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Overreach
An astonishing investigation into the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war – from the corridors of the Kremlin to the trenches of Mariupol.
The Russo-Ukrainian War is the most serious geopolitical crisis since the Second World War – and yet at the heart of the conflict is a mystery. Vladimir Putin apparently lurched from a calculating, subtle master of opportunity to a reckless gambler, putting his regime – and Russia itself – at risk of destruction. Why?
Drawing on over 25 years’ experience as a correspondent in Moscow, as well as his own family ties to Russia and Ukraine, journalist Owen Matthews takes us through the poisoned historical roots of the conflict, into the Covid bubble where Putin conceived his invasion plans in a fog of paranoia about Western threats, and finally into the inner circle around Ukrainian president and unexpected war hero Volodimir Zelensky.
Using the accounts of current and former insiders from the Kremlin and its propaganda machine, the testimony of captured Russian soldiers and on-the-ground reporting from Russia and Ukraine, Overreach tells the story not only of the war’s causes but how the first six months unfolded.
With its panoramic view, Overreach is an authoritative, unmissable record of a conflict that shocked Europe to its core.
The Russo-Ukrainian War is the most serious geopolitical crisis since the Second World War – and yet at the heart of the conflict is a mystery. Vladimir Putin apparently lurched from a calculating, subtle master of opportunity to a reckless gambler, putting his regime – and Russia itself – at risk of destruction. Why?
Drawing on over 25 years’ experience as a correspondent in Moscow, as well as his own family ties to Russia and Ukraine, journalist Owen Matthews takes us through the poisoned historical roots of the conflict, into the Covid bubble where Putin conceived his invasion plans in a fog of paranoia about Western threats, and finally into the inner circle around Ukrainian president and unexpected war hero Volodimir Zelensky.
Using the accounts of current and former insiders from the Kremlin and its propaganda machine, the testimony of captured Russian soldiers and on-the-ground reporting from Russia and Ukraine, Overreach tells the story not only of the war’s causes but how the first six months unfolded.
With its panoramic view, Overreach is an authoritative, unmissable record of a conflict that shocked Europe to its core.
441 pages, Kindle Edition
First published November 11, 2022
242 people are currently reading
1863 people want to read
About the author
Owen Matthews
15 books156 followersOwen Matthews is a British writer, historian and journalist. His first book, Stalin's Children, was shortlisted for the 2008 Guardian First Books Award, the Orwell Prize for political writing, and France's Prix Medicis Etranger. His books have been translated into 28 languages. He is a former Moscow and Istanbul Bureau Chief for Newsweek Magazine. Matthews has lectured on Russian history and politics at Columbia University's Harriman Centre, St Antony's College Oxford, and the Journalism Faculty of Moscow State University.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 148 reviews
December 26, 2022
Overreach is a very interesting book that provides background, context and immediacy to the lead-up and the progression of Russia's invasion of Ukraine up to September 2022.
Owen Matthews brings his own experience to the account from two angles: that of a man raising a family, with his Russian wife, living in Russia; and of a journalist who has reported from within and about Russia and its politics and wars for over a quarter of a century.
The story told here brings together the history of Putin and his immediate and very tight circle, the siloviki , from their days in the KGB to the present. This is told at pace and with a clarity that gives the reasons for the invasion and how those decisions were made, and indeed influenced by others such as the US, NATO, the EU and former Eastern block nations, either by their approach and language to Russia, or in [many] perceived slights and invented snubs. Matthews is able to do this because of his understanding of Russia, its society - for instance people's work, life, living standards, interaction with the state and perception or understanding of their own government and the West; we see how government works, who works in local and central government and how these are managed, viewed, funded and manipulated by Putin and his siloviki. Alongside this, Matthews is able to access those who play central parts in Ukraine politically, and also the US, UK, Germany and others.
This then, provides the reader with accounts, quotes and insight from current and former insiders, blended with those of people who fought/are fighting or suffered from Putin's "Limited Special Operation", as the first six months of this war unfolded.
Overreach: The Inside Story of Putin's War Against Ukraine, being written during the war will, like early accounts of other historic events, not be the final or definitive word, but it is a very good starting point offering a readable, and at times personal, account written by a respected Western journalist with access and contacts that is as good a starting point as any other available today [Dec 2022].
Owen Matthews brings his own experience to the account from two angles: that of a man raising a family, with his Russian wife, living in Russia; and of a journalist who has reported from within and about Russia and its politics and wars for over a quarter of a century.
The story told here brings together the history of Putin and his immediate and very tight circle, the siloviki , from their days in the KGB to the present. This is told at pace and with a clarity that gives the reasons for the invasion and how those decisions were made, and indeed influenced by others such as the US, NATO, the EU and former Eastern block nations, either by their approach and language to Russia, or in [many] perceived slights and invented snubs. Matthews is able to do this because of his understanding of Russia, its society - for instance people's work, life, living standards, interaction with the state and perception or understanding of their own government and the West; we see how government works, who works in local and central government and how these are managed, viewed, funded and manipulated by Putin and his siloviki. Alongside this, Matthews is able to access those who play central parts in Ukraine politically, and also the US, UK, Germany and others.
This then, provides the reader with accounts, quotes and insight from current and former insiders, blended with those of people who fought/are fighting or suffered from Putin's "Limited Special Operation", as the first six months of this war unfolded.
Overreach: The Inside Story of Putin's War Against Ukraine, being written during the war will, like early accounts of other historic events, not be the final or definitive word, but it is a very good starting point offering a readable, and at times personal, account written by a respected Western journalist with access and contacts that is as good a starting point as any other available today [Dec 2022].
March 17, 2023
A must-read. The author has been a foreign journalist in Moscow for 27 years. He explains motivations and actions of both sides, without vilifying or glorifying any side. His argument that NATO's founding rules prohibit taking in countries with unresolved border disputies partly explains NATO's indecisiveness in questions about Ukraine and Georgia. The chapter of war's economic consequences on Russia is hard to get through yet highly illuminating. The current stalemate is explained by two illusions: Russia's aka Putin's bid that Ukraine will finally cede under the pressure and Zelensky's desire to get back not only Lukhansk and Donetsk regions but also Crimea.
