When Reason Goes on Holiday: Philosophers in Politics

by Neven Sesardić

Philosophers usually emphasize the importance of logic, clarity and reason. Therefore when they address political issues they will usually inject a dose of rationality in these discussions, right?

Wrong. This book gives a lot of examples showing the unexpected level of political irrationality among leading contemporary philosophers. The body of the book presents a detailed analysis of extreme leftist views of a number of famous philosophers and their occasional descent into apology for—and occasionally even active participation in—totalitarian politics. Most of these episodes are either virtually unknown (even inside the philosophical community) or have received very little attention.

The author tries to explain how it was possible that so many luminaries of twentieth-century philosophy, who invoked reason and exhibited rigor and careful thinking in their professional work, succumbed to irrationality and ended up supporting some of the most murderous political regimes and ideologies. The huge leftist bias in contemporary philosophy and its persistence over the years is certainly a factor but it is far from being the whole story.

Interestingly, the indisputably high intelligence of these philosophers did not actually protect them from descending into political insanity. It is argued that, on the contrary, both their brilliance and the high esteem they enjoyed in the profession only made them more self-confident and less cautious, thereby eventually making them blind to their betrayal of reason and the monstrosity of the causes they defended.

Genres: Philosophy, Politics, History, Nonfiction, Science, Society, Biography

239 pages, Hardcover

First published November 1, 2016

About the author

Croatian philosopher.

Reviews

[Valeriu Gherghel]

Am citit cartea lui Sesardić în ianuarie-februarie anul trecut, dar n-am dat aici nici un semn. O fac acum, la o nouă răsfoire.

I-am acordat 4 stele nu pentru că ar fi o carte ireproșabilă (nu are cum fi), ci pentru avertismentul care decurge din prezentarea „cazurilor” de filosofi analitici, pentru care argumentul și logica par a fi mai presus de orice (măcar în declarații). Cel puțin asta au spus un Carnap, un Russell, un Hilary Putnam. Din păcate, rațiunea, bunul simț cartesian nu coincid niciodată cu logica și nu decurg din exaltarea ei.

În consecință, filosofii ar trebui să-și prezinte opiniile politice cu cea mai mare prudență. Par a fi specia cea mai vulnerabilă la minciuni și imposturi. Din păcate, îndată ce devin cunoscuți prin cărți / contribuții / articole importante (și ajung în posturi academice de vîrf), filosofii capătă convingerea că-i pot sfătui „de bine” nu numai pe bieții muritori luați ca seminție, ca întreg, dar și pe oamenii politici - prin „scrisori deschise” către președinți, dictatori, regi și sultani. Încep să se adreseze popoarelor, să vaticineze, devin Inspirați, Sfinți în viață. Au impresia că datoria lor nu se reduce la construirea unor „argumente” luminoase, ar fi mult prea puțin pentru ei; datoria lor este, în realitate, de a fi povățuitori ai umanității, sfîșiind întunericul care acoperă ochii mulțimilor, tămăduind orbii, vindecînd șovăielnicii, zguduindu-i pe indeciși.

Firește, filosofii sînt și ei oameni. Om a fost și Platon cînd s-a dus în Siracusa să întemeieze un stat după ideile lui (și a fost luat sclav), om a fost și Seneca, principalul consilier al împăratului Nero, cînd a predicat sărăcia („Sărac nu este cel care are puțin, sărac e cel ce-și dorește mai mult”), deși avea o avere de 350 de milioane de sesterți.

Sugestia lui Neven Sesardić e simplă: faptul că ești profesor de filosofie (sau, Doamne sfinte!, chiar filosof, chiar Filosof), faptul că ești un pontif al Rațiunii, că ai scris „On Denoting”, toate acestea nu te scutesc de a spune și de a face prostii (m-am exprimat gingaș).

P. S. Să te numești Einstein și să scrii cam așa nu-i un semn de istețime: „Nu închid ochii la gravele neajunsuri ale sistemului de guvernămînt rus și nu mi-ar plăcea să trăiesc sub un atare guvernămînt. Dar el are, pe de altă parte, mari merite și este greu de decis dacă pentru ruși ar fi fost mai bine să supraviețuiască urmînd metode mai puțin dure...” (p.99). Fragmentul e dintr-o epistolă din 1948. Aparține savantului. Să nu-mi spuneți că e vorba de un document privat...

[Hemen Kalita]

The book argues that philosophers are overrated when it comes to rational thinking mainly when it concerns politics. I would have given it more stars if the author was not biased towards conservative ideology. He picks up only the leftist philosophers from Russell to Wittgenstein, Angela Davis to Chomsky; even some non-philosophers like –Einstein, Gödel, etc.; and assails them one after one for their irrational and dogmatic views which is in stark contrast to their intellectual capabilities. Author is aware of his selective criticism and he justifies his stance by arguing that leftist intellectuals more often subscribe to, and get away with, outrageous and deplorable views, because they are the majority in the academic circles.

[Robert]

O carte grăitoare despre ce înseamnă rațiunea,mentalitatea și favorizarea anumitor cauze și persoane. Cazurile mai multor filosofi ,printre care Otto Neurath, Ludwig Wittgenstein sau chiar Albert Einstein, care era foarte bine văzut în lumea filosofiei, sunt expuse și analizate dintr-o perspectivă obiectivă, oferindu-se argumente și contraargumente solide. Unele cazuri prezentate sunt de-a dreptul revoltătoare, altele scot la iveală o lume obtuză, în care nu există toleranță și înțelepciune, în ciuda inteligenței superioare pe care o posedă cei din mediile academice.
În concluzie, un filosof excelent nu este și un politician excelent și invers, în ciuda faptului că oamenii în general sfidează legile logicii și corelează multe domenii, în baza virtuților arătate într-una dintre științe,iar o persoană cu un IQ ridicat nu posedă neapărat și o inteligență emoțională ridicată.

,,Căci, între adevărata știință și doctrinele eronate, ignoranța stă la mijloc’’ - Thomas Hobbes


4,5/5

[Otis Chandler]

Mentioned here: https://stratechery.com/2023/an-inter...

[Gareth Clark]

This book was a little disappointing. However, it was well written, fun to read, and engaging. That being said, the case presented in the book seemed "spotty". What I mean by that is that the arguments for the thesis, various examples of prominent thinkers who's reason "when on holiday", were inconsistently convincing. One chapter you had a strikingly compelling point and sometimes in the same chapter you would have a point that the author seems convinces is a good example but just kinda falls flat. This gives the book an odd rhythm in argumentation. One moment you can see the authors point and the next you are questioning his judgment for including a certain piece of evidence or an example. I caught myself often wondering if his political leaning (and not reason) lead him to include certain selections.

A second point to make is the expectation that the author seems to have for analytical philosophers and humans. He seems to see analytical explanations as the only valid explanation for anything. For example, one of the chapters is dedicated to Michael Dummett. The author criticizes Dummet's actions in the 60s for his devotion to anti-racism. The criticism is, of course, not because of the subject matter itself but that Dummett did not used the right "reason" for doing so. In doing so the author seems to suggest that doing anything for any other motivation besides pure reason is to be frowned upon. This vision of humans as "reason machines" seems far too extreme. While it may have held up in the early 20s and 30s I think it would be hard to make a case that that is the foundation of humanity after the postmodern critiques, feminist critiques, and advancements in neuroscience. But this seems to be the position the author has taken.

[Laurie B]

This recounting of philosophers in the 1940s and 1950s who defended the atrocities of Stalin in the name of the utopia proffered by Communism is stunning, to say the least. I can only imagine that a similar tale will be told 50 years from now, about Ibram X. Kendi defending discrimination against white people in the name of equity. There’s little difference here. We all should be better educated on how morality can supersede rationality and common sense, often to the detriment of one’s livelihood or even life.

[Sven Gerst]

Of course, these are ad hominem attacks. But that’s kind of the point of the book, right? It further adds to the debate on the ideological bias in the academy and thus stands in line with the works of Scruton and others. Articulated in a clear (and often quite funny) manner, the book never pretends to be balanced or unbiased—but points out a lot of things that philosophers kindly ignore. And frankly, I was shocked by Lakatos’ past!

[Javier Recuenco]

An absolute powerhouse of a book.
Well written, concise, and shocking.

