Why did ordinary Germans vote for Hitler? In this dramatically plotted book, organized around crucial turning points in 1914, 1918, and 1933, Peter Fritzsche explains why the Nazis were so popular and what was behind the political choice made by the German people.
Rejecting the view that Germans voted for the Nazis simply because they hated the Jews, or had been humiliated in World War I, or had been ruined by the Great Depression, Fritzsche makes the controversial argument that Nazism was part of a larger process of democratization and political invigoration that began with the outbreak of World War I.
The twenty-year period beginning in 1914 was characterized by the steady advance of a broad populist revolution that was animated by war, drew strength from the Revolution of 1918, menaced the Weimar Republic, and finally culminated in the rise of the Nazis. Better than anyone else, the Nazis twisted together ideas from the political Left and Right, crossing nationalism with social reform, anti-Semitism with democracy, fear of the future with hope for a new beginning. This radical rebelliousness destroyed old authoritarian structures as much as it attacked liberal principles.
The outcome of this dramatic social revolution was a surprisingly popular regime that drew on public support to realize its horrible racial goals. Within a generation, Germans had grown increasingly self-reliant and sovereign, while intensely nationalistic and chauvinistic. They had recast the nation, but put it on the road to war and genocide.
Why did the Germans usher Hitler into power in 1933? Peter Fritzche’s 1998 book Germans into Nazis took a fresh look at the question. The book sets out an explanation that seems especially topical and urgent now, given subsequent trends in Western politics.
Fritzsche is Professor of History at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has published widely on European and especially German history. His thought-provoking book attempts to answer the question by casting aside the conventional explanations – Versailles, the Depression, reparations – and looking at the dynamics of division in a society and the desire for unity.
Fritzsche’s thesis is that the First World War was crucial to the rise of Nazism, but not in the way that has been assumed. Conventional explanations have focused on the humiliation of the Versailles treaty, territorial losses and reparations. According to Fritzsche, many postwar parties opposed these; the Nazis were nothing new in this respect. If we want to understand the real role of WW1 in the rise of Nazism, we should start not in 1918 but in 1914, and look at the way it made the Germans feel one people, even though they had been that in theory for over 40 years. Facing attack from outside in 1914, Germans coalesced into what “the Kaiser called the Burgenfrieden, the “peace of the fortress”, [which] promised to resolve the divisions between workers and the middle classes, between socialists and conservatives, [and] between Protestants and Catholics.”
This was important in a divided country. Fritzsche points out that (for example) Prussian voters were divided into property classes, the highest of which were allocated votes of greater value. The popular mobilization brought people together for the first time in a sense of common purpose and resulted in an unprecedented level of civic engagement – the Volksgemeinschaft, the community working as one. A side-effect was that it meant the stratified society of imperial Germany was no longer viable. But it was not satisfactorily replaced.
The new civic engagement never went away. But in the 1920s it was expressed through a series of interest groups, and parties linked to different professional or trade bodies. It was not a substitute. When the Nazis arrived, however, people did feel a sense of common purpose. The way the Nazis did this was, for Fritzsche, far more important than Versailles or reparations, which were already the subject of political discourse. As to anti-semitism, he does not deny its existence in pre-1933 Germany, but does not see the Nazis as having any ownership of it then – all parties were somewhat anti-semitic – or find any evidence that most Germans supported anything like a “final solution”. It is the Volksgemeinschaft that is important here.
Is Fritzsche right? Perhaps only Germans can answer this, but I feel he is onto something, if only because he provides an explanation for Nazism that does not rely on Germans being a weird, separate species. After all, no human is. I know plenty of Germans. They do not have two heads. A reviewer of this book in the Jerusalem Post commented that “Historians examining nations over periods of time have somehow to find a balance between what is inherent in a people and what is not, in order to attempt explanations of national attitudes and conduct.” But can you, in fact, have such a balance – is there anything “inherent in a people”? It is an important point, as ascribing Nazism to the German character has induced a dangerous conviction in other countries that they would never behave as the Germans did. Could any historical phenomenon be repeated by any country, given the right circumstances?