Owen Matthews bases his dissection of Putin's political views on Putin's essay of 2021: On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president...
Owen Matthews bases his dissection of Putin's political views on Putin's essay of 2021: On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president...
November 18, 2022
I highly recommend this account of the background to and first six months of the terrible Russia-Ukraine War. Owen Matthews, who has featured a lot in the broadcast media, has considerable knowledge of and contacts within the Russian establishment, and has used these to good effect to try to explain how we have got to this precipice. It is a balanced account in terms of reflecting the different points of view but leaves the reader in no doubt that this is a disaster for all, and a terrible indictment of the Russian leadership in particular.
As the conflict is sadly very much continuing, this book will no doubt be reviewed and revised but for anyone wishing to have a clear and concise background view of the conflict, this is the English-language book for you.
As the conflict is sadly very much continuing, this book will no doubt be reviewed and revised but for anyone wishing to have a clear and concise background view of the conflict, this is the English-language book for you.
December 24, 2022
ตั้งแต่รัสเซียยกทัพบุกยูเครนในเดือนกุมภาพันธ์ 2022 ด้วย “เหตุผล” ที่ฟังดูเหลือเชื่อ (และจนถึงวันนี้ก็ไม่ควรมีใครหลงเชื่อแล้ว!) ว่า “เข้าไปปลดปล่อยชาวยูเครนจากพวกนีโอนาซี” ประสบการณ์การอ่านตลอดทั้งปี 2022 ส่วนหนึ่งคือการควานหาบทความและหนังสือดีๆ เกี่ยวกับรัสเซียและ/หรือปูตินเพราะอยากเข้าใจมากขึ้นว่าทำไปทำไม(วะ) ซึ่งพอถึงสิ้นปีก็ปรากฎว่าได้อ่านหนังสือแนวนี้รวม 5 เล่ม ในนี้ชอบมาก 2 เล่ม คือ Freezing Order (แปลไทยแล้วในชื่อ “อายัดอำมหิต” โดยผู้เขียนรีวิวนี้ อิอิ) และ The Oligarchs (ให้ภาพชัดมากว่าเหล่าคณาธิปัตย์รัสเซียรวยขึ้นมายังไงหลังสหภาพโซเวียตล่มสลายและใช้อิทธิพลทางการเมืองแบบไหน – จริงๆ เจ้าสัวหลายตระกูลในไทยก็ประมาณนี้เลย เราควรใช้คำว่า oligarchs หรือกลุ่มคณาธิปัตย์กับพวกเขาเช่นกัน เพราะคำว่า “เจ้าสัว” ไม่สื่อถึงอิทธิพลทางการเมืองแม้แต่น้อย :>) อีก 2 เล่มเฉยๆ (The Man Without a Face ประวัติของปูติน และ Putin’s Trolls อธิบายปฏิบัติการข่าวสารยุคปูติน) แต่เล่มที่ชอบที่สุด ยกให้ Overreach ของ Owen Matthews นักข่าวลูกครึ่งรัสเซีย-อังกฤษ อดีตบรรณาธิการโต๊ะมอสโคว์ประจำวารสาร Newsweek
ในหนังสือเล่มนี้ผู้เขียนอาศัยประสบการณ์ทำข่าวรัสเซียมากกว่า 25 ปี รวมถึงสายสัมพันธ์ของครอบครัวและญาติๆ มาฉายภาพอย่างเด่นชัดและน่าติดตามตลอดเล่มถึง “ต้นตอ” ของสงครามครั้งนี้ ทั้งภาพลึกและภาพกว้าง ใครที่อยากรู้ว่าปูตินถูกครอบงำด้วยแนวคิดชาตินิยมผสมรากฐานนิยมศาสนา (คริสต์นิกาย Orthodox) สุดขั้วที่เอามาใช้ในการรุกรานยูเครนได้ยังไง ทำไมปูตินจึงสั่งให้สร้างอนุสาวรีย์ของ Vladimir the Great หน้าเครมลินในปี 2016 และเชิ่อมตัวเองกับประวัติศาสตร์ช่วงนั้น คน “วงใน” ที่เขาไว้ใจทั้งในและนอกเครมลินมีใครบ้าง ทำไมนักแสดงตลกจึงสามารถชนะการเลือกตั้งเป็นประธานาธิบดียูเครน ทำไมรัสเซียจึงบุกไปยึดครองไครเมียในปี 2014 และทำไมอเมริกาและอังกฤษจึงต่อต้านท่อส่งก๊าซ Nord Stream จากรัสเซียมาเยอรมนี มหกรรมโฆษณาชวนเชื่อ ปฏิบัติการข้อมูลข่าวสาร การยึดกุมสื่อในรัสเซียทำงานยังไง ภาวะที่ทุกคนต้องแยกกันอยู่ในช่วงโรคระบาด COVID-19 ส่งผลต่อความคิดและการวางแผนบุกยูเครนของปูตินอย่างไรบ้าง
และเหนือสิ่งอื่นใด อะไรทำให้ปูตินเปลี่ยนจากนักกลยุทธ์ จอมสายลับผู้แยบยล มาเป็นนักพนันที่เอาระบอบของเขาและรัสเซียทั้งประเทศมาเดิมพันในสงครามอย่างบ้าบิ่น ?
