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Cassell History of Warfare
The Art of War: War and Military Thought
The art of making war is among humankind's earliest professions, stretching far back before the written word, when heroic deeds in battles were carved on stone or recited through poem or song.In this sweeping, lucid history, Martin van Creveld explores military thought and strategy, from the earliest Chinese military thinkers to 20th-century perspectives on terrorism. This incredibly comprehensive book provides the reader with a gripping narrative of how war has been waged in ages past and a glimpse of what war may come to look like in the future.
240 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2000
About the author
Martin van Creveld
67 books129 followersMartin Levi van Creveld is an Israeli military historian and theorist.
Van Creveld was born in the Netherlands in the city of Rotterdam, and has lived in Israel since shortly after his birth. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he has been on the faculty since 1971. He is the author of seventeen books on military history and strategy, of which Command in War (1985), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977, 2nd edition 2004), The Transformation of War (1991), The Sword and the Olive (1998) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999) are among the best known. Van Creveld has lectured or taught at many strategic institutes in the Western world, including the U.S. Naval War College.
- wikipedia.org
Van Creveld was born in the Netherlands in the city of Rotterdam, and has lived in Israel since shortly after his birth. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he has been on the faculty since 1971. He is the author of seventeen books on military history and strategy, of which Command in War (1985), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977, 2nd edition 2004), The Transformation of War (1991), The Sword and the Olive (1998) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999) are among the best known. Van Creveld has lectured or taught at many strategic institutes in the Western world, including the U.S. Naval War College.
- wikipedia.org
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Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews
May 30, 2018
It felt more like a historiography than the actual art of war. If you lock yourself up in the library and comb through every book on war, you could just easily write a book like this. Need more depth in knowledge.
July 1, 2011
Obviously intended for folks who have a solid foundation in military history. This book is kind of stuck between being a summary of the bigger trends in military history and a detailed essay aimed at experts. It pulls off neither extreme and, as a result, has a very lukewarm feeling to it. Great pictures and visuals, however.
June 23, 2023
The Art of War, written by Martin Van Creveld in 2000, is one title in the Cassell History of Warfare, General Editor John Keegan. Van Creveld summarizes the best in war strategy from 400 BC China to 2000 AD and the issues arising from nuclear warfare and the potential end of the world.
In the period 400 BC to the Roman era, he cites Sun Tzu and few others in ancient China. Sun Tzu gives a number of guiding principles such as ‘know your enemy and know yourself,’ ‘utilize intelligence to the maximum,’ ‘utilize maximum force,’ ‘utilize deception. and ‘the best war is the one that is never fought.’ These all seem apparent today, however Van Creveld cautions that Sun Tzu lives in a Tao environment as do his competitors. In a more modern environment, the need to restore Tao may not be present.
From antiquity to 1500 AD, Van Creveld recommends Aselepiodotus and Onasander who are primarily philosophers who offer guidance such as ‘have an advisory council,’ ‘do not plunder your allies,’ ‘hold onto a reserve,’ and ‘the Persian nation is wicked, dissembling, and servile.” They also offer a number of specific tactics for specific situations.
In the period from 1500 to 1763, the best guidance comes from Machiavelli and Montecuccoli who was the best at siege warfare. These authors offered guidance such as the need for both a standing army and a temporary, conscripted army as well as bases, objectives, and lines of operations. Buelow added the use of maps allowing strategy to develop at a desk rather than in the field. Jomini added more detail like rivers, roads, mountains, and concepts as theatres of operations. Clausewitz organized methods of planning still in use and distinguished between tactics and strategy. He also articulated that “War is a continuation of policy by other means.” This clarifies that the political leadership, not the military leadership, must take the decision to go to war.
With the advent of the nuclear age, Clausewitz was generally set aside as too philosophical. Large scale conventional war was expected to never go nuclear. States rich enough to engage in major conventional war would not go nuclear as the world would immediately end. This view is being reviewed since several middle states have engaged in large scale conventional warfare without going nuclear.
During the 19th century, Moltke developed the institution of a “General Staff.” Schleiffen developed the (in)famous plan for Prussian Germany to enter war with France and Russia combined. His plan made use of rapid-fire weapons and carefully scheduled troop trains allowing major forces to be transported over large distances in short periods of time.
The chapter on naval warfare is very brief. The objective is to keep your sea lanes open and your enemy’s sea lanes closed.
