Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction

Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy

by Michael J. Loux, Thomas M. Crisp

A Contemporary Introduction is for students who have already completed an introductory philosophy course and need a fresh look at the central topics in the core subject of metaphysics. It is essential reading for any student of the subject. This Fourth Edition is revised and updated and includes two new chapters on (1) Parts and Wholes, and (2) Metaphysical Indeterminacy or vagueness. This new edition also keeps the user-friendly format, the chapter overviews summarizing the main topics, concrete examples to clarify difficult concepts, annotated further reading at the end of each chapter, endnotes, and a full bibliography.

Topics addressed

the problem of universals

the nature of abstract entities

the problem of individuation

the nature of modality

identity through time

the nature of time

the nature of parts and wholes

the problem of metaphysical indeterminacy

the Realism/anti-Realism debate. Wherever possible, Michael J. Loux and Thomas M. Crisp relate contemporary views to their classical sources in the history of philosophy. As experienced teachers of philosophy and important contributors to recent debates, Loux and Crisp are uniquely qualified to write this book.

Genres: Philosophy, Metaphysics, Nonfiction, Academic, Textbooks, Education, College

372 pages, Kindle Edition

First published November 13, 1997

Reviews

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an excellent, albeit not easy, introduction to metaphysics. Loux approaches this subject in Aristotelian fashion. That is, the sudy of being qua being. This is opposed to Kantian metaphysics which has the characterization of our conceptual scheme as its aim. In Loux's tradition others go beyond the more general study of being qua being and include the study of God's existence, free will, mind/body, etc., but Loux sticks to the basic, minimalized approach. He discusses such topics as the problem of universals vis-à-vis realism and nominalism (ch. 1-2), concrete particulars (nature of substance, substrata, and bundles, ch. 3; and their persistence through time, ch. 6), the nature of propositions (ch. 4), the necessary and the possible vis-à-vis possible worlds modalities (ch.5), and the challenge of anti-realism vis-à-vis Dummett and Quine (ch. 7).

Good philosophy, and good teaching on metaphysics is not easy, but this book is still introductory. The metaphysical novice can work through this book (I did) and reap the rewards it offers. The discussions on universals, propositions, and possible world modalities are excellent. The reader will gain a working vocabulary and a base from which future study in metaphysics will be greatly aided. Loux is a top-rate metaphysician. Whether you agree with all of his conclusions or not, this Notre Dame prof will provide you with a great introduction to this important philosophic topic. He has his settled conclusions, but is vary fair with opposing positions. This is a great contribution to Routledge’s excellent "contemporary introductions" series.

[Mrekhy ET · Rating 5 out of 5]

أعظم الكتب هي الكتب اللي تخرج منها شايف العالَم بشكل مختلف، إن أنت نفسك تكون بعدها شخص مختلف، الكتاب ده واحد من الكتب دي.

الكتاب جميل جدا، صعب وخد مني مجهود مش طبيعي، بس يستاهل القراءة لأكتر من مرة، واللي بيتفهم؛ بينوّر حاجات تانية كتير. ده غير نقاش مواضيع كتيرة مرتبطة بمباحث تانية زي المعرفة (الإپيستمولوچيا)، حرية الإرادة، والتعريف بفلسفات وأفكار فلاسفة كتير جدا.

منهجية المؤلف نفسها عظيمة؛ ترتيب المواضيع وطريقة عرضها بتعكس حد مُطّلع بشكل عميق على المباحث دي علشان يعرف يرتّبها بالطريقة السَلِسة دي من غير ما يلخبط القاريء، وكان بيحاول دايمًا يربط الفصول ببعضها ويشرح مدى تأثير موقف في مبحث على بقية المواقف في المباحث التانية، وعرض توافقية أو عدم توافقية بعض المواقف مع بعض، ده غير طبعًا سرده لكل موقف والرد عليه والرد على الرد بطريقة مش معقّدة نسبيًا، والفضيلة الأعظم هو عدم ميل المؤلف لأي طرف، معرفتش للحظة من طريقة كتابته هو مايل لأي موقف وده شيء صعب جدا على أي حد إنه يعمله.

سعيد حقيقي إني أكون أول تعليق مصري وعربي على الكتاب.

نصيحة لك لو دارس أو مهتم بالفلسفة، نصيحة إتقالتلي كتير ومهتمّتش بها: ذاكر وأقرا الفلسفة بالإنجليزي لو الإنجليزي بتاعك يسمح، وبالأخص لو بتقرا فلسفة تحليلية. مش هقولك غير إن عمري ضاع في الكتب العربي.

[Lesyk Mahula · Rating 4 out of 5]

це було складно, але я це зробив. важко якось оцінити зважаючи на предмет, але зрозуміти що таке метафізика і онтологія як наука (наука?) дає дуже добре. все дуже складно, особливо розуміючи мінімальне практичне застосування інформації, але непогано так ламає мозок місцями.

[Jacob Aitken · Rating 5 out of 5]

Loux gives a thorough, intermediate "introduction" to the current problems in contemporary metaphysics. He briefly defends an Aristotelian metaphysics of sorts, though he is fair to different conclusions. The book is easier than Chisholm's *On Metaphysics,* though far more difficult than van Inwagen's text.

He gives the standard surveys of Realism and Nominalism, though he does focus on modern nominalist defenders with a discussion on trope nominalism. He has two different sections on "Particulars" and notes the difficulties each position will face. (I am surprised he did not discuss the Ship of Theseus problem).

I particularly enjoyed his fine chapter on Possible Worlds Semantics. It is here that he drew together a number of themes: Those who hold to realism also hold to identity through time and (usually) Possible Worlds Actualism. Nominalists as a general rule do not (with exceptions).

This is a fine account of modern metaphysics, though certainly not for the beginning reader.

[Tirdad · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is certainly one of the best introductions to contemporary Metaphysics. Loux gives a very clear and intelligible survey of topics. His account is not restricted to just telling the story of debates and going on, but rather he goes into detail, discusses the technical features of theories and compares pros/cons. Overally, I really liked the book. I just want to explain briefly how this book could be a better book:

- Some important topics - such as Truthmaking, Grounding, Dispositions, Essence and Free Will- not covered in the book. I understand that this book is an intoductory book, but I think even beginners need to be somewhat familiar with these topics.
- Loux avoids using formal(logical) symbolization of statements, which I think makes it more difficult to understand statements/arguments. Formalization is very helpful especially in comprehending steps of an argument.
- I found the last chapter on "Anti-Realism" a bit disorganized. I think there is a big difference in clarity between this chapter and the others.

[Richard Newton · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found this to be a good metaphysics introduction at the undergraduate level, but only for a limited number of topics. One or two of the topics I have read reasonably extensively on, but still found something new in Loux's book, or found his explanations particularly clear. The chapters on universals and concrete particulars are particularly good. I also liked his final chapter on realism versus anti realism.

On the downside I found the writing style occasionally a little irritating, mainly because he over-explains some items. (However, this is a lesser sin than assuming the reader understands and jumping around without sufficient explanation). The chapter on causality, which is a subject I am interested in, is thin. There is nothing on freedom and determinism or the mind-body issue. Perhaps these are not contemporary.

I found another book on metaphysics by Lowe's to suffer from similar problems, but overall to be a little more rounded and more enjoyable to read.

[Mahdiye Fatehi · Rating 4 out of 5]

قشنگ و روون. نمی‌دونم چون فلسفه دوست دارم این قدر راضی‌ام ازش یا واقعا هم چیز خوبی بود. نکته‌ی مثبتش اینه که تو اکثر موارد استدلال‌ها رو خوب نقل کرده. ارجاع‌هایی که برای مطالعه‌ی بیشتر داده بود هم قشنگ بود، هرچند که من خیلی سراغ اونا نرفتم. یه ستاره رو بابت این کم کردم که چند جا خیلی گیجم کرد، چون من فکر می‌کردم استدلال آورده و من دارم نمی‌فهمم، در حالی که فقط ادعاها رو پشت هم ردیف کرده بود.

[Laura Marx]

I have not had regular dealings with any solid book, except Plutarch and Seneca, from whom I draw like the Danaïds, incessantly filling up and pouring out. Some of this sticks to this paper; to myself, little or nothing. (Montaigne, On the Education of Children)

i read a lot of this, which took a long time and more self-discipline than i was in those days disposed to using, and yet i remember very little about it. so i wish i didn't bother! what stuck the best was the jargon, the way philosophers use them, 'primitive', 'vicious', 'just in case', useless stuff like that. the problem was that the arguments go by so quickly that it was too much for my brain to absorb in the long-term. while reading the short-term memory holds it all together, and you think it is all remarkably clear and brusque a summary, and think you have learned a lot. then, two years later, you find that the structure in your memory was, yes, very much a house of cards, and while you were away the angel of history, the updraft of his wings, or his pretty little footsteps, have caused the whole thing to fall. you can pick up a few of the cards, but you cannot remember how they all stacked together, and so you cannot rebuild the house.

that was my problem: i expected that if i read it i'd remember it, and that in remembering it, it'd be useful to me. well, i don't remember it, and it isn't useful to me. i have not since learned to remember things any better, but i have learned how to make better use of the books i forget. you see, at the time when i would take notes i would write out every blow of the argument. my notes would recount every strand. this was fine (and only fine) for reading papers, but a textbook isn't like that. you end up with something just as long as the textbook and, therefore, just as useless for reference. you actually want to notate as little as possible, not as much as possible. what would have been useful would have been a note that said, for example:

problems of universals: - infinite regress (pg 31) [cf. Parmenides]

rather than what i wrote:

- Another issue that arises is that exemplification results in an infinite regress. If a exemplifies F-ness, then a also exemplifies exemplifying F-ness, and then also exemplifies exemplifying exemplifying F-ness, and so on forever.
- The same goes for the account of predication: if a is F can be rephrased a exemplifies F-ness, then…
- [After reading this I wrote: why is this necessary a problem, cant there just be an infinite series of properties (which we might denote with an elipses, 'f-ness…’, the mathematical symbol for 'repeating’?) - but then…]
- Loux says that while many realists have treated this as a problem and attempted to solve it, it does not need to be. The realist can simply say that there are an infinite number of properties of exemplification (he says while it is a cycle, it is not ‘viscious’!) [Fools seldom differ!]
- Realists who want to avoid the regress might simply say that exemplification is not subject to the realist’s account. They may also say that they are just giving a more “articulated” explanation of whats already going on rather than introducing a new object, and similarly, of predication, that ‘a is F-ness’ is semantically equivalent to ‘a is F’ and does not actually introduce a new exemplification that also exemplifies etc.
- Another infinite regress appears in the realist account: we have said earlier that exemplification is a relation between a particular and a universal. Because relations are also universals, when we say that a exemplifies F-ness, we say that the two are related by exemplification, so we introduce another univeral, the relationship of exemplification. Because a and F are related by exemplification, we need “a higher form of exemplification … to ensure that a and F enter into a relation of exemplification”, and so on…

which is almost longer than Loux's own treatment and is worse than useless to me now. all you need to remember is a word and a page number, and the only place you need to remember it is your notes. then if it comes up you'll know how to get to the information when you do need to refer to it. heed my words, reader, learner, note-taker, Prince of a Thousand Books!