Overreach คลี่คลายคำถามข้างต้นและคำถามอื่นๆ ที่เกี่ยวข้องกับต้นตอของสงครามอย่างน่าสนใจ ผ่านการย่อยข้อมูลมหาศาลและการสัมภาษณ์คนหลายร้อยคนทั้งในและนอกเครมลิน กระบวนการได้มาซึ่งข้อมูลของผู้เขียนก็น่าติดตามไม่แพ้เส้นเรื่องหลัก ทหารรัสเซียหลายคนให้การหลังจากที่ตกเป็นเชลย บางคนยอมให้ข้อมูลแบบนิรนาม ต้องนัดพบกันในสวนสาธารณะตามเวลาที่กำหนด คนสนิทของปูตินหลายคนยอมให้ข้อมูลแต่ระวังตัวแจ ชาวรัสเซียจำนวนมากที่รักชาติแต่ไม่รักปูตินอยากให้โลกรู้ว่าพวกเขาคิดอะไร
ความเจ๋งของหนังสือเล่มนี้คือไม่ได้เล่าแต่ “ต้นตอ” ของสงคราม แต่เล่าเบื้องลึกและเบื้องหลังของ 6 เดือนแรกในสงครามด้วย (คนเขียนต้องเขียนเร็วชนิดสายฟ้าแลบ เพราะหนังสือเพิ่งตีพิมพ์เดือนพฤศจิกายน 2022 ไม่ถึง 10 เดือนหลังสงครามเริ่ม!) ข้อมูลที่น่าสนใจที่สุดสำหรับตัวเองคือกลยุทธ์ของจีน ซึ่งพูดต่อหน้าสาธารณะในสิ่งที่ทั้งสองฝ่ายอยากได้ยินทุกครั้ง แต่ลับหลังก็เดินเกมฉลาดและมีการเปลี่ยนแปลงเชิงนโยบายที่ส่งผลต่อสงคราม เช่น ในเดือนมีนาคม 2022 จีนกดดันให้อเมริกาล้มเลิกแผนการหนุนโปแลนด์ให้ส่งเครื่องบินรบ MiG-29 ให้กองทัพอากาศยูเครน แต่ในเวลาต่อมาการเดินเกมการทูตแบบส่วนตัวของ หวังอี้ รัฐมนตรีต่างประเทศของจีน กับนาโต้และอเมริกาส่งผลให้จุดยืนเกี่ยวกับรัสเซียและสงครามครั้งนี้ขยับเข้ามาชิดกันมาก จนสีจิ้นผิงประกาศว่าโลกต้อง “ป้องกันไม่ให้เกิดวิกฤตินิวเคลียร์ในทวีปยูเรเซีย” ระหว่างเจอไบเดนในการประชุม G20 ที่บาหลี
อ่านสนุกมากและได้ความรู้มหาศาล ในเมื่อสงครามยูเครนยังไม่จบ Overreach จึงเปรียบเสมือน “ร่างแรก” ของหนังสือเล่มใหม่ที่ผู้เขียนคงได้เขียนอย่างแน่นอน เมื่อใดก็ตามที่สงครามจบลง
ในหนังสือเล่มนี้ผู้เขียนอาศัยประสบการณ์ทำข่าวรัสเซียมากกว่า 25 ปี รวมถึงสายสัมพันธ์ของครอบครัวและญาติๆ มาฉายภาพอย่างเด่นชัดและน่าติดตามตลอดเล่มถึง “ต้นตอ” ของสงครามครั้งนี้ ทั้งภาพลึกและภาพกว้าง ใครที่อยากรู้ว่าปูตินถูกครอบงำด้วยแนวคิดชาตินิยมผสมรากฐานนิยมศาสนา (คริสต์นิกาย Orthodox) สุดขั้วที่เอามาใช้ในการรุกรานยูเครนได้ยังไง ทำไมปูตินจึงสั่งให้สร้างอนุสาวรีย์ของ Vladimir the Great หน้าเครมลินในปี 2016 และเชิ่อมตัวเองกับประวัติศาสตร์ช่วงนั้น คน “วงใน” ที่เขาไว้ใจทั้งในและนอกเครมลินมีใครบ้าง ทำไมนักแสดงตลกจึงสามารถชนะการเลือกตั้งเป็นประธานาธิบดียูเครน ทำไมรัสเซียจึงบุกไปยึดครองไครเมียในปี 2014 และทำไมอเมริกาและอังกฤษจึงต่อต้านท่อส่งก๊าซ Nord Stream จากรัสเซียมาเยอรมนี มหกรรมโฆษณาชวนเชื่อ ปฏิบัติการข้อมูลข่าวสาร การยึดกุมสื่อในรัสเซียทำงานยังไง ภาวะที่ทุกคนต้องแยกกันอยู่ในช่วงโรคระบาด COVID-19 ส่งผลต่อความคิดและการวางแผนบุกยูเครนของปูตินอย่างไรบ้าง
และเหนือสิ่งอื่นใด อะไรทำให้ปูตินเปลี่ยนจากนักกลยุทธ์ จอมสายลับผู้แยบยล มาเป็นนักพนันที่เอาระบอบของเขาและรัสเซียทั้งประเทศมาเดิมพันในสงครามอย่างบ้าบิ่น ?