During the brief interwar period, Douhet published the only significant guide on the objectives of an air force and what tactics are appropriate. Fuller developed tactics for armored forces and Liddell Hart made recommendations for ‘indirect’ tactics for flexible, mobile forces and forces able to sidestep enemy battles. This allows flanking of enemy forces or change of objectives. Ludendorff was the only Commander-In-Chief who had war experience. He was also more nearly correct than the others.
Most nuclear age theories were more aimed at preventing nuclear war than winning nuclear war. The most lasting strategy was MAD. Most nuclear strategies were not developed by commanders of conventional forces. The only USSR strategy simply said that there would be no controllable nuclear war; if any nuclear weapons were targeted at them, they would immediately go all out with nuclear weapons. Examples of post 1945 conventional wars include Viet Nam and several Israeli vs Arab wars. Other wars since 1945 that have remained conventional include what we would call civil wars or terrorism. The most robust of these war plans has been Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Civil War. His primary point is that the struggle is primarily political.
Van Creveld is a clear and brief writer who knows his material. The book is interesting in scope and time period. There are also numerous pictures and maps illustrating various points. 3.5 stars
In the period 400 BC to the Roman era, he cites Sun Tzu and few others in ancient China. Sun Tzu gives a number of guiding principles such as ‘know your enemy and know yourself,’ ‘utilize intelligence to the maximum,’ ‘utilize maximum force,’ ‘utilize deception. and ‘the best war is the one that is never fought.’ These all seem apparent today, however Van Creveld cautions that Sun Tzu lives in a Tao environment as do his competitors. In a more modern environment, the need to restore Tao may not be present.
From antiquity to 1500 AD, Van Creveld recommends Aselepiodotus and Onasander who are primarily philosophers who offer guidance such as ‘have an advisory council,’ ‘do not plunder your allies,’ ‘hold onto a reserve,’ and ‘the Persian nation is wicked, dissembling, and servile.” They also offer a number of specific tactics for specific situations.
In the period from 1500 to 1763, the best guidance comes from Machiavelli and Montecuccoli who was the best at siege warfare. These authors offered guidance such as the need for both a standing army and a temporary, conscripted army as well as bases, objectives, and lines of operations. Buelow added the use of maps allowing strategy to develop at a desk rather than in the field. Jomini added more detail like rivers, roads, mountains, and concepts as theatres of operations. Clausewitz organized methods of planning still in use and distinguished between tactics and strategy. He also articulated that “War is a continuation of policy by other means.” This clarifies that the political leadership, not the military leadership, must take the decision to go to war.
With the advent of the nuclear age, Clausewitz was generally set aside as too philosophical. Large scale conventional war was expected to never go nuclear. States rich enough to engage in major conventional war would not go nuclear as the world would immediately end. This view is being reviewed since several middle states have engaged in large scale conventional warfare without going nuclear.
During the 19th century, Moltke developed the institution of a “General Staff.” Schleiffen developed the (in)famous plan for Prussian Germany to enter war with France and Russia combined. His plan made use of rapid-fire weapons and carefully scheduled troop trains allowing major forces to be transported over large distances in short periods of time.
The chapter on naval warfare is very brief. The objective is to keep your sea lanes open and your enemy’s sea lanes closed.
During the brief interwar period, Douhet published the only significant guide on the objectives of an air force and what tactics are appropriate. Fuller developed tactics for armored forces and Liddell Hart made recommendations for ‘indirect’ tactics for flexible, mobile forces and forces able to sidestep enemy battles. This allows flanking of enemy forces or change of objectives. Ludendorff was the only Commander-In-Chief who had war experience. He was also more nearly correct than the others.
Most nuclear age theories were more aimed at preventing nuclear war than winning nuclear war. The most lasting strategy was MAD. Most nuclear strategies were not developed by commanders of conventional forces. The only USSR strategy simply said that there would be no controllable nuclear war; if any nuclear weapons were targeted at them, they would immediately go all out with nuclear weapons. Examples of post 1945 conventional wars include Viet Nam and several Israeli vs Arab wars. Other wars since 1945 that have remained conventional include what we would call civil wars or terrorism. The most robust of these war plans has been Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Civil War. His primary point is that the struggle is primarily political.