[Shayan Hamraz · Rating 5 out of 5]

مثل دیگر کتاب‌های این مجموعه کتاب عالی‌ای هستش. این مجموعه توسط انتشارات راتلج چاپ شده و توسط بهترین متخصصان هر حوزه‌ای نوشته شده و توسط انتشارات حکمت ترجمه شده که ترجمه خوب و قابل قبولی داره. اگر به دنبال یک مجموعه می‌گردید که فلسفه رو به شکل موضوعی بررسی کنه، این مجموعه بهترین مجموعه‌ای است که در زبان فارسی تا کنون چاپ شده.
سطح کتاب خیلی بالاست و تخصصیه. خیلی درآمدطور نیست و برای افراد مبتدی توصیه نمیشه. مناسب برای دانشجوهای ارشد به بالاست.

[Yumeko (blushes) · Rating 3 out of 5]

In being informed that I would be a peach if I existed as a fruit, I begin to wonder what sort of exemplifications find themselves in me to befit such honor.
Hermaphroditic in the flower's reproductive structure, they are not the hardest to pollinate; more precisely, to wind pollinate, given the smooth and light pollen. Is wind the cause for the (say) eventual birth of the peach? Disregarding that a good deal of pollen may never find themselves close to a relevant carpel, but consider the ones that do. How does one define the mysterious 'power' all causes seem to possess, aside from temporal succession and possibly spatial contiguity being part of their intentional definitions.
(I pray my use of the word power does not start a line of pseudoscience in itself akin to quantum mysticism. Though I do wonder if they'd sound any different from a regular metaphysician who uses common vocabulary in a radically different way)
Or is a successful account provided by Hume's conception of causation? That it is a conjunction of successive events, and that causes do not necessarily necessitate their effects.
Still, most notice that though a peach tree stands in front of them, it is not hard to imagine that it could've not been there, in effect picturing a possible world. Yet it is curious how this conception of necessity and contingency you don't literally find empirically, and that you find easiest to talk of these claims (if not the only way to) in linguistic context; such is one of the criticisms the use of modal notions have received (I thought it was interesting to see the use of modal notions being defended with the concept of possible worlds)
A sister of mine prefers her fruit cold, if not frozen. So you put the peaches in a plastic bag to prevent loss of moisture for a few hours, and you let it cool. You've at least to wait an hour or two. An hour or two of what though? No, that concept is ingrained as one of time, and so are the tenses. Yet it was how Taggart proceeded in claiming that time is unreal:
Series A: events ordered in terms of tensed properties of past present and future, and
Series B: events ordered in terms of tenseless relations of being earlier or less than.
He considered the universal concept within time that it presupposes change, and that if the B series is really different from the A it could consider change that A would not. He understood the B series to presuppose the A, and showed that to believe that there was an A series led to a contradiction, therefore the B was a contradiction as well, and so proved that time is unreal. More than a few of objections are seen by this argument. Though, I continue to wonder why a more scientific perspective was never discussed in the book. To disregard this completely is not a simple oversight.
The peaches are probably cold enough by now. Unsurprisingly, you find them in the freezer again, in the 'same' plastic bag, but this theorizing leads one to reconsider if it is literally the same object as before. It is indeed still a concrete particular, an exemplification of a fruit, of a peach (in the case you subscribe to metaphysical realism), but it's less soft now, so is it really the same? Does calling it the same account for the change? How big of the change will make it lose its identity as a peach. What of the people who subscribe to presentism, how will they talk of diachronic sameness?
The bodies of the peaches I've eaten cling to the seed (cling stones) and the separation is messy at times, but what is it that I'm separating? If you take the stone, and likewise take the leathery (unless it's not a cling stone) yellow (or white depending on where you're from) skin as a part of the peach, you would likely not consider yourself a mereological nihilist, but if you take a peach as a whole entity, why not take two peaches and a stone one as well? Indeed, scaling up, where would one stop and reach the 'final whole'?
The text itself
Alas, I could talk about peaches and metaphysics for long, and there are things I've left out, but Loux would've given greater reference for the discussion if he talked about more topics, one review points out what is important, I would've liked discussion on meta-metaphysics (consider the fact that metaphysical realism and nominalism take up at least half the book or more). I also stress on a point already expressed in the aforementioned review, there is a minimal use of logical notation. Arguments are often much easier to parse, more compact, and the nuances are imho expressed more efficiently. It is also not hard at all to translate back for those unfamiliar to the notation, and would take only a sentence or two.
As a textbook, I do not appreciate it missing end of chapter questions, and the fact that it is not designed to be immersive. Though, as a textbook, I still think it does a better job than Inwagen, which is too conversational, covers less, and is relatively less in depth, though is also more readable because of those reasons. The rating is my subjective assessment of enjoyment.
The text focuses greatly on many specifics of the arguments it mentions, which is usually welcome, but the goal of the theorizing frequently seems rather out of sight when such emphasis is put on the details and whatever passes criticism.
Not to see metaphysics from a utilitarian perspective, but does it not seem to evade practicality and use? I wonder how that could be helped. I mean, it is considered to be part of the search for the ultimate reality, contrasting appearance (Inwagen's words), while its own would be esoteric complications between scholars and trying to be nothing more. Oh well, that's still a lot of words for someone who doesn't really know very much abt metaphysics.
Wonder what we'd get if a group of metaphysicians experienced ego dissolution, and could still theorize soberly.

[Dan Ust · Rating 4 out of 5]

Actually read this over the course of about two years, selecting chapters I was most interested in -- the one on modality and the one on persistence -- first. Overall, good intro. He does drill into rival views, though I'm more surprised by what he doesn't discuss. Perhaps things like exdurance (not discussed) can be chalked up to being more advanced topics. Also, he raises the idea of supervenience in one chapter, but not in others. I'd expect it to come up especially in a discussion of propositions.

Excellent bibliography too. By the way, this mini-review is for the 01998 edition. I know he expanded the book in a revised edition, but have yet to read that one.

[Adam Omelianchuk · Rating 4 out of 5]

My favorite introduction to metaphysics. Broadly realist and writing from an Aristotelian perspective, Loux introduces the reader to themes broadly discussed in general ontology. Metaphysics, he says, is the study of being qua being. What exists and characterizes them? Loux has nice discussions of universals, particulars, propositions, possible worlds, causation, time, and the challenge of anti-realism. While the discussions of each topic can get long and convoluted, Loux clearly writes about each topic and fairly represents the contrary views on each. Recommended.

[Melis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Genel tartışmaya hakim olmak için alınabilecek, üzerinde “çalışılabilecek” bir kitap.

[Chris]

>construct a theory around a prephilosophical intuition
>the theory contradicts another prephilosophical intuition
>"why can't i find a coherent theory?"
ngmi

[Jarod Lowe · Rating 3 out of 5]

50/100

I myself am an amateur to philosophy, and was looking to introduce myself to a topic that I found quite interesting: metaphysics. I found a recommendation for this book on the philosophy subreddit, and after a couple weeks I have finally finished it.

I admit that I was perhaps looking for a more foundational introduction, rather than a detailed look into the arguments of specific present-day philosophers. This is more for someone looking to get started reading into modern day metaphysics than it is an introduction to the basic ideas and prominent theories.

That being said, I think it is still painfully dry. I suffer from being a visual learner, and the pages of solid block text describing extremely abstract ideas. The example and analogy sentences present on every 3rd or 4th page were the only things keeping me grounded in the goings-on of the book, but still I found myself digging into the text just so that I didn't have to read it any further.

Perhaps this is an immature take, but I think a proper introduction could do with more simplified summaries, figures like flowcharts or images, and even more analogy sentences. As it is, this introduction to metaphysics could do better at transmitting the knowledge it has to offer to curious minds.

[Ansh Vakharia · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is great and it’s very structured, as somone who has somewhat of a background in philosophy but is farley new to metaphysics this book took me around 2 months to finish making highly detailed notes on each page. I learned a lot on this book and now i am able to dive into more dense material. However this book is not an easy read and if the reader wants to truley grasp the text he may need to ponder for sometime on the different arguments the text offers. Louxs writing style can be frustrating at times as he can write messy without clarifying terms. I highly recommend this book for someone who is a good reader and is interested in metaphysics

[Emilia Kastehelmi Nättinen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Although it was a really hard read, especially to a person who’s never read metaphysics before, it was perhaps one of the most interesting and thought provoking reads I’ve ever had. I should definitely re-read many parts of it again to realise what they all meant, because there was so much information that it was impossible to understand everything at once.
And as an non-native english speaker myself, that gave it an extra challenge at times.

But as a philosopher and thus a lover of thinking, I can say I had many mindblowing moments and euphoria whilst reading this and leaving the book behind now feels kind of sad and melancholic, because of it😅

[AK Crossover · Rating 5 out of 5]

หนังสือเล่มนี้เป็นหนังสือที่ใช้เรียนวิชาอภิปรัชญา
อภิปรัชญาเป็นสาขาหนึ่งของปรัชญา และเป็นวิชาที่นับว่า "ยอดฮิต" ในสมัยก่อน
อภิปรัชญาคือ ศาสตร์ที่ศึกษาเกี่ยวกับ ความเป็นจริง "reality" การมีอยู่ "being" ความเป็นสาเหตุ "causality" เวลา "time" เป็นต้น

[مهدی محمدی · Rating 4 out of 5]

مفصل‌تر از روال معمولِ کتاب‌های مقدماتی است. متن خیلی چگال و پرجزئیات است و معمولا استدلال‌ها را بیشتر از یک شمای کلی توضیح می‌دهد. همین ویژگی جذابش کرده.
اما به‌همین‌خاطر برای شروع متافیزیک تحلیلی احتمالا بهترین گزینه نباشد.

[Brother Brandon · Rating 3 out of 5]

Read this for school. Found it very easy to understand and the concepts were made very clear. Anyone new to metaphysics could start here and be on their way!

[Ruben Lake · Rating 5 out of 5]

As the title of the book states, it's introductory. Perfect for the newcomer to have the floodgates of existential queries open for them. Easy to follow, not so much semantic soup.

[Keegan Dunn · Rating 5 out of 5]

Totally adore this book and feel like my engagement with it was the most productive period of my life in terms of becoming an effective philosophy student.

[Jens · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book gives a good introduction to contemporary neo-Aristotelean metaphysics as it is practiced in analytic departments. It discusses the classic but still unresolved problem of universals, providing a detailed overview of realism and nominalism, two camps that continue to return in later sections. As is the case when talking about substrata, where substance and bundle theorists diverge along the same lines. Characteristic of analytic philosophy is its linguistic turn which here follows a strong correspondence theory of truth that comes out when discussing propositions, facts, events, and states-of-affairs and their ontological status. This part irked me because I think one cannot be more off the mark than this when it comes to language. Modality, causation and time receive extended treatment as well, discussing the usual suspects: possible worlds, Hume, A- and B-theories of time etc. There is a chapter on persistence through time of particulars and the book finishes with some anti-realist challenges.
What I found most interesting though was the introduction. Here a justification is given as to why exactly we should go back to Aristotle in thinking about metaphysics as the study of being qua being. The assumption is made that we have only our prephilosophical conception of the world, our intuitions, to rely on to decide what is good metaphysics and what is not. If the consequences of some theory are exposed as absurd through thought experiments, the collective community's response will be to turn away from it, and that pretty much establishes its falsity. I have no great quarrel with this, because it is exactly true that there is nothing else on which to trust in these things, but it does not sound like a great method. The job of metaphysics then consists in identifying the ontological categories under which all things fall (such as particulars, propositions, thoughts, events, time, etc.) and to make the whole consistent.
The main opponents to this way of philosophizing, and to which the author feels obliged to respond to, are the 'conceptual schemers'. These are followers of the Kantian project of critique and argue for a restriction of reason to empirical claims only. They do this by pointing out that experience is constituted by our conceptual scheme or framework, that what our experience provides is a specifically human point of view of reality that is ordered by the application of general concepts regulated by certain principles that are applied to unstructured sense-experience (e.g. the concept of causality). The author's counter argument makes use of an apparent infinite regress in this way of thinking: If we cannot get to know the real world because of the mediation of cognition, how come we can know whether or not there is any mediation to begin with? There would have to be a conceptual scheme that allows us to think this mediation, and then another one to think this second mediation, ad infinitum.
I very much doubt this argument works. It depends on how expansive you take the definition of a 'conceptual scheme' to be. Does this include logic? Then yes, it is unsound, in arguing for conceptual schemes one would be using a prior conceptual scheme. But if general principles of reasoning are presupposed to be universally valid (as all philosophy necessarily does, otherwise there is no possibility of doing it) and extraneous to the scheme, I think one can reason one's way to this transcendentalist view; Kant's treatment of causation being a good example of this: We never actually see causation happening, but we are convinced of it all the same.
I would go even farther and venture to say the neo-Aristotelian counter argument itself is faulty. It assumes the validity of the very inclusive conceptual scheme in order to show it leads to an infinite regress, but at the same time it relies on the neo-Aristotelian intuition about the absurdity of such a regress, an intuition the schemers hold we cannot trust. An infinite regress does not involve a straight contradiction, so can we really say the very inclusive conceptual scheme is a logically inconsistent idea?
Anyways, I'm more of a process metaphysics guy to begin with so I don't really have a big bone in this fight. I wrote a little review of process metaphysics here.

[Rachael · Rating 5 out of 5]

I loved this introduction to metaphysics and ended up taking detailed notes. Loux has a gift for taking complex ideas and rendering them approachable to the philosophical novice and I found that by the end of the book I was wishing for more. He covers a variety of metaphysics topics including nominalism vs realism, substratum and bundle theory, Platonic and Aristotelian approaches to what counts as a thing and its relations to properties. Not shying away from the more technical he discusses the ontology of propositions, facts, states of affairs and events. He has a very informative chapter on modality, including the actualism of Plantinga vs the possibilism of Lewis and varying conceptions of objects persisting through time giving a very clear picture of the two main rivals for the theory of what time is.

Each chapter argues for two or more sides in a debate over the subject matter covered including the views of relevant prominent philosophers.

[Michael Dorais · Rating 3 out of 5]

I ready through this quickly just to get a familiarity with the subject matter. After getting one overview of the subject matter by readying the Metaphysics book by Peter Van Invagen, I dove into this book, which I liked better because it treats the subject more rigorously. On my first ready I'd say I had a about 50-70% overall comprehension even though I had 99% comprehension of the individual sentences. I'm going to have to return and re-read this more careful with pencil and notebook in hand.

[Spawk Hw · Rating 5 out of 5]

NOT for anyone brand new to philosophy. But for someone who has already acquired a basic knowledge of the field, this is a near perfect book. (my only complaint is that the chapter on propositions was a little overly drawn out.

[Arturo Javier · Rating 5 out of 5]

¡Justo lo que andaba buscando! Un gran introducción al fascinante mundo de la metafísica al puritito estilo analítico. Me habría encantado leerlo más temprano en la carrera, pero de todos modos me sirvió para rellenar algunas lagunas en mi formación.

[Marcus · Rating 3 out of 5]

A solid introduction to Metaphysics. Good outline for rote purposes.

[Alexandre Guay · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bon recueil de textes. Idéal pour un cours d'introduction.

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very good but supplement with van Inwagen to get a well-rounded introduction to all of the issues in metaphysics