Overreach คลี่คลายคำถามข้างต้นและคำถามอื่นๆ ที่เกี่ยวข้องกับต้นตอของสงครามอย่างน่าสนใจ ผ่านการย่อยข้อมูลมหาศาลและการสัมภาษณ์คนหลายร้อยคนทั้งในและนอกเครมลิน กระบวนการได้มาซึ่งข้อมูลของผู้เขียนก็น่าติดตามไม่แพ้เส้นเรื่องหลัก ทหารรัสเซียหลายคนให้การหลังจากที่ตกเป็นเชลย บางคนยอมให้ข้อมูลแบบนิรนาม ต้องนัดพบกันในสวนสาธารณะตามเวลาที่กำหนด คนสนิทของปูตินหลายคนยอมให้ข้อมูลแต่ระวังตัวแจ ชาวรัสเซียจำนวนมากที่รักชาติแต่ไม่รักปูตินอยากให้โลกรู้ว่าพวกเขาคิดอะไร
ความเจ๋งของหนังสือเล่มนี้คือไม่ได้เล่าแต่ “ต้นตอ” ของสงคราม แต่เล่าเบื้องลึกและเบื้องหลังของ 6 เดือนแรกในสงครามด้วย (คนเขียนต้องเขียนเร็วชนิดสายฟ้าแลบ เพราะหนังสือเพิ่งตีพิมพ์เดือนพฤศจิกายน 2022 ไม่ถึง 10 เดือนหลังสงครามเริ่ม!) ข้อมูลที่น่าสนใจที่สุดสำหรับตัวเองคือกลยุทธ์ของจีน ซึ่งพูดต่อหน้าสาธารณะในสิ่งที่ทั้งสองฝ่ายอยากได้ยินทุกครั้ง แต่ลับหลังก็เดินเกมฉลาดและมีการเปลี่ยนแปลงเชิงนโยบายที่ส่งผลต่อสงคราม เช่น ในเดือนมีนาคม 2022 จีนกดดันให้อเมริกาล้มเลิกแผนการหนุนโปแลนด์ให้ส่งเครื่องบินรบ MiG-29 ให้กองทัพอากาศยูเครน แต่ในเวลาต่อมาการเดินเกมการทูตแบบส่วนตัวของ หวังอี้ รัฐมนตรีต่างประเทศของจีน กับนาโต้และอเมริกาส่งผลให้จุดยืนเกี่ยวกับรัสเซียและสงครามครั้งนี้ขยับเข้ามาชิดกันมาก จนสีจิ้นผิงประกาศว่าโลกต้อง “ป้องกันไม่ให้เกิดวิกฤตินิวเคลียร์ในทวีปยูเรเซีย” ระหว่างเจอไบเดนในการประชุม G20 ที่บาหลี
อ่านสนุกมากและได้ความรู้มหาศาล ในเมื่อสงครามยูเครนยังไม่จบ Overreach จึงเปรียบเสมือน “ร่างแรก” ของหนังสือเล่มใหม่ที่ผู้เขียนคงได้เขียนอย่างแน่นอน เมื่อใดก็ตามที่สงครามจบลง
November 1, 2024
Sublime o relato que o autor faz do período que antecedeu a agressão da Federação Russa à Ucrânia e da forma como se desenrolaram os primeiros meses de uma guerra, de dimensões desconhecidas na Europa desde 1945, que alguns previram que duraria escassos dias...
Análise histórica e política (quase) em directo, por uma voz profundamente conhecedora da realidade sociopolítica dos dois países.
Se te interessa o assunto, this is as good as it gets.
Imperdível.
Análise histórica e política (quase) em directo, por uma voz profundamente conhecedora da realidade sociopolítica dos dois países.
Se te interessa o assunto, this is as good as it gets.
Imperdível.
July 26, 2023
Overreach deals with the Ukrainian-Russian conflict from its very beginning all the way to September 2022 and the Kharkiv counter-offensive. The book is split into two: the first half details the history of the Ukrainian-Russian relationship (including the Orange revolution, the Maidan revolution and the 2014 invasion) and then the second half details the 2022 invasion and the course of the war.
There were probably too many pages spent dealing with the background of the war and not enough on the actual war itself. Would have liked to read more about the battles, the strategies, the equipment and the commanders. It doesn't even mention
The author briefly goes over some key battles such as the one for the Hostomel airport. However, there are few details about other major battles such as the siege of Mariupol and Azovstal. The war crimes at Bucha are covered in more detail including the story of the young Russian soldier that committed war crimes and was subsequently captured and sentenced to life in prison. Various actors in the war such as the foreign volunteers, the Chechens, the Wagner mercenaries are each discussed in turn.
The most interesting parts of the book are the individual stories of various people involved in both sides of the conflict from Ukrainian refugees and soldiers to the Russian conscripts. The many of stories of Ukrainian civilian suffering are hard to read, for example the story of a Ukrainian woman that had to first go through Russian in order to escape to Western Europe as it was safer than crossing the frontline.
Even though the author is very knowledgeable about Russia, being part Russian and having lived and worked there as a journalist, it feels that this book was written too quickly and only briefly covered the subject matter. I also noticed a couple of errors in the book such as the confusion of Bucharest and Budapest for the location of the NATO 2008 summit.
Overall this is a decent book but it is more like an introduction to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. I am hoping that once the war is over a definitive account can be written.
There were probably too many pages spent dealing with the background of the war and not enough on the actual war itself. Would have liked to read more about the battles, the strategies, the equipment and the commanders. It doesn't even mention
The author briefly goes over some key battles such as the one for the Hostomel airport. However, there are few details about other major battles such as the siege of Mariupol and Azovstal. The war crimes at Bucha are covered in more detail including the story of the young Russian soldier that committed war crimes and was subsequently captured and sentenced to life in prison. Various actors in the war such as the foreign volunteers, the Chechens, the Wagner mercenaries are each discussed in turn.
The most interesting parts of the book are the individual stories of various people involved in both sides of the conflict from Ukrainian refugees and soldiers to the Russian conscripts. The many of stories of Ukrainian civilian suffering are hard to read, for example the story of a Ukrainian woman that had to first go through Russian in order to escape to Western Europe as it was safer than crossing the frontline.
Even though the author is very knowledgeable about Russia, being part Russian and having lived and worked there as a journalist, it feels that this book was written too quickly and only briefly covered the subject matter. I also noticed a couple of errors in the book such as the confusion of Bucharest and Budapest for the location of the NATO 2008 summit.
Overall this is a decent book but it is more like an introduction to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. I am hoping that once the war is over a definitive account can be written.
September 21, 2023
A decent overview of the war and it's background until September 2022. A good 50% of the book consists of the historical background of the war, so if you know about Russian and Ukrainian history, there might be some repetition.
February 20, 2023
Timely, compelling and arguably far more perceptive than could reasonably be expected so soon.