Fritzsche doesn’t answer that question, and he doesn’t speculate on the broader implications of his theory. He leaves that to the reader, which is perhaps what a good historian should do. But one notes that many people in Western countries seem to feel that their sense of identity is threatened, and do not feel that any entity represents them collectively. Neither, it seems, do many Americans. In fact they seem to feel that there is no single national life, no conversation, that includes them, and few fora for civic engagement. Neither left nor right answers these concerns. In this situation, many will turn to those who claim to speak for them and against “the establishment”, and who promise to return their sense of belonging. These trends at least partly underlie the Brexit vote in Britain, the meteoric rise of Trump in the US and the growth of populist right-wing movements in Europe. If Fritzsche’s thesis is correct, could the German pattern be replicated elsewhere?
Fritzsche quotes Hitler’s dictum that the nationalists forgot the social and the socialists forgot the national. Hitler forgot neither. Given people’s feelings of powerlessness against business, globalization and a perceived loss of identity, this is an important point. In fact Fritzsche’s thesis invests the Nazi phenomenon with a universality that makes this book crucial in this new time of populism.
Read for a college course. Overall, a poor assessment of the political situation in Germany between the end of the First World War and 1933. The author, like many liberal historians, focuses solely on superstructural aspects of fascism and divorces it from the material base of German society.
Highly relevant to our current electoral situation. Not a joke! Basically: if you use neoliberalism to stomp on working people for long enough, they will begin listening to whoever starts catering to them, and they will overlook a lot of things they might ordinarily find questionable. HOLLYWOOD LIED: when major institutions crumble, they aren't immediately replaced by morally superior and equally effective institutions; often they're replaced by fringe forces who talk a good game. The only thing missing from the equation is hypernationalism which fortunately has a bad rep these days. Recommended, I guess, if you want to feel gloomy but also feel like there is some understanding of where to press
The author Peter Fritzsche seems to focus on his argument in Germans into Nazis , "that National Socialism was the result of broad trends in German politics since the onset of World War I" (Page 232). He describes his reasoning for this, as well as gives many historical events and examples in detail. One great thing about this book is that it gives the average person a much deeper look into the transformation of Germans into Nazis and what exactly took place. He notes that much of it can still be a mystery, but that there were many events before the Nazis came into power that should be examined and analyzed.
Although Fritsche sees the connections, he is not satisfied with individuals or historians that argue it was the Treaty of Versailles or the Great Depression that brought the Nazis into Power. Throughout his book he backs this up with thorough explanations and his complete analysis of day by day events occurring in Germany from 1914 to 1933.
The book is organized by particular dates that are important to the changes going on in Germany. I felt that this was an interesting organization of chapters and for his purpose it seemed to work well.
Overall, this book made me think more in-depth about what was going on in Germany before the rise of Hitler, however it is important to note that this book barely touches the topic on the actual devastation of the Nazis. The book is mainly detailing why it got to that point rather than detailing what happened after the fact. This is perfectly fine, however, do not expect deep/moving imagery about Nazi Germany. Instead the events displayed are still quite interesting, just about the events before Germans actually shifted to Nazis. I just want to make this clarification since the title Germans into Nazis may cause the assumption that there will be detailed descriptions of Nazis, whereas the main focus is why exactly the Nazis did rise. With that, Fritzsche did a remarkable job.