[Enrique Marchán]

El libro parte de una premisa interesante: algunas de las mejores mentes del siglo XX, como Einstein o Wittgenstein, tenían opiniones totalmente irracionales en temas políticos. El autor explora cómo estos genios, a pesar de su brillantez en campos específicos, cayeron en sesgos que los llevaron a apoyar regímenes cuestionables, como los comunistas en Yugoslavia y la Unión Soviética. Explica ligeramente cómo funcionan las cámaras de eco en la Academia y cómo hay una sobrerepresentacion ideológica de la izquierda en la Universidad, que hace que ciertas ideas tengan una alta penetración entre catedráticos y profesores.

Aunque la premisa es buena y los ejemplos son interesantes, el contenido del libro podría haberse resumido en un artículo de 20 páginas. Además, el autor se centra exclusivamente en filósofos que apoyaron posiciones de izquierdas, argumentando que no encuentra ejemplos similares entre pensadores de derecha y que estos ya están lo suficientemente perseguidos por la academia. Esto hace que el libro, que pretende criticar los sesgos, termine siendo él mismo muy sesgado, lo cual le resta credibilidad.

Por ejemplo, podría haber abordado el caso de la Alemania nazi y cómo muchos científicos brillantes apoyaron las ideas de Hitler, o mencionar casos actuales de "genios" con opiniones absurdas en ciertos temas. Es conocido el caso de Taleb, que tiene tesis brillantes pero en otros temas es un auténtico cuñado que no permite el debate. Los mecanismos mentales explicados en este libro no logran explicar realmente por qué se terminan dando estos sesgos.

En conclusión: la idea central es interesante y puede ser útil para una lectura rápida, como obra completa me parece mediocre. El sesgo del autor y la falta de profundidad en el análisis limitan su alcance y hacen que pierda parte de su potencial.

[Gavin Owen]

Recommended via podcast I had listened to.
He is very biased (by his own admission)
While I think much of what he says is true, the format of arguments + constant left bashing was quite annoying.
Not sure how I’d have structured the book, just know it wouldn’t be like this.

[Edward D]

Fact based view of how intelligent people stumble

Maybe retitle this gem as " Reason Goes away when good sense is needed for public policy" on something more consice.

[Juan]

Una sola idea en medio de un libro pesado y largo (mi opinión).
La idea es potente: cuando examinas la vida y acciones de los máximos exponentes de la racionalidad a lo largo de la historia, te encuentras con las vidas de seres extremadamente irracionales.
Si los grandes filósofos no fueron capaces de vivir a la altura de sus ideas... ¿Qué se puede esperar del resto de mortales?
Si te interesa profundizar en miles de anécdotas de diferentes personajes históricos, quizás te interese el libro.
A mí me aburrió. No pasé de un tercio.

[Richard]

This book was written by a young philosophy student who clearly has an ax to grind -- no doubt, he wrote this after realizing he would never be accepted into the elite world -- but it's a well-researched and useful reminder not to take every philosopher as an expert on contemporary events.

"In academic philosophy, there are no enemies to the left"

Many, perhaps most, intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century were openly sympathetic to Communism. And not just the "let's all share stuff" versions of socialism that every good western democrat finds appealing today. We're talking "the ends justifies the means" Leninism and "a million deaths is a statistic" Stalinism. It wasn't until well into the 1950s that the evidence against Soviet and Maoist atrocities had become so undeniable that it was no longer "cool" to praise communism.

We're not talking about obscure, fringe intellectuals. It's Albert Einstein, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Kurt Gödel, Bertrand Russell, Hilary Putnam. They're all on record praising the most repressive regimes in history, often continuing to defend their positions even after the overwhelming evidence of unconscionable atrocities.

Other intellectuals, less famous now than then, were similarly pro-Soviet: Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, Imre Lakotos, Jerry Cohen.

One touchpoint was during the trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, executed in 1953 for passing atom bomb secrets to the Soviets. Although later-unveiled Soviet documents proved they were in fact guilty, many intellectuals of the time strongly defended them, calling it a baseless conspiracy charge against their fellow leftists.

The FDR administration offered a sympathetic haven for many of these pro-Soviet intellectuals, often at the highest offices. Vice President Henry Wallace -- who, but for Roosevelt's switch to Harry Truman in his third term -- openly supported the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. Wallace, who later ran as the candidate for the Progressive Party, later admitted that if he had been President he would have appointed to his Cabinet people we now know were actively spying for the Soviets. These are people like Laurence Duggan, Harry Dexter White -- who in the "Verona Documents" newly-opened KGB archives after the breakup of the USSR -- are mentioned as Stalin's eyes and ears in the FDR administration.

Academic philosophers who hold non-leftist views are automatically in a tiny minority, but there are a few: Gottlob Frege, Robert Nozick. But note how the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy goes out of its way to refer to Frege's views using the word "unfortunately".

The extreme left-wing bent continues today, with philosophers like Richard Rorty using "Republican" and "fascist" interchangeably.

I'm sure the majority of people who read this review think of themselves as "moderates" or "left-leaning" and certainly adamantly opposed to "right wingers". Read this to challenge yourself, and ask where you picked up that viewpoint. However much you appreciate your university education, this book is a useful reminder that the only real value you should cherish from that education is the ability to think for yourself, especially when your very smart teachers are themselves simply following the herd.

[Tony Dib]

الذكاء الاستثنائي لا يضمن البحث الصادق عن الحقيقة؛ بل قد يجعل صاحبه أكثر براعة في عقلنة ما يريد تصديقه. نفترض عادةً أن المتقدمين في المنطق والتحليل وأصحاب القدرة العالية على التعامل مع الحجج المعقدة يملكون نوعاً من المناعة ضد الأفكار الرديئة. لكن سيسارديتش يعرض كيف لبعض العقول التي تُظهر قدراً استثنائياً من الصرامة والدقة داخل مجالها الأكاديمي، بمجرد دخول الإيديولوجيا إلى الغرفة، أن تتخلى عن المعايير نفسها التي بنت عليها سمعتها الفكرية. فالإنسان عالي الذكاء ليس بالضرورة أقل عرضة للتحيز أو ضغط الجماعة من غيره. وقد تكون المشكلة في بعض الحالات أنَّ ذكاءه يمنحه ترسانة أكبر للدفاع عن تحيزاته.

الشخص العادي يستطيع أن يتبنى فكرة هشة ويقدم لها تبريراً ضعيفاً. أما المفكر المتمرس فيستطيع أن يستدعي مفردات فلسفية مبهرة، وبنى منطقية معقدة، وطبقات من المصطلحات التحليلية، ليبني حول الفكرة نفسها حصناً فكرياً منيعاً. لا يعود العقل هنا أداة لاختبار الاعتقاد، بل محامٍ عنه. هناك فرق بين أن نسأل: «هل هذه الفكرة صحيحة؟» وبين «كيف أستطيع أن أثبت أن الفكرة التي تبنيتها مسبقاً صحيحة؟». في الحالة الثانية لا تقودنا القدرة العقلية بالضرورة نحو الحقيقة؛ بل تجعلنا أكثر قدرة على اختراع الحجج التي تحمينا منها. هذا ما يجعل ظاهرة الفلاسفة الذين يناقشهم سيسارديتش مثيرة للسخرية بقدر ما هي مثيرة للقلق. نحن لا نتحدث عن أشخاص يفتقرون إلى التفكير النقدي. بل عن أشخاص كرّسوا حياتهم المهنية للمنطق، والوضوح المفاهيمي، وتحليل الحجج، والتمييز الدقيق بين المقدمات والنتائج. ومع ذلك، عندما يتعلق الأمر بالمعتقد الإيديولوجي، تختفي القدرة النقدية بصورة عجيبة.

كأن العقل يمتلك قاطعين كهربائيين منفصلين؛ أحدهما يعمل داخل البحث الأكاديمي، حيث ينبغي تعريف المصطلحات بعناية، وفحص الأدلة، والرد على الاعتراضات، وتجنب التناقضات؛ والآخر يعمل عندما تصبح القضية إيديولوجية، فتتراجع هذه المعايير فجأة أمام الانتماء والولاء والبيئة الاجتماعية المحيطة بالمثقف بما فيها من رضا الزملاء، والخوف من العزلة، وما يمكن تسميته بـ«اقتصاد السمعة» داخل الجماعة. وبمجرد أن يصبح لرأي معين تكلفة اجتماعية ولرأي آخر مكافأة اجتماعية، لا يعود امتلاك عقل متطور ضمانة للحياد. بل قد يصبح هذا العقل أداة أكثر كفاءة في إنتاج التبريرات التي تسمح لصاحبه بالوصول إلى النتيجة المطلوبة اجتماعياً مع الاحتفاظ بصورة الشخص العقلاني في الوقت نفسه. وهنا يصبح التبرير أكثر خطورة من مجرد النفاق. ليس من الضروري أن يكذب المفكر ولا أن يعرف في داخله أن حجته زائفة. ربما يكون قد نجح فعلاً في إقناع نفسه بها. والقدرة على خداع النفس أخطر من خداع الآخرين.