According to the old cliche, journalism is the first rough draft of history. Unfortunately, this is often only true in the sense of history as “things that happened” – the interesting questions of history, those requiring careful arguments about causation and counterfactual, await more distance, better sources, and the attention of experts. This applies even more to major events. Owen Matthews has no doubt that the war in Ukraine is one of these, declaring in the introduction to Overreach that “The world’s security architecture, food and energy supply, balance of military power and alliances will be altered by [the war] forever”.
Matthews has, therefore, set himself a difficult task by seeking to write “a first draft of the history of how the war began – and how the conflict moved from Russia’s blitzkrieg through stalemate to Ukrainian counter-offensive.” The focus of the book is what Matthews describes as “the most compelling mystery at the heart of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine…what was the true reason that Putin decided to go to war?”
Measured against this standard, and considering the circumstances under which it was produced, the book is a success. Part 1 covers the historical origins of the 2022 invasion, stretching from Kyivan Rus’ to the election of Volodymyr Zelensky as President of Ukraine in 2019. Chapter 1 (“Poisoned Roots”) is necessarily concise and touches lightly, if at all, on many of the controversies of early Russian and Ukrainian history, but Matthews does a good job emphasising the fundamental uncertainty of key issues.
Chapter 2 (“And Moscow is Silent”) gives a brief biography of Putin that largely aligns with the conventional Western interpretation. As the Chapter title suggests, much is made of Putin’s distress at the fall of the Soviet Union (Matthews quotes Boris Reitschuster’s claim that the infamous ‘Moscow is silent’ moment is “the key to understanding Putin”) and its development into simmering anti-NATO resentment. The last part of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 summarise the history of post-USSR, pre-Zelensky Ukraine, including the Euromaidan protests and the subsequent conflict in the Donbas.
Chapter 4 (“Tomorrow Belongs to Me”) and Part 2 consider the period from 2014 to February 2022. Chapters 4 and 5 are the core of the book, because they most clearly address Matthews’ original question about why Putin decided to go to war. Matthews’ answer may come as a surprise to a casual reader, because he emphasises the role of key figures in Putin’s inner circle, rather than the Russian President himself.
Chapter 4 considers the roles of Aleksandr Dugin, Konstantin Malofeev, Metropolitan Tikhon, Sergei Glazyev and Vladislav Surkov, alongside factors such as Russia’s success in Syria and Putin’s contempt for Zelensky that together created a political, ideological and economic environment in which outright invasion was possible. Chapter 5 continues with the consolidation of influence in the hands of the “tiny group of men” whom Matthews claims led Russia to war. To the short biographies of key figures in Chapter 4 are added profiles of Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, FSB director Alexander Bortnikov and Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu.
Matthews’ focus on the major Russian non-Putin characters makes Chapter 4 and 5 the best and most interesting parts of the book. Matthews describes Surkov as “the most paradoxical and fascinating figure ever to have worked in Putin’s Kremlin”, and makes his case well. The portrait of Patrushev is also helpful for introducing readers to an essential figure in Russia’s recent past, the current war, and possibly the future too. The first section of Chapter 5 deserves a book of its own (perhaps by Matthews, perhaps by Mark Galeotti, whose work Matthews draws on) charting the long, agonising decline of the so-called “liberals” in the Kremlin, from Yegor Gaidar to Surkov, as they consistently failed to deliver the results that successive Russian leaders wanted.
In Part 3, Matthews attempts to devote the same careful analytical attention to events following the February 2022 invasion. The results are mixed, in large part because these events are simply too recent. Matthews adopts a thematic, rather than strictly chronological account. Important topics, such as shifts in Western attitudes to the war and the effectiveness of economic sanctions, receive attention. However, Matthews is constrained by the limited information available at the time of writing. In February 2023 the question of Western resolve, while less pressing than in late 2022, remains open in the face of a potentially protracted conflict. A full understanding of the true impact of economic sanctions, and the consequent decoupling of Russia from Western economies, awaits the sort of detailed analysis by economists that will take years.
Another implication of Matthews’ thematic approach is that readers who have not been following events in Ukraine closely may find themselves disoriented. Important events are either alluded to indirectly, or addressed with reference to a particular theme. This can can make it difficult to place them within a broader context. The reader’s comprehension is also not helped by the greatest flaw of the book – the absence of supporting material. The lack of maps or an index (there is a reference list) will drive readers elsewhere for the necessary reminders about who the supporting characters are and where events are occurring. Wikipedia will do the job, but this is a disappointing omission presumably caused by constraints on what must have been a rushed editorial process.
There are other signs of this that go beyond a larger-than-average number of typos. In some cases, language is loose in a way that could be confusing. Igor Sechin appears twice in one list (with two distinct descriptions, both accurate). Matthews titles the profile of Surkov “The Grey Cardinal”, before frowning on using that epithet for Surkov when he later insists that “the title properly belonged to Nikolai Patrushev”. The claim that an appointment received by a young Sergei Shoigu in 1990 made him “equal rank with rising Party star Boris Yeltsin” may be strictly true, but the implicit suggestion that Yeltsin was a rising star in the Communist Party in 1990 is an unusual one since he was at that point in the final stages of a very messy divorce from the Party.
Rough edges and a weaker third act do not prevent Overreach from achieving its aims. It is timely, compelling and arguably more perceptive than could reasonably be expected so soon. It is strongly recommended, especially for readers who have been following the war since February 2022, or who have some prior knowledge of Putin or Russian politics.
Readers seeking more focus on events since February 2022 with a more chronological structure could also consider Luke Harding’s Invasion: The Inside Story of Russia's Bloody War and Ukraine's Fight for Survival.
According to the old cliche, journalism is the first rough draft of history. Unfortunately, this is often only true in the sense of history as “things that happened” – the interesting questions of history, those requiring careful arguments about causation and counterfactual, await more distance, better sources, and the attention of experts. This applies even more to major events. Owen Matthews has no doubt that the war in Ukraine is one of these, declaring in the introduction to Overreach that “The world’s security architecture, food and energy supply, balance of military power and alliances will be altered by [the war] forever”.