This book reminds me of the adage about "part-truths that beget total errors." What it has to say about the political process that turned Germans into Nazis is, for the most part, valid and valuable. It's what it leaves out that troubles me and troubles me greatly. Historian Peter Fritzsche maintains that the Nazis prevailed in 1933 not because the German people embraced authoritarianism, militarism, and nationalism (as other right-wing parties did) but because they offered them something the other political parties did not: a "refreshingly moral vision of the nation", and "a political movement that was unabashedly nationalist, forward-looking, and socially inclusive, that recognized the populist claims of constituents without redividing them on the basis of occupation." World War I, says Fritzsche, accelerated the populist yearnings of the German public for political enfranchisement and national solidarity as exemplified, for example, in America's July 4th celebrations. That this yearning was ultimately satisfied by a Hitler rather than a German version of Jefferson requires quite a bit more explaining, however, than we get from this book. Weimar politics, like Tennyson's depiction of Nature, was "red in tooth and claw", full of the rhetoric of ressentiment, humiliation, militancy, spite, and political paranoia-- but don't expect to find any of that here. In this sanitized rendering of events, we learn nothing about the pre-1933 collaboration of the right-wing police and army with the Nazis, how this collaboration intimidated the public, and finally, utterly desensitized them to brutal conduct and brutal speech. Or how the Social Democratic leadership's own decency and naive faith in the German public led them to discourage youthful supporters from standing up to Nazi intimidation in the streets. As for the social reform and political participation that Germans hungered after, nowhere does Fritzsche acknowledge that it was the liberal Germans, disproportionately Jewish, and not the right-wing, who were actually doing something-- a great deal, in fact-- to transform German society in this direction. As early as the 1860s, a German complained in the press, "Why is it necessary that a Jewish woman [Lina Morgenstern] has to manage the soup kitchens: why can't Germans do that; does everything have to be left to the Jews?" But, in fact, reformist causes remained the preserve of liberal Germans in the Weimar period as well. Liberals drafted labor legislation and implemented reforms in the realms of law, social welfare and education. If the right wing, and most of the German public, felt themselves unmoved, and uninterested in participating in these developments, we must ask why. Fritzsche, who I hasten to add is no apologist for the Nazis, fails to explain why Germans condoned and even supported the vile expressions of Nazi antipathy toward Jews and liberals; nor does he offer a convincing explanation of why they were drawn to Nazi "idealism"; his portrait of Nazis as savvy local politicos and grass-roots organizers is short on substance and ultimately unpersuasive. Until 1933, the Nazi's concrete-- as opposed to rhetorical-- accomplishments amounted to little more than organized hooliganism and grandiose spectacle.
It does not attempt to answer everything about the Nazi phenomenon, nor to answer the kind of questions asked after WWII was over, such as, "How much did the average German know about the genocide of Jewish and other people deemed "less human"?
What the author does try to do -- and, I think, rather successfully -- is to illustrate how much of what came to appeal to so many people about what the Nazi party SAID it stood for was the result of the turmoil and loss experienced during and in the years after WWI.
He does this by fleshing out the political, cultural, and social experience of the German people on three occasions: at the outbreak of the war in 1914, at the moment of German defeat in 1918, and in the pivotal year of 1933 when the Nazis came to power. He traces significant continuing factors and forces through this almost 20 year period in order to show how what the Nazis said they would do, and what they appeared to represent, was so appealing to a people who longed to experience once again the sense of national identity and pride that they had felt in 1914, who longed to set aside the divisions and humiliations that followed Germany's defeat in 1918, and who had long tired by 1933 of the old parties -- including the Socialists -- who had come to represent SOME Germans, but not all of them.
Spurred by Hitler's constant themes of restoration of national honor and the unity of all Germans, something integral to everything Hitler said or wrote from the 1920s onward, it seems that a significant majority of Germans -- although not all of them, as Fritzsche is careful to note -- really welcomed Hitler's coming to power and the victory of the Nazi Party.
Now clearly the harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty, including the loss of lands occupied by a significant number of Germans and the financial burden of paying reparations, and the economic and social devastation caused by the Great Depression played a major role in weakening the new democratic republic proclaimed just days before the end of WWI. So, too, did the constant maneuvering for political advantage by Germany's numerous parties, ranging from the conservative to the socialist and Marxist.
But there was something more fundamental, too. "Between 1924 and 1930," Firtzsche notes, "in elections across Germany, farmers, homeowners, artisans, and civil servants abandoned the traditional politicians to field their own electoral slates. The bourgeois parties were repeatedly accused of cozying up to the rich and powerful and of ignoring the plight of ordinary Germans." (P. 178)
"What most burghers, and a great many workers besides, were looking for was a political movement that was unabashedly nationalist, forward-looking, and socially inclusive, that recognized the populist claims of constituents without redividing them on the basis of occupation." (P. 184)
"Compared to the established bourgeois parties, which remained aloof, the Nazis sought out Germans where they were to be found: in taverns, soccer fields, and market squares. These appearances lent credibility to Hitler's repeated rhetorical identification with the tribulations of ordinary Germans.... the Nazis insisted that theirs was a political movement with a national purpose.... his followers...hammered in again and again the need to solve local problems by liberating the entire nation from republican misrule. National solidarity was the answer to Germany's vexing problems: social reform, economic productivity, the shameful peace. There was a deliberate attempt to enroll Germans in a collective destiny and to present Hitler as a national savior rather than a solicitous politician.