من أكثر الصور عبثية في هذا السياق أن ترى لغة تحليلية شديدة التعقيد تُستخدم لتقديم نظام استبدادي إجرامي أو معتقد متوحش كما لو أنه ذروة العدالة، وذلك بعد تمريره عبر سلسلة من التعريفات والتجريدات والمصطلحات الفلسفية. وهنا لا يكون التعقيد الفكري دليلاً على عمق الفكرة. أحياناً يكون مجرد آلية لإخفاء القبح. ولهذا تخرج من الكتاب أكثر شكاً في الفرضية الشائعة القائلة إن زيادة مستوى التعليم أو الذكاء تؤدي تلقائياً إلى زيادة العقلانية. الأدوات العقلية نفسها التي تمكّن الإنسان من اكتشاف خطئه تمكّنه أيضاً من بناء أكثر الدفاعات تعقيداً لمنع نفسه من رؤية الخطأ. إذا كانت المقدمات المنطقية قد اختيرت مسبقاً تحت ضغط سياسي أو اجتماعي أو قبلي، يصبح المنطق خادماً ممتازاً لها. ليس اكتشافاً غريباً أو عجيباً أن يكون للفلاسفة آراء سياسية رديئة. المزعج هو اكتشاف أنَّ التفوق العقلي والصرامة المنهجية قد يتعايشان داخل الشخص نفسه مع قدر مذهل من التغييب والعته الإيديولوجي، وأنَّ المؤسسات الفكرية لا تستطيع الاعتماد على ذكاء أعضائها وحده لحماية نفسها من هذا العته. فالتعددية الفكرية، وإمكانية الاعتراض، والثمن الاجتماعي لمخالفة الإجماع، كلها مهمة بقدر أهمية القدرات الفردية للأشخاص داخل المؤسسة.

مع اقتناعي الكامل بأطروحة سيسارديتش، أتساءل هل يدرس ظاهرة عامة في العلاقة بين الذكاء والإيديولوجيا، أم أنه يدرس إخفاقات مثقفي اليسار خصوصاً ثم يعمم النتيجة على العقل السياسي ككل؟ إنَّ معظم الحالات التي يركز عليها سيسارديتش تتعلق بفلاسفة ومثقفين انجذبوا إلى الشيوعية أو دافعوا عن أنظمة وحركات من أقصى اليسار، أو تعاملوا بتساهل عجيب مع جرائم ارتُكبت باسمها. هذه الحالات تقدم أمثلة صارخة على ”الفصام الإدراكي“ في عقل المثقف، لكن ما مدى تمثيلهم للظاهرة التي يريد الكتاب تفسيرها؟ إذا كانت الظاهرة في جوهرها قبلية ومعرفية وليست يسارية في ذاتها، يصبح التركيز شبه الحصري على جانب واحد من الطيف السياسي نقصاً منهجياً لا مجرد اختيار تحريري. تعمل هذه الآلية في اتجاهات أيديولوجية مختلفة عند المحافظ والقومي والليبرتاري واليميني المتطرف. هنا تظهر مشكلة ”التحيّز الانتقائي“. عندما يبدأ الباحث بمجموعة من الأمثلة المعروفة بنتيجة معينة (فلاسفة شديدو الذكاء تبنوا مواقف يسارية كارثية أو دافعوا عن أنظمة شمولية) فمن السهل إيجاد أنماط وأمثلة تؤكد الفرضية. لكن الاختبار الأقوى للأطروحة كان سيقتضي البحث بصورة متناظرة عن الحالات المضادة: مفكرين من اليمين مارسوا النوع نفسه من التسويغ والتبرير، أو فلاسفة يساريين احتفظوا بصرامتهم النقدية عندما تعارضت الأدلة مع مصالح جماعتهم، أو مفكرين غير مسيّسين تعرضوا لضغوط مشابهة ولم يستسلموا لها.

وجود مثل هذه المقارنات كان سيسمح بالإجابة عما إذا كان ما سبق مقترناً بالضغط الإيديولوجي عموماً، أم أثر لبيئة العمل الأكاديمي. فلو كانت المشكلة مرتبطة أساساً بالهيمنة اليسارية داخل دوائر فلسفية معينة، يصبح التفسير مؤسسياً: بيئة فكرية متجانسة خلقت حوافز لتقوية السمعة، وكافأت تحيزات، وقللت كلفة الأخطاء التي تصب في الاتجاه المقبول سياسياً. أما إذا كان المقصود إثبات أنَّ الذكاء نفسه قد يزيد قدرة الإنسان على تسويغ معتقداته السياسية مهما كان اتجاهها، فنحن بحاجة إلى عينة أكثر تنوعاً لكي نعرف أن الآلية لا تعتمد على إيديولوجيا بعينها. ومن هنا أجد أن الكتاب أحياناً يتحرك بين أطروحتين من دون أن يميّز بينهما بما يكفي. الأولى محدودة وقوية: عدد من كبار الفلاسفة التحليليين في القرن العشرين أظهروا مستوى مذهل من سوء الحكم والانحياز عندما تعلق الأمر بسياسات يسارية وشيوعية، رغم صرامتهم الفكرية في تخصصاتهم. أما الثانية فأوسع: الذكاء العالي لا يحمي الإنسان من التفكير القبلي، بل قد يجعله أكثر براعة في عقلنة ما تفرضه عليه جماعته السياسية. الكتاب يقدم أدلة قوية جداً على الأولى. أما الثانية فأجدها معقولة ومقنعة، لكن لا تثبت بالقوة نفسها بمجرد تجميع أمثلة من اتجاه إيديولوجي واحد.

[Shobeir]

Great premise, repetitive and not much insights

I like the book. It’s very helpful and it makes you wonder and introspect your own thoughts and point of views. But the author’s push for painting a picture to drive his point home without any attempt to understand the reasons makes the book less appealing and boring after the first one third.

[Greg Benham]

It can be repetitive—I likely would have enjoyed it more if I was more familiar with the philosophers referenced.

[Bob]

An eye-opening look at the respect and deference given to philosophers even when they turn political. One wonders if they become leftists because of their leap into politics.

[Amy Mossoff]

Tried twice but couldn't get past the first couple of chapters. Two stars because I like the premise and it seemed well-researched, but it was just boring.

[Pablo Gatto]

Nadie está exento de momentos de ceguera o mera estupidez y Neven Sesardić lo deja claro. Múltiples anécdotas bien referenciadas denotan que, poseer la capacidad de razonar, no implica que la usemos constante o adecuadamente.

Un recordatorio de nuestra falibilidad. Particularmente, cuando se trata de causas políticas.

[John Reis]

Sesardic looks at the politics of a number of analytic philosophers. Neurath wrote propaganda for Stalin during the Ukraine famine, Wittgenstein was a Stalinist, Carnap blamed the West for the Iron Curtain, Lakatos encouraged a young member of his communist cell to commit suicide and she did. The editor in chief of the journal Philosophy of Science, William Malisoff, supported Lysenkoism, and refused to publish any who disagreed with it. Einstein and Godel were very critical of the US, but hardly a peep about the USSR. Putnam’s Resolution approved by APA against US in Vietnam.

This is an eye-opening book. To be sure, he makes small leaps, conclusions from available evidence to conclusions about motives, but none were giant leaps.

Most of these men took up the communist rhetorical device of calling anyone to their right ‘reactionaries.’

He does not really have a theory about why so many presumably smart men were so incredibly evil when it came to their political positions.

[Shu]

I would read this book as a warning against our tendency to swing away from a political system associated with negative lived experiences and then to put false hope in finding a solution in the antithesis. This tendency, while insidious and destructive, seems to me rather understandable and redeemable for many of the philosophers examined here. Nonetheless, I would posit that, for a few of the philosophers (e.g. Lakatos), it is, in fact, not a temporary suspension of rationality (as suggested by the book title) but a heightened Luciferian intellect that rationalized away their political delusion. That makes this book a disheartening read.