Matthews has, therefore, set himself a difficult task by seeking to write “a first draft of the history of how the war began – and how the conflict moved from Russia’s blitzkrieg through stalemate to Ukrainian counter-offensive.” The focus of the book is what Matthews describes as “the most compelling mystery at the heart of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine…what was the true reason that Putin decided to go to war?”
Measured against this standard, and considering the circumstances under which it was produced, the book is a success. Part 1 covers the historical origins of the 2022 invasion, stretching from Kyivan Rus’ to the election of Volodymyr Zelensky as President of Ukraine in 2019. Chapter 1 (“Poisoned Roots”) is necessarily concise and touches lightly, if at all, on many of the controversies of early Russian and Ukrainian history, but Matthews does a good job emphasising the fundamental uncertainty of key issues.
Chapter 2 (“And Moscow is Silent”) gives a brief biography of Putin that largely aligns with the conventional Western interpretation. As the Chapter title suggests, much is made of Putin’s distress at the fall of the Soviet Union (Matthews quotes Boris Reitschuster’s claim that the infamous ‘Moscow is silent’ moment is “the key to understanding Putin”) and its development into simmering anti-NATO resentment. The last part of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 summarise the history of post-USSR, pre-Zelensky Ukraine, including the Euromaidan protests and the subsequent conflict in the Donbas.
Chapter 4 (“Tomorrow Belongs to Me”) and Part 2 consider the period from 2014 to February 2022. Chapters 4 and 5 are the core of the book, because they most clearly address Matthews’ original question about why Putin decided to go to war. Matthews’ answer may come as a surprise to a casual reader, because he emphasises the role of key figures in Putin’s inner circle, rather than the Russian President himself.
Chapter 4 considers the roles of Aleksandr Dugin, Konstantin Malofeev, Metropolitan Tikhon, Sergei Glazyev and Vladislav Surkov, alongside factors such as Russia’s success in Syria and Putin’s contempt for Zelensky that together created a political, ideological and economic environment in which outright invasion was possible. Chapter 5 continues with the consolidation of influence in the hands of the “tiny group of men” whom Matthews claims led Russia to war. To the short biographies of key figures in Chapter 4 are added profiles of Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, FSB director Alexander Bortnikov and Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu.
Matthews’ focus on the major Russian non-Putin characters makes Chapter 4 and 5 the best and most interesting parts of the book. Matthews describes Surkov as “the most paradoxical and fascinating figure ever to have worked in Putin’s Kremlin”, and makes his case well. The portrait of Patrushev is also helpful for introducing readers to an essential figure in Russia’s recent past, the current war, and possibly the future too. The first section of Chapter 5 deserves a book of its own (perhaps by Matthews, perhaps by Mark Galeotti, whose work Matthews draws on) charting the long, agonising decline of the so-called “liberals” in the Kremlin, from Yegor Gaidar to Surkov, as they consistently failed to deliver the results that successive Russian leaders wanted.
In Part 3, Matthews attempts to devote the same careful analytical attention to events following the February 2022 invasion. The results are mixed, in large part because these events are simply too recent. Matthews adopts a thematic, rather than strictly chronological account. Important topics, such as shifts in Western attitudes to the war and the effectiveness of economic sanctions, receive attention. However, Matthews is constrained by the limited information available at the time of writing. In February 2023 the question of Western resolve, while less pressing than in late 2022, remains open in the face of a potentially protracted conflict. A full understanding of the true impact of economic sanctions, and the consequent decoupling of Russia from Western economies, awaits the sort of detailed analysis by economists that will take years.
Another implication of Matthews’ thematic approach is that readers who have not been following events in Ukraine closely may find themselves disoriented. Important events are either alluded to indirectly, or addressed with reference to a particular theme. This can can make it difficult to place them within a broader context. The reader’s comprehension is also not helped by the greatest flaw of the book – the absence of supporting material. The lack of maps or an index (there is a reference list) will drive readers elsewhere for the necessary reminders about who the supporting characters are and where events are occurring. Wikipedia will do the job, but this is a disappointing omission presumably caused by constraints on what must have been a rushed editorial process.
There are other signs of this that go beyond a larger-than-average number of typos. In some cases, language is loose in a way that could be confusing. Igor Sechin appears twice in one list (with two distinct descriptions, both accurate). Matthews titles the profile of Surkov “The Grey Cardinal”, before frowning on using that epithet for Surkov when he later insists that “the title properly belonged to Nikolai Patrushev”. The claim that an appointment received by a young Sergei Shoigu in 1990 made him “equal rank with rising Party star Boris Yeltsin” may be strictly true, but the implicit suggestion that Yeltsin was a rising star in the Communist Party in 1990 is an unusual one since he was at that point in the final stages of a very messy divorce from the Party.
Rough edges and a weaker third act do not prevent Overreach from achieving its aims. It is timely, compelling and arguably more perceptive than could reasonably be expected so soon. It is strongly recommended, especially for readers who have been following the war since February 2022, or who have some prior knowledge of Putin or Russian politics.
Readers seeking more focus on events since February 2022 with a more chronological structure could also consider Luke Harding’s Invasion: The Inside Story of Russia's Bloody War and Ukraine's Fight for Survival.
April 3, 2023
Esines kirjavigu ja toimetamisvigu (lk 46 Livoonia vajaks kindlasti õiendust). Üldiselt aga väga ladus ja sisukas taust Ukraina sõjale.
February 7, 2025
Extreem interessant.
September 22, 2024
A comprehensive look at the first 2 years of the Ukrainian war. Mathew’s writing style can feel repetitive at times - a symptom, I think, of the fact the book has been revised and updated.
December 10, 2023
Начнёт ржаветь в крови железо кулаков,
На прочность пробуя гранитных лиц упрямства.
И выйдет зло из безумий берегов,
И ненависти воцарится пьянство.