"Nazi propaganda very effectively portrayed political choices in utopian terms: here was a party that stood inalterably opposed to the present 'system' and, once in power, would rebuild the nation." (p. 195)
Given his insights, it would have been good to hear his interpretation of how many citizens "soured" on Naziism as the hope of the early '30s turned into war preparation -- and then actual war on two fronts, once again, the very thing that doomed the German forces in WWI -- in the latter '30s and into the '40s.
The German middle and working class sowed the seeds of the Nazis rise to power in the nineteenth century. They took root at the outbreak of the Great War in July 1914. And they bloomed with the Nazi’s rise to power from 1930.
Historians and other writers say there were three reasons the Nazis came to power. Germany lost the Great War. The Allies forced the country to pay repressive reparations and the Great Depression. Fritzsche says they were factors but not the main reasons. He believes the Nazis provided a vehicle for the working and middle class to express their nationalism and demand a less rigid society.
When the German government declared war in August 1914, hundreds of thousands of people showed their support in the streets of cities and towns throughout the country. Fritzsche argues it’s a landmark in German history, as is the surrender in November 1918, the ascension of the Nazis in January 1933 and the May 1933. There’s a chapter on each in which Fritzsche builds his argument.
Nazi policies didn’t differ to other far right parties. The quest for national unity, national pride and a new society set the party apart from others.
The Nazis converted discontent into votes. Working class and middle class disatsifaction and expressed demands for change through two big and vocal organisations, the Landvolk and the Stahlhelm. These two groups arranged mass protests in the nineteen twenties, long before the Nazi’s ascendancy began at the 1930 elections. The Landvolk represented agricultural interests, and returning soldiers founded the Stahlhelm, an extremist and nationalist paramilitary organisation, in December 1918.
Fritzsche says these and other organisations provided the structure for working and middle class Germans to voice their rejection of the past and a yearning for a new future.
The seeds had long been there, organisations such as the Landvolk and the Stahlhelm watered them and the Nazis made them bloom. Germany’s Great War defeat and the Great Depression contributed to the Nazi’s rise, but they weren’t the main reasons.
This well-written and accessible book provides a convincing argument. It is also an enlightening introduction to the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazism.
Book Review When the German government gets taken over by a very powerful leader by the name Adolf Hitler, the Jews and right minded Germans have to find a way to stop his evil plan. Will they stand up for the Jews being mistreated, or will they curl up and hide? I didn't really enjoy this book. It was really boring and did not include enough of the action that I was expecting. I picked this book because I liked reading about WW11 because of the action and wars, but this book was really dry and didn't include that kind of stuff. This book is more about the political views of the people and how they feel about Hitler coming into power in Germany. Some people stood up then were killed or put in jail or concentration camps with the jews, but the Germans that were scared to stand up for the jews turned into Nazis and killed jews and fought for hitler. The cons in this book is that there is a little bit of violence and bad language. A pro about this book is that you learn a lot about history reading this book, and knowing history is very important. It also teaches you about subjects you learn in scholl and can help you with assignments. My favorite quote was ¨Some Germans were to scared to stand their ground against the nazi regime.¨ This shows how many were scared of hitler and stayed hidden and got turned into a nazi.
An interesting look at how the Nazis rose to power that digs deeper than the traditional explanations of Versailles and mass unemployment and looks back to the beginning of WW1. Not only did the German population come together in a unified cause that touched all classes of people, it was also the beginning of mass participation in politics, a huge departure from the past. The Nazis offered a strong nationalistic platform that Germans were hungry for, and they brought tangible solutions to ordinary people's problems. Anti-semitism was already common at that time, but to believe that it was the draw to the Nazi Party is to miss the other ways the Nazis differed from everyone else—in particular, their vision of a national community that appealed to the middle classes AND welcomed workers.
Fritzsche's arguments are clear and well expressed. It's a different take on an important issue that feels particularly relevant today.
Great work by a great historian. Dr. Fritzsche gives a detailed analysis of how the Nazi party came into the spotlight. His use of a multitude of primary sources; newspapers, journals, letters, election data, etc., give the reader a solid perspective of what life was like in 1930s Germany. His writing flows well, with few parts being a little slow, and his transitions across the time frame are smooth. Dr. Fritzsche makes it clear to the reader how the Nazis gained the spotlight and more members through careful political tactics. His works is truly offers an on the ground perspective.
