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Subjectivity And Selfhood: Investigating the First-person Perspective
What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social construct -- or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years. Countering this, in Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness. He investigates the interrelationships of experience, self-awareness, and selfhood, proposing that none of these three notions can be understood in isolation. Any investigation of the self, Zahavi argues, must take the first-person perspective seriously and focus on the experiential givenness of the self. Subjectivity and Selfhood explores a number of phenomenological analyses pertaining to the nature of consciousness, self, and self-experience in light of contemporary discussions in consciousness research.
Philosophical phenomenology -- as developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others -- not only addresses crucial issues often absent from current debates over consciousness but also provides a conceptual framework for understanding subjectivity. Zahavi fills the need -- given the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical interest in subjectivity -- for an account of the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness that is accessible to researchers and students from a variety of disciplines. His aim is to use phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of central importance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and psychiatry. By engaging in a dialogue with other philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology can demonstrate its vitality and contemporary relevance.
Philosophical phenomenology -- as developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others -- not only addresses crucial issues often absent from current debates over consciousness but also provides a conceptual framework for understanding subjectivity. Zahavi fills the need -- given the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical interest in subjectivity -- for an account of the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness that is accessible to researchers and students from a variety of disciplines. His aim is to use phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of central importance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and psychiatry. By engaging in a dialogue with other philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology can demonstrate its vitality and contemporary relevance.
265 pages, Hardcover
First published December 9, 2005
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September 23, 2025
if you like this review i now have website: www.michaelkamakana.com
100617 first review: this is sort of 'phenomenology for analytic philosophers'. as such it might be too introductory for those always already convinced of the continuing relevance of this particular 'continental' philosophical research program. i am one such thinker, i have never had to convince myself of the value of investigations of subjectivity and selfhood...
this is easy to read, with some sense of history of 'classic' phenomenonologists (155), merleau-ponty, husserl, sartre, heidegger, de beauvoir etc., and then names of the analytics (17) i am not familiar with, but rather than try to sum up all the arguments leading to some investigation of schizophrenia and autism, i will focus on one chapter: 'self and others'. this is where phenomenonologists are sometimes accused of tending to solipsism...
1) this is 'intersubjectivity'. in fact an ongoing concern for husserl, sartre, merleau-ponty, heidegger, that they search for original intuitions before a child discovers language, the way it necessarily precedes any 'theory of mind', which might be said to only prove its own assumptions. as much does the 'argument by analogy' that evades transparency, immediacy, subjective aspect of 'self awareness'. i work with the idea that intersubjectivity is an original human condition from birth on. it is only later that it is even questioned. there are several arguments against the ‘theory of mind’ idea: that we do not 'infer' from gestures etc. but see the other through, in thought, emotions, intentions, by 'how' these gestures 'express' themselves. we humans have a shared bodily situation, thus possibilities, so by immediate 'empathy' we can sense the intersubjectivity without thought...
2) this is followed by our nature as 'embodied subjectivity' and how we discover ourselves as both subject and object, the image from m-p of one hand touching the other, which requires that there is no absolute coincidence but only one then the other alternating sense, the 'reversibility', through which our 'ipseity' (self) and 'alterity' (other) indicates how we know others in emotions, thoughts, intentions. sartre will interpret this in his own way somewhat more conflicting, heidegger in the way 'being-with' includes all the human world 'afforded' us, but the point is without being 'embodied' to begin with we would have no basis to be 'intersubjective'... this would be neither possible nor comprehensible...
3) next we must go 'beyond empathy', not discounting it, but extending to heidegger's argument that it is not simply the natural world but the human world we first encounter and to which we give primacy- the world of chairs, doors, tables etc. as created by others for their and our human use, so implies that we are not solipsistic, not alone, not needing any other indications, that is if we use empathy to create intersubjectivity we make the error of thinking a problem where there is not one: simply, we interact, interpret, live in shared world with others, interpret 'alterity', generally successfully... thus it is only when this 'breaks down', when our intuitions are off, when the other acts contrary to expectations, that we even think about 'other minds' as a problem...