И глядя на того, кто падал в пустоту,
Забвения больного поражения,
Увижу лишь себя, лежащим на полу,
И умоляющем о чуде воскрешения.
Главный минус книги в том, что автор не анализирует ситуацию. Вместо этого он просто пересказывает новости.
Во-первых, автор начинает свою книгу с далёкой истории - с Киевской Руси. Если бы я хотел прочитать про Киевскую Русь, я бы взял отдельную книгу по истории того периода. В итоге получилось, что первая четверть книги, это короткий пересказ совместной украино-русской истории. Зачем? С какой целью автор решил рассказать читателям такой сложный предмет как совместная русско-украинская история? Чтобы показать, что Россия всегда пыталась уничтожить Украину? Или чтобы показать, что эти две страны всегда жили вместе (Make Confederation Not War)? Продолжая пересказывать российско-украинскую историю, автор упоминает историю Голодомора. Голод в Украине был и это факт, который никто не оспаривает. Но почему автор не говорит, что голод был не только в Украине? Потому что иначе возникает ощущение, что голод был ТОЛЬКО в Украине, и он был сделан намеренно. Я не знаю, был ли он сделан специально или нет, но я знаю точно, что голод в 1932—1933 был не только в Украине. Вот цитата из Википедии: «В 2013 году Институт демографии и социальных исследований имени М. В. Птухи НАН Украины провёл международную научную конференцию «Голод на Украине в первой половине XX столетия: причины и результаты (1921—1923, 1932—1933, 1946—1947)», где были опубликованы оценки демографических потерь в результате голода 1932—1933 гг.: избыточное количество смертей населения Украины составило 3 млн. 917,8 тыс. чел., России — 3 млн. 264,6 тыс., Казахстана — 1 млн. 258,2 тыс. чел., суммарно на всей территории СССР — 8 млн. 731,9 тыс. чел. Относительные потери от голода 1932—1933 гг. были наивысшими в Казахстане — 22,42 %, на Украине — 12,92 %, в России — 3,17 %, в среднем по СССР 5,42 %».
Во-вторых, говоря об оранжевой революции и её последствиях, автор ничего не говорит о том, почему в России её так негативно восприняли. Революции были не только в Украине и Грузии, но и в Киргизии (три революции) и в Армении. В Казахстане недавно произошёл чуть ли не военный переворот. Но во всех трёх случаях Россия не вела себя агрессивно. Если оценивать ситуацию по этой книге, становится совершенно не понятно, почему именно революция в Украине была воспринята Россией так болезненно. Возможно, они сделали глубоко не политические вопросы, как например, языковой вопрос и сугубо исторические вопросы, как например Голодомор, политическими вопросами? Автор ничего не говорит о националистических организациях и их роли в современной украинской политике (при этом посвящает целую главу российским националистам, например Дугину). Возможно, их влияние на украинское общество было настолько небольшим, что не стоит этому придавать большое значение? Может быть, но почему тогда Россия постоянно о них говорит? Если Россия создала проблему из ничего, то почему автор не показал это в своей книге? Короче говоря, не получается выстроить логическую последовательность событий с целью понять, почему мы сегодня пришли к тому, к чему пришли. Другими словами, не понятно, почему Россия была настроена так агрессивно именно к Украине (начиная с 2004 года).
В-третьих, в главе посвящённой началу военного конфликта на востоке Украины в 2014 году, автор пишет:
«In Donbas a series of inconclusive military skirmishes between rebels and freelance Ukrainian nationalist militias made it increasingly obvious that the separatist areas of Donetsk and Luhansk would only be brought back under Kyiv’s rule by a full-scale military intervention».
Автор не задаётся вопросом, был ли это единственный правильный выбор. Сегодня мне уже интересно задуматься над тем, а был ли шанс отправить в Донецк и Луганск не танки, а переговорщиков, т.е. начинать не контртеррористическую операцию на востоке Украины, а сначала попытаться провести переговоры и договориться как-нибудь. Я не утверждаю, что так и нужно было поступить, ибо я и читаю книгу, чтобы это понять. Я допускаю, что это могло быть бессмысленным решением. Может быть. Я просто не знаю. Но автор не углубляется в этот важный вопрос. К примеру, автор не задаётся вопросом, почему сопротивление киевским властям возникло только в Луганске и Донецке. Автор не объясняет, почему восток Украины был так сильно недоволен лидерами Евромайдана. Чем они были так не довольны? Почему автор ничего не говорит об истории конфликта? У автора хватило времени пересказать историю совместного российско-украинского сосуществования, начиная с Киевской Руси, но у него не хватило времени, чтобы рассказать, почему восток Украины был так негативно настроен к Киеву и всей остальной Украине. Сами подумайте: произошли бы те события в 2014 году, если бы в тех областях жизнь была бы благополучной? А почему она была там не благополучной? Почему жители Донбасса и Луганска не защитили свою родину? У меня нет ответа. Я сам не знаю. Но и автор этого не объясняет. Да, Россия активно помогала сепаратистам Донбасса, но откуда эти сепаратисты взялись (как перешли украино-российскую границу?) и почему местные жители их не прогнали, ведь в Донецке и Луганске была полиция? Если Россия всех подкупила, то почему люди не продались ни в Одесе, ни в Харькове? Неужели так легко захватить города, если для этого достаточно переправить через границу несколько сот людей? У меня нет ответов. Я сам не понимаю, как это конфликт разросся до таких масштабов фактически из ничего. Но и автор этого не объясняет. Всё что он говорит, это поверхностная и давно известная информация из СМИ, которая всё упрощает и ничего не проясняет.