An examination of the rise of Hitler and Nazism, starting not in 1933 but in 1914. Fritzsche gives a fresh perspective on what made the Nazi party so appealing to average German burghers by looking at the activities and events on four very important dates in 1914, 1918 and 1933. Actually kind of terrifying, given that our current situation with this administration is not far off from this kind of blind nationalism.
Hands down the worst history book I’ve ever read. Basically unreadable. It’s feels like he just had a bunch of bullet points and turned them into paragraphs somehow without many changes, and the way he would structure the paragraphs I was constantly having to reread the beginning of the paragraph to realize what on earth he was talking about which I’ve never had to do before. Never ever would recommend.
Fritzsche makes a compelling argument that Germans may not have been driven by anti-semitism prior to the election of 1933. Yet, I disagree with his argument that the Great Depression was not the primary factor to the rise of the Nazis. Plenty of studies of populism have suggested a strong coorelation between the destruction of Durkheimian solidarity and fascist features like strong figures who embody the party and "other"-ing politics.
Very entertaining read, engaging and worthwhile. A good description of the german population at the time and about how the first world war influenced the birth of the Nazi party. I would have liked to see a bit more of Hitler's work in the mid-to-late twenties, just after his release from prison.
Had to read this for a class* Fritzsche breaks down the rise of the Third Reich in clear terms and makes a compelling argument on the rise of Nazism in a post-WWI Germany. Great read if you’re not big on historical books!
Germans Into Nazis takes a great look at regular German people can become Nazis. Fritzsche uses all modes of media in his book as sources. The narrative Fritzsche uses are photographs that connect with the time periods he is discussing. The book is split up into four chapters, or time periods, that are: July 1914, November 1918, January 1933, and May 1933. These are key dates Fritzsche believes reflects the different changes of the German population.
*These are some of my notes from class - Reflecting back to German history, the Unification of Germany happened in 1871 so Germany is fairly young. - "Volk" develops over time and it was seen as political legitimacy. - Nazism does not equal facism. Emotion was a binding factor for nazism. - Nazi campaigns were not based on foreign policy. There were so many German political parties, the Nazi party had to use other things to separate themselves. - Nazis never got the majority of the vote. However, anti-Semitism is not enough to keep people from voting for Hilter. Anti-Semitism was engrained in the people (Germany have a deep history of it as a culture). - Nazism had racial purity at the centre of its worldview.
Es un libro más técnico que de novela... Está muy interesante ya que nos lleva a entender el desarrollo del ethos nazi, en un pueblo que normalizó el desprecio y el odio por un otro.
Me dejo entender muchas dudas que acarreo hace años sobre la transición nazi, me dejó dudas nuevas, lo consultaré con mi profesora de historia contemporanea
This has proven to be one of the most insightful and instructive narratives that I have read in the contact of the Inter War period in Germany.
I have always been of the opinion that the foundations for the rise of Nazism were laid during the economic and social implosion of Germany in the wake of Versailles and the downfall of the Kaiser. This books substantiates this belief, in part, by way of an incredibly detailed and thoughtful narrative. However, whilst my rather simplistic outlook on the germination of extreme nationalism ends at Versailles, the Author elaborates further by arguing that it was a combination of the lack of legitimacy held by the old order, coupled with the short comings of the Socialist Revolution, and the middle class desire for stability and a return to Imperial Greatness via Nationalism which ultimately provided the foundation for the erection of the Reich.
The Author covers the period ranging for the declaration of war in 1914; the November revolution and counter-revolution of 1918, (including coverage of the failed S.A and Nazi putsch in 1920 and 1923), culminating in the establishment and maintenance of the Third Reich from 1933 onwards, with the broad-based support of the working; middle, and upper classes. The Rise of Nazism follows this chronology, and covers key developments within the time line and details what affect they had, (if any) on the trajectory of the German Nation during the economic and political calamities of the 1900's.
The book is notable in the sense that it accurately captures the dynamics of the political and economic context which gave rise to nationalism; desires for nation rejuvenation, and the pivotal role played by the Professional and Middle Classes in the maintenance of order, and the articulation of elitist interests over and above the aspirations of the Revolution of 1918 and those seeking a qualitative break with the inherent nationalism and militarism of the Kaiser. In essence, the rise of Hitler was by no means a predetermined outcome due largely to the diffuse blend of competing ideas and motivation aimed at a combination of self-preservation; the articulation of economic and class-based viewpoints, and national chauvinism on the part of the military. The critical element in the rise of the ascendancy of Hitler was the backing received from business interests and the military and not "Germany" or the German people as a whole.
One of the most illuminating chapters concerns the march towards 1933. The blend of reactionary sentiment on the part of the Land Volk, and the Burghers, coupled with militia - based violence against the Communists and Socialists created a social ferment in which the with the competing right-wing and Nationalist parties sought to outbid one another with a view to gaining a foothold in this reactionary constituency of self-interest. The most interesting feature concerns the modulation of the competing ideologues in line with the response received on from the Land Volk, with concepts such as anti-Semitism not gaining any credence amongst the groups involved. The majority of whom were looking for the restoration of the national identity, underpinned by the belief that Germany neither lost nor won the war. Furthermore, as a tangible to the question of why Nazism took hold; the Author points to the economic and social inclusion offered by the National Socialists during the transition from Revolution, to Hindenburg, to Hitler. Paradoxically, whilst the Socialists; Nationalists, and elitists interest groups were all seeking power in order to represent a sectional interest, the National Socialists sought to engage with the broader public at grass-roots level, providing a "shadow welfare system" for Party Member's in difficulty; arranging socio - political events for the membership to attend, and employing rhetoric of national renewal as a Volk, rather than by class or economic status. The identification and promotion of a common enemy was only possible once the Volk belonged to the movement as a whole.
The book was a fascinating and considered assessment of the rise of the Third Reich and should be read by anyone with an interest in this important aspect of Germany History.
Occasionally you run across a book from grad school that you squirreled away to read later because the professor was so amped up about it. Over the last decade this particular book has been marinating in a series of garages and I've been traveling to and from Europe. I finally dove into it this month and now I understand why I held onto it. Dr. Fritzsche starts it off at Munich's Odeonplatz (the Nazis actually made people salute this site) in 1914, with a photograph of a young Adolf Hitler in the crowd basking in "this fabled moment of unity" as Germany mobilized for the First World War. The author then talks of wartime sacrifice (especially the mobilization of German women for the effort as "especially working-class women became active in public work for the first time in 1914") and illustrates how the truth came home in letters from the front. He shows how wartime slang changed in this mobilization (Anyone remember the famous 'Freedom Fries' phenomenon of 2003?) on the German Street and argues that "war relief began as a grassroots affair that had the effect of involving more people from various classes in public life than ever before. The number of volunteers in this period must be counted in the millions. At the same time, the newly founded patriotic, social welfare, and self-help organizations brought a richer texture to public life." World War One thus politicized the German people and by 1918 there was an explosion of political organizations in Germany representing everything from artisan guilds to intramural athletes. Unfortunately this also included paramilitary organizations and, when things got tough, the violence famously started in the inter-war years as unemployed 20-30-year-old males were wandering around the Weimar Republic's big cities looking for something to do. By 1933, when Hitler took power, street marchers in smart uniforms, carrying torches and drums in nocturnal rallies were supporting the new regime alongside a vigorous radio and press propaganda machine. "What was in fact dictatorial scaffolding in Spring 1933 looked like healthy resolve to most Germans," the author explains, "who identified with the national revolution, welcomed the end it put to party bickering, and felt these events vindicated the political paths they had long pursued, even if they did not consider themselves out-and-out National Socialists." Yes, he says, they were pissed off about the Treaty of Versailles, their social fabric had unraveled in the Depression, and Fritsche argues that "in the end what Nazi spectacle sought to recreate for every person was the experience of Adolf Hitler when he stepped into the patriotic crowd on Munich's Odeonplatz on 2 August 1914 and recognized the correspondence of his personal identity with Germany's national identity." In this final chapter, Dr. Fritzsche has brought us back to the beginning in explaining how a rational, motivated, modern Christian nation was transformed over a couple of decades into a Manichaean nest of vipers by charlatans and thieves. He only lightly touches on the "othering"--the disdain for Jews and Slavs that the Nazis harnessed for their nefarious aims, but if you're looking for that you can supplement this superb short book with the recent excellent studies by Richard Evans, Tim Snyder, or Michael Burleigh. I am glad I read these historians first and saw the Odeonplatz myself (people are still laying bouquets of flowers there) before tackling this excellent read.