4) then we have to deal with the 'transcendence of the other', that is, if we recognize we are always already 'with others' in our embodied being, that the other is with us not merely socially but technologically in everything that 'affords' human interaction with the world, with 'alterity', and to be truly self transcendent we must recognize that we exist 'for others', as shown in sartre's notion of 'shame'. we need others to be ourselves...
5) this is an attempt to suggest how each of 1) through 4) build on each other, and how they can be used all together rather than just one or the other, despite how some so obviously contradict each other. the idea here works for me. that they contradict simply suggests they each have contexts. this seems very 'jaina' for me: 1) empathy 2) embodied 3) alterity 4) transcendence... all add something, all are understood phenomenonologists' ideas which seem to me much more convincing than analytics' models of 'mind theory' in which we are like little scientists who only develop into selves when we are old enough to tell our self-stories...
as said, this is only one chapter. i do not think i have fully captured how interesting is this book. perhaps too simple for thinkers always already using phenomenonology, but fun. if you like to read philosophy... there are so many books to read and so little time...
more
Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions
Jainism as Meta-Philosophy
The Experiential Dimension of Advaita Vedanta
Husserl's Phenomenology
Husserl
Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations
Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology
100617 first review: this is sort of 'phenomenology for analytic philosophers'. as such it might be too introductory for those always already convinced of the continuing relevance of this particular 'continental' philosophical research program. i am one such thinker, i have never had to convince myself of the value of investigations of subjectivity and selfhood...
this is easy to read, with some sense of history of 'classic' phenomenonologists (155), merleau-ponty, husserl, sartre, heidegger, de beauvoir etc., and then names of the analytics (17) i am not familiar with, but rather than try to sum up all the arguments leading to some investigation of schizophrenia and autism, i will focus on one chapter: 'self and others'. this is where phenomenonologists are sometimes accused of tending to solipsism...
1) this is 'intersubjectivity'. in fact an ongoing concern for husserl, sartre, merleau-ponty, heidegger, that they search for original intuitions before a child discovers language, the way it necessarily precedes any 'theory of mind', which might be said to only prove its own assumptions. as much does the 'argument by analogy' that evades transparency, immediacy, subjective aspect of 'self awareness'. i work with the idea that intersubjectivity is an original human condition from birth on. it is only later that it is even questioned. there are several arguments against the ‘theory of mind’ idea: that we do not 'infer' from gestures etc. but see the other through, in thought, emotions, intentions, by 'how' these gestures 'express' themselves. we humans have a shared bodily situation, thus possibilities, so by immediate 'empathy' we can sense the intersubjectivity without thought...
2) this is followed by our nature as 'embodied subjectivity' and how we discover ourselves as both subject and object, the image from m-p of one hand touching the other, which requires that there is no absolute coincidence but only one then the other alternating sense, the 'reversibility', through which our 'ipseity' (self) and 'alterity' (other) indicates how we know others in emotions, thoughts, intentions. sartre will interpret this in his own way somewhat more conflicting, heidegger in the way 'being-with' includes all the human world 'afforded' us, but the point is without being 'embodied' to begin with we would have no basis to be 'intersubjective'... this would be neither possible nor comprehensible...
3) next we must go 'beyond empathy', not discounting it, but extending to heidegger's argument that it is not simply the natural world but the human world we first encounter and to which we give primacy- the world of chairs, doors, tables etc. as created by others for their and our human use, so implies that we are not solipsistic, not alone, not needing any other indications, that is if we use empathy to create intersubjectivity we make the error of thinking a problem where there is not one: simply, we interact, interpret, live in shared world with others, interpret 'alterity', generally successfully... thus it is only when this 'breaks down', when our intuitions are off, when the other acts contrary to expectations, that we even think about 'other minds' as a problem...
4) then we have to deal with the 'transcendence of the other', that is, if we recognize we are always already 'with others' in our embodied being, that the other is with us not merely socially but technologically in everything that 'affords' human interaction with the world, with 'alterity', and to be truly self transcendent we must recognize that we exist 'for others', as shown in sartre's notion of 'shame'. we need others to be ourselves...
5) this is an attempt to suggest how each of 1) through 4) build on each other, and how they can be used all together rather than just one or the other, despite how some so obviously contradict each other. the idea here works for me. that they contradict simply suggests they each have contexts. this seems very 'jaina' for me: 1) empathy 2) embodied 3) alterity 4) transcendence... all add something, all are understood phenomenonologists' ideas which seem to me much more convincing than analytics' models of 'mind theory' in which we are like little scientists who only develop into selves when we are old enough to tell our self-stories...
as said, this is only one chapter. i do not think i have fully captured how interesting is this book. perhaps too simple for thinkers always already using phenomenonology, but fun. if you like to read philosophy... there are so many books to read and so little time...
more
Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions
Jainism as Meta-Philosophy
The Experiential Dimension of Advaita Vedanta
Husserl's Phenomenology
Husserl
Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations
Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology
August 6, 2017
Have you ever become confused when you reached to pick up a pencil because you suddenly couldn’t tell the difference between yourself and the pencil? Of course not. But why not? You are a physical object, and so is the pencil. Why does it matter which one you are?
It matters because experience has a personal, subjective feel to it. The sense that you are the owner of your experience is what makes your thoughts yours. Psychiatrists sometimes call that ipseity, or personal identity, and its failure is a characteristic of schizophrenia. What would it be like if you had thoughts that did not seem like they were yours? It would be exactly like hearing voices.
Insights such as that can be won from Dan Zahavi's difficult book, Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. The book is difficult because the questions are difficult. What is subjectivity? What makes us self-aware? What is the self?
Without an account of subjectivity, Zahavi writes, we cannot understand what a self is, and if we cannot understand that, we will not be able to consider that some pathologies, such as schizophrenia and autism, are comprehensible. I would add that without understanding subjectivity, we cannot understand anything about human culture, from politics to the arts to literature. Modern human life is 90% in the head.
There is no clue anywhere in the physical world that consciousness exists. Self-awareness alone reveals it. But how does that work? Zahavi argues that experience always has a subjective aspect. There is no free-floating experience out there on its own. Every experience is somebody's experience, so subjectivity must be intrinsic to consciousness. It follows, then, that subjectivity must be inherently self-aware, albeit in a prereflective, noncognitive, nonintrospective way.
Zahavi suggests that subjectivity is fractured within itself, fragmented or cracked just enough to create a thin shadow of self-alienation, the tiniest precursor of the epistemological subject-object divide. That is enough for subjectivity to get a look at itself. Strange as that sounds, Zahavi desperately needs this concept, for without it, as Husserl wrote, "I cannot grasp my own functioning subjectivity because I am it” (p. 92).
I agree that subjectivity, at its core, is self-alienated and unstable. That instability is what allows subjectivity to be revealed to itself in deliberate reflection. Subjectivity is, then, the knife that can cut itself. The conclusion should have been stated in boldface, uppercase letters, but Zahavi is not prone to bold statements.
Zahavi also takes up the question of intersubjectivity, the problem of how people know each other's mind. You say “ouch” when you bang your thumb and that is what I would say, so you must have feelings like I do. Zahavi convincingly shows that analogy is not how we know each other, despite what common sense would say. I was skeptical at first, then thoroughly persuaded.
All Zahavi's arguments appeal to scientific findings, philosophical sources, logic, and intuition to support ideas that one presumes come from phenomenological analysis. But phenomenology is not a well-defined epistemological method like science, so there are no criteria for judging the validity of its output. The book is thus a set of arguments that aims to be persuasive, not a presentation of consensus findings. Personally, I was persuaded and much-enriched in the process.
Zahavi's main method of argument is exegesis of Husserl's writings, on which he is a well-known expert. He also explicates passages from Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and other phenomenologists. He deserves high praise for making Husserl's turgid writing accessible, going beyond even the published sources to provide his own translations of posthumous letters and notes. Yet for all Zahavi's scholarship, this book suffers from a bit too much Husserl and not enough Zahavi. Time and again, I looked to the author for direction, only to find another set of arguments from Husserl. Remarkable for a book endorsing a first-person perspective, there is little of it apparent.
This is an exciting book, though, rich in ideas, with practical implications, on perhaps the most important topics a psychologist ever confronts: subjectivity and selfhood. My head nearly exploded. It may be too difficult for the average reader.
It matters because experience has a personal, subjective feel to it. The sense that you are the owner of your experience is what makes your thoughts yours. Psychiatrists sometimes call that ipseity, or personal identity, and its failure is a characteristic of schizophrenia. What would it be like if you had thoughts that did not seem like they were yours? It would be exactly like hearing voices.
Insights such as that can be won from Dan Zahavi's difficult book, Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. The book is difficult because the questions are difficult. What is subjectivity? What makes us self-aware? What is the self?
Without an account of subjectivity, Zahavi writes, we cannot understand what a self is, and if we cannot understand that, we will not be able to consider that some pathologies, such as schizophrenia and autism, are comprehensible. I would add that without understanding subjectivity, we cannot understand anything about human culture, from politics to the arts to literature. Modern human life is 90% in the head.
There is no clue anywhere in the physical world that consciousness exists. Self-awareness alone reveals it. But how does that work? Zahavi argues that experience always has a subjective aspect. There is no free-floating experience out there on its own. Every experience is somebody's experience, so subjectivity must be intrinsic to consciousness. It follows, then, that subjectivity must be inherently self-aware, albeit in a prereflective, noncognitive, nonintrospective way.
Zahavi suggests that subjectivity is fractured within itself, fragmented or cracked just enough to create a thin shadow of self-alienation, the tiniest precursor of the epistemological subject-object divide. That is enough for subjectivity to get a look at itself. Strange as that sounds, Zahavi desperately needs this concept, for without it, as Husserl wrote, "I cannot grasp my own functioning subjectivity because I am it” (p. 92).
I agree that subjectivity, at its core, is self-alienated and unstable. That instability is what allows subjectivity to be revealed to itself in deliberate reflection. Subjectivity is, then, the knife that can cut itself. The conclusion should have been stated in boldface, uppercase letters, but Zahavi is not prone to bold statements.
Zahavi also takes up the question of intersubjectivity, the problem of how people know each other's mind. You say “ouch” when you bang your thumb and that is what I would say, so you must have feelings like I do. Zahavi convincingly shows that analogy is not how we know each other, despite what common sense would say. I was skeptical at first, then thoroughly persuaded.
All Zahavi's arguments appeal to scientific findings, philosophical sources, logic, and intuition to support ideas that one presumes come from phenomenological analysis. But phenomenology is not a well-defined epistemological method like science, so there are no criteria for judging the validity of its output. The book is thus a set of arguments that aims to be persuasive, not a presentation of consensus findings. Personally, I was persuaded and much-enriched in the process.
Zahavi's main method of argument is exegesis of Husserl's writings, on which he is a well-known expert. He also explicates passages from Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and other phenomenologists. He deserves high praise for making Husserl's turgid writing accessible, going beyond even the published sources to provide his own translations of posthumous letters and notes. Yet for all Zahavi's scholarship, this book suffers from a bit too much Husserl and not enough Zahavi. Time and again, I looked to the author for direction, only to find another set of arguments from Husserl. Remarkable for a book endorsing a first-person perspective, there is little of it apparent.
This is an exciting book, though, rich in ideas, with practical implications, on perhaps the most important topics a psychologist ever confronts: subjectivity and selfhood. My head nearly exploded. It may be too difficult for the average reader.
February 21, 2018
Zahavi defends Husserl's theory that all conscious experience or awareness involves a fundamental level of self-awareness. This self-awareness is unconventionally defined as a crucially pre-reflective, implicit sense that an experience is mine or is experienced by me. Zahavi believes that the many philosophers who deny the existence of a self, or who explain the self away as a social-construct, are correct but mislead in believing in a faulty or narrow conception of the self. Once these philosophers are able to take up Husserl's insight that the self is not an explicit object of awareness but rather this underlying and unifying sense that is a condition for all experiences, they would see that the self is real.
Zahavi slides between seemingly contradicting claims about the self. He restates his descriptions about the nature of this pre-reflective sense of self-awareness too many times throughout the chapters. Even with this much repetition, I was left unsure and confused about the value of naming this feature of experience "self" whatsoever. Zahavi must insist that this pre-reflective self-awareness is so extremely implicit and pre-cognitive in order for it to have any empirical plausibility (since it is intuitive that we are not aware of our own being every single waking moment in life). But if it is so implicit, it doesn't seem to make much sense to label it as a form of "self" whatsoever. I think given Zahavi's descriptions of this "self", it is more appropriate to call it simply an openness onto the world, as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty describe it.
Furthermore, Zahavi misconstrues Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's positions on the nature of self and intentionality in order to make them seem to align with Zahavi's interpretation of Husserl's position. He extremely selectively takes quotes from both of these philosopher's texts and decontextualizes them. It is frustrating to see such polemical moves, and I want to warn readers that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty both have never endorsed such a theory of an implicit self-awareness behind all experience.
There are two features of the book that I appreciated. First, in the last chapter when Zahavi reviews various psychological theories on the nature of the processes or mechanisms that are affected in autism, and the nature of the experience of being autistic, Zahavi keenly picks out the wrong assumptions in such theories and complicates them with his more nuanced grasp on the varieties of conceptions of self. It is satisfying to see such theories made transparent and tossed away. Second, throughout the book, Zahavi reviews many main positions, contemporary and historical, on the nature of self. It was useful to have such an overview.
However, I did not find these features redeeming for the time spent in working through the book. I would urge potential readers to just read the introduction of the book or some book reviews rather than go through the whole thing. Reading the entire book puts some readers at risk for having misunderstandings of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, and the book has only a few points that are simply elongated and repeated.
Zahavi slides between seemingly contradicting claims about the self. He restates his descriptions about the nature of this pre-reflective sense of self-awareness too many times throughout the chapters. Even with this much repetition, I was left unsure and confused about the value of naming this feature of experience "self" whatsoever. Zahavi must insist that this pre-reflective self-awareness is so extremely implicit and pre-cognitive in order for it to have any empirical plausibility (since it is intuitive that we are not aware of our own being every single waking moment in life). But if it is so implicit, it doesn't seem to make much sense to label it as a form of "self" whatsoever. I think given Zahavi's descriptions of this "self", it is more appropriate to call it simply an openness onto the world, as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty describe it.
Furthermore, Zahavi misconstrues Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's positions on the nature of self and intentionality in order to make them seem to align with Zahavi's interpretation of Husserl's position. He extremely selectively takes quotes from both of these philosopher's texts and decontextualizes them. It is frustrating to see such polemical moves, and I want to warn readers that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty both have never endorsed such a theory of an implicit self-awareness behind all experience.
There are two features of the book that I appreciated. First, in the last chapter when Zahavi reviews various psychological theories on the nature of the processes or mechanisms that are affected in autism, and the nature of the experience of being autistic, Zahavi keenly picks out the wrong assumptions in such theories and complicates them with his more nuanced grasp on the varieties of conceptions of self. It is satisfying to see such theories made transparent and tossed away. Second, throughout the book, Zahavi reviews many main positions, contemporary and historical, on the nature of self. It was useful to have such an overview.
However, I did not find these features redeeming for the time spent in working through the book. I would urge potential readers to just read the introduction of the book or some book reviews rather than go through the whole thing. Reading the entire book puts some readers at risk for having misunderstandings of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, and the book has only a few points that are simply elongated and repeated.
November 25, 2018
This is a remarkable book. Zahavi investigates the nature of self-consciousness from a phenomenological perspective. But what makes this text such an insightful read, beside the clarity of the writing, is the way that the author draws upon disparate texts from Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, amongst others, to clarify the key phenomena concerning self-consciousness. Thus, Zahavi's insightful textual exegesis is completely directed toward 'the things themselves,' in a way that is truly phenomenological. Zahavi also engages with central texts in the analytic tradition concerned with self-consciousness and the use of first-person concepts, in a way the provides added clarity and rigor to the question. More specifically, Zahavi returns to Shoemaker's argument concerning the impossibility of a derived or mediated notion of self-consciousness. As Zahavi (p. 27) says, "In order to identify something as oneself one has to hold something true of it that one already knows to be true of oneself. In some cases, this self-knowledge might be grounded on some further identification, but the supposition that every item of self-knowledge rests on identification leads to an infinite regress." In other words, the proper application of "I" cannot be given by a rule stated in the third-person.
For Zahavi this provides a basis for his defense of an unmediated and non-intentional sense of the self that underwrites more developed modes of self-consciousness. His arguments concerning the first-personal nature of experience were especially insightful. Thus, if A and B both see a yellow car, the object of their experience is identical and would necessarily be described such but the manner of their experience, what Zahavi calls the mode of access is distinct and characterized by a first-personal giveness. Similar, the author's discussion of intersubjectivity is also insightful. Another strength of the text is Zahavi's enagement with theoretical and empirical literature in psychology concerning the theory of mind. The author uses his previous analysis of a non-derived notion of the self, and a multimodal notion of intersubjectivity to critique the overly intellectual focus of much of important strands of this psychological literature. In short, the book provides a sustained phenomenological analysis of self-conscious that manifests its unmediated or non-intentional basis and the fundamental role of intersubjectivity in its constitution.
For Zahavi this provides a basis for his defense of an unmediated and non-intentional sense of the self that underwrites more developed modes of self-consciousness. His arguments concerning the first-personal nature of experience were especially insightful. Thus, if A and B both see a yellow car, the object of their experience is identical and would necessarily be described such but the manner of their experience, what Zahavi calls the mode of access is distinct and characterized by a first-personal giveness. Similar, the author's discussion of intersubjectivity is also insightful. Another strength of the text is Zahavi's enagement with theoretical and empirical literature in psychology concerning the theory of mind. The author uses his previous analysis of a non-derived notion of the self, and a multimodal notion of intersubjectivity to critique the overly intellectual focus of much of important strands of this psychological literature. In short, the book provides a sustained phenomenological analysis of self-conscious that manifests its unmediated or non-intentional basis and the fundamental role of intersubjectivity in its constitution.
July 9, 2015
This is primarily a book about phenomenology and "analytic" theory of mind. On that level, it's very good. Zahavi is careful and thorough there.
For a phenomenological philosopher, it's a bit too basic. Zahavi helped me think through issues related to embodiment and intersubjectivity, through his consideration of situations like autism. I really want to find an extensive phenomenology of abnormality. I'm not entirely sure there could *be* such a phenomenology.
For a phenomenological philosopher, it's a bit too basic. Zahavi helped me think through issues related to embodiment and intersubjectivity, through his consideration of situations like autism. I really want to find an extensive phenomenology of abnormality. I'm not entirely sure there could *be* such a phenomenology.
July 9, 2025
I found Dan Zahavi’s Subjectivity and Selfhood to be a really engaging read. It offers a clear and insightful look into selfhood, subjectivity, and the first-person perspective. Despite dealing with some pretty dense concepts, it’s surprisingly readable and left me with plenty to think about.
January 25, 2021
What's extraordinary about Zahavi's book is how CLEAR he is. He's able to take the most pretzelesque ideas of Husserl and clarify them through a number of rhetorical strategies, my favorite being his transition phrase "To put it differently...."
When it comes to the content, the final chapters that defend the phenomenological approach against the theory-theory of mind interpretation, particularly as they bear on autism, persuaded me. I look forward to reading more from this thinker.
When it comes to the content, the final chapters that defend the phenomenological approach against the theory-theory of mind interpretation, particularly as they bear on autism, persuaded me. I look forward to reading more from this thinker.
April 13, 2023
Gegebenheitsweisen.
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