В четвёртых, говоря об отказе подписать Минские соглашения, автор пишет следующее:
«Thousands of protesters gathered on Kyiv’s Maidan Square under the slogan ‘No capitulation!’ More menacingly, several Ukrainian nationalist militias, including the Azov Battalion that was then fighting in the Luhansk region of Donbas, refused to accept the agreement. Andriy Biletsky, the leader of the far-right National Corps and first commander of the Azov Battalion, accused Zelensky of ‘disrespecting’ veterans and of acting on behalf of the Kremlin. Zelensky met Biletsky and other militia leaders in an attempt to convince them to surrender their unregistered weapons and accept the peace accord. They refused, and the referendum plan collapsed – and with it any realistic chance of peace in Donbas».
Получается, что это не правительство Украины и не её политическая элита частично виновата в начале полномасштабных военных действий 2022 года (большая часть вины лежит, конечно, на РФ), а какая-та небольшая кучка радикалов. Мне такая версия видится очень нереалистичной. С моей точки зрения, отказ от подписания Минских договорённостей было принято украинскими властями, а не под нажимом небольшой группы националистов. Нужно ли их было вообще подписывать? Я не знаю. Сколько я не пытался разобраться, сколько я не читал Википедию, я так и не смог понять, в чём была проблема с этими Минскими договорённостями. Другими словами, я так и не понял, почему Минские соглашения не были подписаны. Что касается этой книги, то автор ничего не говорит о Минских соглашениях, как не говорит о том, нужно ли их было подписывать или нет. Но если смотреть из сегодняшнего дня, можно же прийти к какому-то окончательному выводу, не так ли? Может, зная к каким последствиям их не подписание привело, их всё же стоило Зеленскому подписать? Я повторю, что лично я не знаю, нужно ли их было подписывать или нет. Что касается вооружённых националистов типа группы Азова и Красного Сектора, которые были резко против подписания договорённостей, то мне кажется, у украинской армии было достаточно сил, чтобы справится с ними. Так что не стоит сбрасывать ответственность с украинского правительства на плечи украинских националистов.
Дальше я читать уже не стал, так как автор начал пересказывать биографию Патрушева, писать что-то о Бортникове, «активных мероприятиях» за рубежом (в Британии) и в целом, на темы, которые не связаны непосредственно с началом военного конфликта на востоке Украины в 2022 году.
С оценкой автора, данной действиям РФ, я согласен, но вот отсутствие взвешенной оценки в отношении украинских властей, выглядит странно, ибо по факту, автор никак не оценивает действия украинского правительства.
The main disadvantage of the book is that the author does not analyze the situation. Instead, he simply recounts the news.
First of all, the author starts his book with distant history - Kievan Rus'. If I wanted to read about Kievan Rus', I would have picked up a distinct book on the history of that period. As a result, it turned out that the first quarter of the book is a short retelling of joint Ukrainian-Russian history. Why? For what purpose did the author decide to tell readers such a complex subject as joint Russian-Ukrainian history? To show that Russia has always tried to destroy Ukraine? Or to show that these two countries have always lived together (Make Confederation Not War)? Continuing to retell the Russian-Ukrainian history, the author mentions the history of the Holodomor. There was a famine in Ukraine, and this is a fact that no one denies. But why doesn't the author say that the famine was not only in Ukraine? Because otherwise one gets the feeling that the famine was ONLY in Ukraine and it was done intentionally. I don't know if it was done on purpose or not, but I know for sure that the famine in 1932-1933 was not only in Ukraine. Here's a quote from Wikipedia: "In 2013, the M.V. Ptukha Institute of Demography and Social Research of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine held an international scientific conference "Famine in Ukraine in the first half of the XX century: causes and results (1921-1923, 1932-1933, 1946-1947)", where estimates of demographic losses as a result of the famine of 1932-1933 were published: the excess deaths of the population of Ukraine amounted to 3 million 917.8 thousand people, Russia - 3 million 264.6 thousand, Kazakhstan - 1 million 258.2 thousand people, in total on the whole territory of the USSR - 8 million 731.9 thousand people. Relative losses from the famine of 1932-1933 were the highest in Kazakhstan - 22.42%, in Ukraine - 12.92%, in Russia - 3.17%, on average in the USSR - 5.42%".
Secondly, speaking about the Orange Revolution and its consequences, the author does not say anything about why it was so negatively perceived in Russia. There were revolutions not only in Ukraine and Georgia but also in Kyrgyzstan (three revolutions) and Armenia. In Kazakhstan, there was almost a military coup recently. But in all three cases, Russia did not behave aggressively. If we evaluate the situation according to this book, it is not clear why the revolution in Ukraine was perceived so painfully by Russia. Did they perhaps make deeply non-political issues like the language issue and purely historical issues like the Holodomor into political issues? The author says nothing about nationalist organizations and their role in contemporary Ukrainian politics (while devoting an entire chapter to Russian nationalists such as Dugin). Is it possible that their influence on Ukrainian society was so small that we should not pay much attention to it? Maybe, but then why does Russia talk about them all the time? If Russia created a problem out of nothing, why didn't the author show it in his book? In short, it is not possible to build a logical sequence of events to understand why we have come to where we are now. In other words, it is not clear why Russia was so aggressive towards Ukraine (since 2004).
Third, in the chapter devoted to the beginning of the military conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the author writes:
«In Donbas a series of inconclusive military skirmishes between rebels and freelance Ukrainian nationalist militias made it increasingly obvious that the separatist areas of Donetsk and Luhansk would only be brought back under Kyiv’s rule by a full-scale military intervention».
The author does not ask whether this was the only right choice. Today, I wonder whether there was a chance to send negotiators to Donetsk and Luhansk instead of tanks, i.e., not to launch a counter-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine, but first to try to negotiate and reach an agreement somehow. I'm not claiming that's what should have been done, as that's why I'm reading this book - to understand. I concede that it may have been a pointless decision. It could have been. I just don't know. However, the author doesn't delve into this important issue. For example, the author does not ask why resistance to the Kyiv authorities arose only in Luhansk and Donetsk. The author does not explain why the east of Ukraine was so dissatisfied with the Euromaidan leaders. What were they so dissatisfied with? