. Digression ended.]

According to Marx, under the Asiatic Mode the state (the despot) is the real landlord and there is a general slavery insofar as the despot is the coordinator of all crucial hydraulic and communal works (pp. 376-377). Lenin accepts the Marxist notion of the Asiatic Mode until 1914. (He abandons it in 1916.) But of course, Marx is interested in the question for theoretical reasons, Lenin for practical ones. But that does not mean that Marx cannot alter theory for practical reasons.

Now, what is a ruling class? Those who control the "decisive means of production and the 'surplus' created by them (p. 380)." Regarding Marx's inability to find classes in the AMP and instead only see there the sovereign and/or the state our author writes, "[t]his was a strange formulation for a man who ordinarily was eager to define social classes and who denounced as a mystifying 'reification' the use of such notions as 'commodity' and the 'state', when the underlying human (class) relations were left unexplained (p. 380)." I found this a convincing point. Wittfogel adds that of Marx's sources, JS Mill, Francois Bernier, and Richard Jones had all spoken of functionaries of the oriental states (i.e., bureaucrats) receiving portions of the surplus. Therefore Marx was well aware of it. Our authors judgement of this in a nutshell:

"Marx' interest in the class issue, the data at his disposal, and his objection to the mystification of social relations point to one conclusion, and one conclusion only. They all suggest that from his own standpoint Marx should have designated the functional bureaucracy as the ruling class of oriental despotism. But Marx did nothing of the kind. Instead of clarifying the character of the Oriental ruling class he obscured it. Measured by the insights reached by Bernier. Jones. and Mill, Marx' mystification (reification) of the character of the ruling class in Oriental society was a step backwards. (p. 381)"

You see our authors criticism of Marx/ism is that he (and his movement) wasn't Marxist enough! Whether this happened because of anarchist criticism or the later need to justify a socialist revolution in Russia or some other reason (or combination of reasons) is immaterial. Wittfogel does not understand himself to be a mere anti-Marxist. Rather, he sees himself as more consistently applying the insights of Marx in order to find classes in the AMP. How should Wittfogels 'Marxism' be judged? György Lukács once said:
"Let us assume for the sake of argument that recent research had disproved once and for all every one of Marx's individual theses. Even if this were to be proved, every serious 'orthodox' Marxist would still be able to accept all such modern findings without reservation and hence dismiss all of Marx's theses in toto - without having to renounce his orthodoxy for a single moment. Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx's investigations. It is not the 'belief' in this or that thesis nor the exegesis of a 'sacred' book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. ("History and Class Consciousness", 'What is Orthodox Marxism', Lukács)"

After reading this book, I think that Wittfogel should be judged a Marxist (however heretical). And his arguments accepted or rejected by marxists in those terms.

Final Thoughts

It is tempting to treat this book as a successful attempt to commingle marxist analysis with geopolitical analysis in order to enrich our understanding of history. Surely, Wittfogel is right to think that geopolitics would benefit from a marxist analysis. (And, I would add, vice versa.) And yes, this book is richly suggestive, thoughtful and shows years of study. But, for example, in asserting that, "his goal was to prepare a marxist geopolitics as an alternative to nationalist varieties" (John Agnew, "Making Political Geography", p. 81) one can be mislead into thinking that this has (or can) be achieved. Why do I think this?

Because to simply equate the Marxist notion of AMP with a geopolitical understanding of Land-Power (which, I believe, at the theoretical level will prove necessary) is very misleading - at best. Why? The Marxist understanding is dialectical; everything moves. This is untrue of geopolitics. Here there are invariants: most obviously geography, and the resulting unsurpassable geopolitical difference between land and sea powers. The Marxist historical stages dialectically go through the 'primitive communism' of tribalistic prehistory, our Asiatic Mode, ancient slavery, feudalism, and then on to capitalism. (And one day, according to Marx, socialism.) Of course, the Asiatic Mode sticks out like a sore thumb because it doesn't seem to develop into another mode while all the others do (or, in the case of capitalism, one day will).

Now this progressive 'stagism' was common in early modern thought and certainly is not unique to Marx; see, for instance, Montesquieu, Turgot and Adam Smith. What was entirely new in Marx was his methodology. And this is why the AMP must remain such a contested notion within Marxist theory. That methodology (dialectical materialism) was one of movement, while to the consternation of all the Asiatic Mode did not seem to move (i.e., change into another stage due to contradictions within itself). If the Asiatic Mode was unmoving in this sense, could there be another mode of production that was also unmoving? Of course, no marxist wanted to think this of capitalism!

I would argue that the historically later marxist modes of production (slavery, feudalism, capitalism) all can be brought into fruitful contact with the geopolitical notion of seapower, while this cannot be said of the Asiatic Mode vis-à-vis landpower. The contemporary histories of capitalist states Marx studied while in England were those of western europe. And its history, geopolitically, was the triumph of sea-powers over lesser sea-powers and land-powers. I think that Arrighi (see his "The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times") has nicely shown how well marxist theory can explain the transformations of Capitalist Regimes as the succession of hegemonic sea powers. (-Although this certainly wasn't his intent!) The sea-powers that Arrighi focuses on, btw, are Genoa, the Dutch, the British, and the USA. These are all classical examples of what nineteenth century geopoliticians meant by seapower.

But I doubt strongly that what Arrighi has certainly achieved for capitalist political economy / history can be done, in a Marxist manner, for a geopolitical-informed world history. Why? Marxism posits the oneness of Man and History. This 'oneness' becomes ever more exact, dialectically, over time. (Of course this is never fully achieved. Every step in the dialectical process leads to new contradictions. There are no utopias or end-points.) While Marxism teaches this (ever more exact) monism, Geopolitics teeters upon an unsurpassable dualism: landpower versus seapower. I don't believe that there is anything unsurpassable in a material dialectical history. Therefore I think that any marxist geopolitics that seeks to be internally consistent, will be always tempted to, and eventually forced to, either deny the unmoving nature of the asiatic mode (i.e., landpower) or do away with the category entirely.

The other possibility, explored by Wittfogel in this book, is to find classes in the AMP. The objection to this move will be: if the absence of private property (in the AMP) doesn't equate to the absence of exploitation then how can we be certain that socialism itself won't become but another exploitive society? It will probably be eventually agreed that if the AMP is retained within the edifice of marxist thought then the possibility of exploitation in a socialist society cannot be theoretically ruled out. So again, AMP will be discarded.

Now, from a geopolitically 'landpower' point of view, what might one say? Well, our nationalistic geopolitician might say that this history of capitalism as delineated by Arrighi (and others) was but the history of western european seapowers and their north american / australian avatars. He might add that what we currently refer to as 'globalization' is merely the attempt of these powers (and alliances thereof) to impose their will on the rest of the world. And he would consider the distinct international institutions of late modernity (for instance, the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, the OECD, and most NGO's), to varying degrees, to be part of this conspiracy to remake the world in the image of western european seapowers. Who thinks like this? ...Well, Vladimir Putin for one.

But the geopolitical understanding of landpower vs. seapower will one day (I hope!) be the subject of another review. Four stars for a wonderfully suggestive, thoughtful book marred by the excesses of its time. (- But again, name a book or individual that hasn't been.) It really should be reprinted.

[Soheil · Rating 4 out of 5]

ویتفوگل این کتاب رو با ۳۰ سال تحقیق تو مصر و خاور میانه نوشته پایه نظریش نظرات مارکس بوده ولی بطور قوی اونو گسترش داده
جذابیت کتاب استنادهایی که به مکانها وقایع و اثار بجا مونده است که می کنه
خوندنش توصیه می کنم

[Bob Croft · Rating 4 out of 5]

Powerful argument, good logical layout. Hydraulic economies (Those based on huge water projects, either irrigation or flood control) require large corvees of labor, generally require autocrats, and morph into monumental constructions and armies. Farming tends to be high intensity and productive; peasants often have control over their own farming practices, but little else. Intensive agriculture allows very high productivity(per acre), so high populations. The state, originally managed (save in conquest situations) by the technical elite, demands total subservience. Exceptions featuring cooperative, not forced, labor, and hence non-totalitarian societies are Venice, Salt Lake City and the Netherlands. Most land is rented or allocated by government or by (usually palace connected) landholders; peasant ownership occasionally occurs. Hydraulic Despotism would be a better title, as examples include Central America, the Pueblos, Spain under the Muslims, and Hawaii, in addition to the expected Egypt, India, the near east and China. Despotisms are often exported sans hydrology, as in Rome (via Sicily), Russia, the Byzantine Balkans.

[Michele Boldrin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Must read.

[Timothy · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found this book to be highly entertaining and thought-provoking, although it is not the sort of work that ages well. Simultaneously an overarching study of world history and an anti-Soviet polemic, the book explores Marx's concept of the "Asiatic mode of production" by comparing the socioeconomic structures of historical Asian and other non-Western civilizations. Wittfogel finds authoritarian modes of government to be linked to the needs of river-valley societies, which require a high degree of centralization in order to carry out large-scale irrigation projects. A specialist in Chinese history, the author confidently draws from an immense range of literature and positions each civilization within a highly nuanced framework. The book (as well as the historical argument) is mechanically organized to an oppressive degree, but Wittfogel's dry humor and barely suppressed anger help to keep the writing fresh. This is a flawed and somewhat outdated work, but still a classic with which students of history should become familiar.

[JV · Rating 5 out of 5]

Um largo estudo sobre projetos de irrigação e sua relação com geografia e história. A obra desafia filosofias e concepções muito em voga. O pensamento a partir de Smith, por exemplo, baseia-se nas três ordens:

“The whole annual produce of the land and labour of every country, or what comes to the same thing, the whole price of that annual produce, naturally divides itself, it has already been observed, into three parts; the rent of land, the wages of labour, and the profits of stock; and constitutes a revenue to three different orders of people; to those who live by rent, to those who live by wages, and to those who live by profit. These are the three great, original, and constituent orders of every civilised society, from whose revenue that of every other order is ultimately derived.”

Marx parece desenvolver cada uma das ordens – rentistas, burgueses e proletários – nas ordens históricas feudalismo, capitalismo e socialismo. Enquanto agente econômico Smith via os representantes do governo como rentistas da terra pública e donos dos títulos de governo a partir dos impostos. No melhor dos casos. De resto é o governo instituído para defender o rico do pobre, atrapalhar o mercado e proteger os donos da propriedade dos desprovidos.

Nas sociedades além da Europa só se via povos governados por enormes estados, gentes tratadas como escravos de seus líderes (v. Montesquieu) e na mais totalitária e vil servidão (Marx). Não viram que longe de ser apenas rentistas de largas terras, esses Estados essencialmente controlavam gerencialmente as águas e vastos projetos de irrigação. Viram obras massivas como as muralhas da China, o Taj-Mahal, Angkor, as casas de Los Pueblos, as pirâmides do Egito, os zigurates etc, mas lhes passou despercebido a canalização do Nilo, os Kanats da Pérsia, os Johads da Índia, os aquedutos dos andes e do império romano, obras de controle do rio Amarelo e Yang-Tsé ou a conexão subterrânea entre poços que ainda hoje encontramos no Saara. Viram pobres e ricos como também os havia na Europa mas não perceberam que o menor apparatschik tem mais poder que o mais rico mercador carente da privança imperial. Porque dentro de uma “sociedade hidráulica” o Estado é tão mais forte que a sociedade que o povo está para o aparato como uma nação subjugada está para os seus dominadores.

Os economistas e sociólogos clássicos falharam em entender essas sociedades porque no ocidente a segurança jurídica dá liberdade para ampla utilização da propriedade, o que foi chamado de “propriedade forte”, aquela sob o arbítrio do dono. Nas sociedades hidráulicas a propriedade é fraca, o conjunto de leis vago, dependente dos caprichos absolutos do imperador e sujeita a todo tipo de arbitrariedade fiscal. Wittvogel classifica essas sociedades de acordo com a amplitude de atividade econômica com a qual essas sociedades conseguiram conformar propriedade fraca e forte. As civilizações do Havaii, Incas, Egito, China Antiga e Suméria são sociedades hidráulicas simples pois propriedade privada móvel e imóvel é fraca e subordinada. As civilizações mesoamericanas, Índia, China, oriente médio, Bizâncio e Rússia são semi-complexas dada a relativa independência do comércio e indústria. Uma sociedade hidráulica complexa teria propriedades fracas e fortes no comércio, indústria e agricultura.

Como dissemos as sociedades hidráulicas formam-se em torno de um projeto hidráulico (rio, aqueduto, tanque, poço etc) que só pode concretizar-se através do poder construtor e organizador de um aparato burocrático. Longe de se tornar um Estado Burocrático, são sociedades centralizadoras e autocráticas onde o monitoramento, insegurança e opressão mantém o permanente funcionamento desse projeto. Tornam-se civilizações cultas e avançadíssimas pois seus mestres são construtores em última estância e construtores porque grandes organizadores pois registram, controlam e contabilizam. Após chegar a um grau de excelência essas sociedades enfrentam o dilema da lei dos retornos administrativos decrescentes: o aumento do controle aumenta o custo, mas não o lucro do empreendimento. Em termos populares, se melhorar estraga. E não há como fugir disso porque, como dissemos, seu Estado é o maior ou o único investidor. Um cacique (ou Tsar, Chagga, Faraó, whatever) tenta inovar, tudo parece sair bem, mas ao final de algumas décadas o prejuízo é palpável. A frustração da sociedade atinge um máximo e o cacique é substituído. O novo líder volta a fazer tudo tal qual antes e apesar de revoluções e convulsões cíclicas a civilização mantém sua forma estagnada através de milênios.

O livro foi concebido por Karl Wittvogel quando pesquisava no Institut für Sozialforschung (conhecido por Escola de Frankfurt) dos quais era membro fundador. Sua monografia havia sido sobre a sociedade agrária na China e tentava enquadrá-la como sociedade feudal segundo o dogmatismo marxista – a falha em conformar a teoria àquela realidade só seria percebida anos depois. Seu desenvolvimento intelectual passara a ver o comunismo com outros olhos. A União Soviética, longe de ser um desenvolvimento do capitalismo, era apenas mais uma das faces da Civilização Hidráulica. Em cartas Lênin parece temer justamente isso. Quando divulgou o resultado de suas pesquisas, ele foi rejeitado pelo partido – o que não lhe importava mais desde que se desiludiu com o pacto com os nazistas. Exilado em Londres, Wittvogel foi ferrenho anticomunista.

“O Despotismo Oriental” é um grande alerta ao ocidente que em seu triunfalismo tomou por destino o que é acaso e escolha. A Inglaterra não nasceu para ser livre como o Egito não nasceu para a servidão. A Bíblia narra a subjugação do Egito a Faraó da seguinte forma:

Não havia pão em toda a terra, porque a fome era mui severa; de maneira que desfalecia o povo do Egito e o povo de Canaã por causa da fome.
Então, José arrecadou todo o dinheiro que se achou na terra do Egito e na terra de Canaã, pelo cereal que compravam, e o recolheu à casa de Faraó.
Tendo-se acabado, pois, o dinheiro, na terra do Egito e na terra de Canaã, foram todos os egípcios a José e disseram: Dá-nos pão; por que haveremos de morrer em tua presença? Porquanto o dinheiro nos falta.
Respondeu José: Se vos falta o dinheiro, trazei o vosso gado; em troca do vosso gado eu vos suprirei.
Então, trouxeram o seu gado a José; e José lhes deu pão em troca de cavalos, de rebanhos, de gado e de jumentos; e os sustentou de pão aquele ano em troca do seu gado.
Findo aquele ano, foram a José no ano próximo e lhe disseram: Não ocultaremos a meu senhor que se acabou totalmente o dinheiro; e meu senhor já possui os animais; nada mais nos resta diante de meu senhor, senão o nosso corpo e a nossa terra.
Por que haveremos de perecer diante dos teus olhos, tanto nós como a nossa terra? Compra-nos a nós e a nossa terra a troco de pão, e nós e a nossa terra seremos escravos de Faraó; dá-nos semente para que vivamos e não morramos, e a terra não fique deserta.
Assim, comprou José toda a terra do Egito para Faraó, porque os egípcios venderam cada um o seu campo, porquanto a fome era extrema sobre eles; e a terra passou a ser de Faraó.
Quanto ao povo, ele o escravizou de uma a outra extremidade da terra do Egito.
Somente a terra dos sacerdotes não a comprou ele; pois os sacerdotes tinham porção de Faraó e eles comiam a sua porção que Faraó lhes tinha dado; por isso, não venderam a sua terra.
Então, disse José ao povo: Eis que hoje vos comprei a vós outros e a vossa terra para Faraó; aí tendes sementes, semeai a terra.
Das colheitas dareis o quinto a Faraó, e as quatro partes serão vossas, para semente do campo, e para o vosso mantimento e dos que estão em vossas casas, e para que comam as vossas crianças.
Responderam eles: A vida nos tens dado! Achemos mercê perante meu senhor e seremos escravos de Faraó.
E José estabeleceu por lei até ao dia de hoje que, na terra do Egito, tirasse Faraó o quinto; só a terra dos sacerdotes não ficou sendo de Faraó.

Gênesis 47:13-26

É história digna de ser lembrada porque pode ser a nossa. O início da elaboração conceitual das civilizações a partir da Europa deu-se principalmente a partir de três obras: Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations ("An Essay on Universal History, the Manners, and Spirit of Nations" em Inglês) de Voltaire, A riqueza das Nações de Adam Smith e O Espírito das Letras de Montesquieu. Quando do lançamento dessas obras a Europa em grande parte era governada por uma monarquia absolutista e julgaram não ser grande a diferença do Despotismo Oriental. Quando da passagem para a República essa questão ficou para trás e passou-se a pensar apenas em Modernidade. O comunismo é um lembrete de quanto a modernidade pode lembrar o mais antigo dos modos de produção, o oriental de escravidão absoluta. As três características necessárias de uma sociedade hidráulica é divisão de trabalho, cooperação e cultivo intensivo. Todas já presentes no industrialismo. Havendo uma apropriação dos meios de trabalho e do poder, nada obsta à implantação de um despotismo jamais visto em seu alcance e controle.

[noblethumos · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Oriental Despotism" is a book by German-American scholar Karl Wittfogel, first published in 1957. In this work, Wittfogel argues that there are certain types of societies in which the state has an all-encompassing and authoritarian control over its citizens, which he refers to as "Oriental despotism."

Wittfogel's analysis centers around his concept of "hydraulic society," which refers to societies that are built around large-scale irrigation systems, such as those found in ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and China. He argues that the construction and maintenance of these systems required an enormous centralized bureaucracy, which eventually became the basis for a highly centralized and authoritarian state.

According to Wittfogel, this type of society is characterized by a number of distinctive features, including a highly centralized state, a lack of private property, and a rigid hierarchy of social and political classes. He argues that these societies are fundamentally different from those found in the West, where individualism, capitalism, and democracy have played a larger role in shaping political and social structures.

Critics of Wittfogel's work have argued that his analysis is overly simplistic and relies too heavily on broad generalizations about "Oriental" societies. However, his work has been influential in shaping debates about the nature of authoritarianism and the role of the state in shaping political and social structures.

GPT

[Med · Rating 5 out of 5]

باورم‌نمیشه همچین کتاب مهمی حتی تصویر هم نداشته باشه، I don’t believe an important book like this , even not have a simple picture

[J M-B · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is a book that is more well known than it is widely read. It has long been on my radar, but i finally got round to reading it because of the impact of the covid pandemic on the attitudes governments left and right across the capitalist world towards extensions of state intervention in the economy. Wittfogel’s central argument, that there is a characteristic mode of production in arid and semi-arid (Asiatic) regions that arose from the need for massive state direction of hydraulic projects to make agriculture viable, also seems to have some relevance to the scale of projects required to address climate change. Central to Wittfogel’s model of the Asiatic hydraulic society was that the centralized administration required to maintain the system of production on marginally viable territories was so strong as to restrict the development of private property (p. 78) and utilized peasant labour in ways that prevent the formation of a proletarian class (28). The capitalist state seems poised to be, not only more interventionist in relation to the business cycle, but also more directive of the global economy than the followers of Hayek ever feared. And that’s before the shift to a war economy in the West’s response to the Ukraine crisis.

As so often when one finally reads a book that is encumbered with a big reputation, there is less to it than one has been led to expect. Wittfogel had an early reputation as a radical Marxist, through his association with the Frankfurt School and George Lukacs, and through his opposition to Stalin’s ‘Third Period’ policy of equating German Social Democrats with Fascists. Oriental Despotism, however, is a later work (1957) published in America during the McCarthyite period. His interest in the idea of the Asiatic Mode of Production, which was to inform Oriental Despotism, came from his reading of the Lenin / Plekhanov debates on Russian agriculture at the (1906) Congress of the Russian Social Democratic and Labour Party at Stockholm. Under the influence of the ideas of Plekhanov, Wittfogal came to include Russia as an historic example of Asiatic despotism and he dated the beginning of the ‘new totalitarian order’ in Russia not from the rise of Stalinism, but starting with the October revolution of 1917 (9). It was this, more than anything, that made this book so attractive to the American academy of the time.

Perhaps Wittfogel is due for renewed interest. If so, it is unlikely to be because of the potential relevance of his ideas to the scale of state organization that will be needed to address climate change. The west’s current preoccupation with Putin’s kleptocracy in Russia may make his ideas about an eternal Russian imperialism suddenly very attractive to the new cold war warriors keen for some rubbish to re-cycle.

[Emad Mosaddegh · Rating 5 out of 5]

کتابی زیبا است . از همه ی زوایا حکومت های شرقی را بررسی و نوع و دلایل پیدایش چنین حکومت هایی را توضیح داده است . به طوری که از نظر منتقدان غربی حاکمان غربی از ارج و قرب بیشتری برخوردارند و باعث می شود که دستوراتشان سریع تر انجام گردد . کتابی بسیار عالی .

[Hossein · Rating 5 out of 5]

یه کتاب حساب شده و حاصل سالها تحقیق گسترده

[Nils · Rating 5 out of 5]

A remarkable piece of macro-sociological synthesis, which is both profound and very much self-consciously of its moment in the 1950s. Wittfogel, former Weimar playright and Frankfurt Schooler become virulent anti-totalitarian intellectual Cold Warrior, provides a profound reading of how the biophysical need to manipulate water (for agriculture and flood control) interacts with political and social institutions to produce either liberty or despotism.

[Anon · Rating 3 out of 5]

Right now, I read stuff like this, mostly. Not exactly Oprah Book Club material

[Plato]

I want to read this book

[Marijan Šiško · Rating 4 out of 5]

ovo je bila moja knjiga za plažu :)