Van Creveld is a clear and brief writer who knows his material. The book is interesting in scope and time period. There are also numerous pictures and maps illustrating various points. 3.5 stars
February 21, 2022
This is a very broad and selective overview of military strategic thoughts from early China and Rome to end of 20th century. Given the size of field and size of the book it's obvious a lot will be left out and what makes the cut will be treated broadly and quickly. And that's the main issue with the book. What it does it does decently enough, provides reader with some insight into what thinkers thought about fighting wars, it just does very little of it.
Book naturally picks certain time periods that were both more productive in terms of strategic thought and when such thoughts were more applicable. So ancient China and Rome gets some mention (cna't write a book on strategy without mentioning Sun Tzu) and then starting from 17th century more thinkers get mentioned and analyzed.
This book would greatly benefit from being a two if not even three volume book of same format, as such we can only dip our toes into the pool of development of such ideas.
Book naturally picks certain time periods that were both more productive in terms of strategic thought and when such thoughts were more applicable. So ancient China and Rome gets some mention (cna't write a book on strategy without mentioning Sun Tzu) and then starting from 17th century more thinkers get mentioned and analyzed.
This book would greatly benefit from being a two if not even three volume book of same format, as such we can only dip our toes into the pool of development of such ideas.
October 15, 2019
Ganske tørr oversikt over teorier knyttet til hvordan og hvorfor kriger utkjempes. Ettersom boka snart er 20 år gammel er det i dag artig å lese hvor lite tiltro forfattereren hadde i 2000 på utviklingen av "informasjonkrig/cyberwarfare".
November 23, 2018
This book provides a broad and introductory view to military strategy, from Ancient Chine, through to Jomini and Clauswitz, with a brief discussion of nuclear weapons and terrorism.
January 11, 2022
A highly readable introduction and overview to the concept of military thought and its most influential thinkers. As with all books in the series, this includes lavish illustrations.
September 13, 2022
I always enjoy reading Creveld, but it’s hard to tell who this short book is meant to appeal to. It’s not appropriate for the beginner, and too shallow for the initiated.
May 12, 2024
A good overview of military thought. Yet will drill down to specifics at times. Great book for its size.
January 14, 2025
This book provide a good overview about military history writings. I read this book in 2025 and was impressed by the accuracy of last chapter.
October 11, 2025
An excellent overview of military thought. It includes the ancient world, including Asia and comes up to reach the present (namely 2000).
July 25, 2011
Somewhat unfortunately titled... since "The Art of War" is also the title of the most-famous and the third-most-famous works on warfare (Sun Tzu's and Jomini's, respectively). This is a decent overall survey of military thought and theory over the centuries. It falters towards the end, where the author departs from the survey of other writings and feels compelled to weigh in with his own opinions on modern warfare. A good introduction to the study of military philosophy and doctrine (and led me to some writers of whom I'd been previously unaware).
February 23, 2026
"The Art of War: War and Military Thought" by Martin van Creveld is an informative historical overview of military strategy and army structure from ancient China to the modern Era. Aside from the first chapter on Chinese military thought, the book is largely Eurocentric. The coloured illustrations of maps and artistic depictions of war are stunning!
October 16, 2007
It was probably more than OK but it's a topic I have a hard time getting my brain around. This helped a little but not enough that I would recommend it to others if a "Warfare for Dummies" were available elsewhere.
December 24, 2009
I am still not convinced that war is an art form. I still have not read anything that explains the process how and why we so regularily loosen our social and moral values to validate the initiation of violence and force. Honor, patriotism, a hankering for great things... I don't get it.
July 7, 2010
good broad review of war theory through the ages from Sun Tzu to Clausewicz and beyond.
points out the evolution of war theory as it progresses from the overall context and minutia to developing theory of strategy.
points out the evolution of war theory as it progresses from the overall context and minutia to developing theory of strategy.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 25, 2013
Quick and easy read providing a solid overview of the evolution of military war and thought. This serves as the wallpaper for deeper study. Perhaps light on Thucydides and heavy on Clausewitz, but who am I to judge.
December 3, 2015
This book accomplishes its purpose of providing an examination of the evolution of military thought. However, the author suffers from clear bias and has an odd obsession with Jomini while nearly poo-pooing the ideas of Clausewitz.
Read
March 4, 2011Interesting and it fired my interest in militar history.
July 28, 2011
It works as a bibliography with some decent synopses of the seminal works of military science/art. I guess I have read so much military history, it was a more like a review for me.
December 10, 2015
Good resource for writers!
Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews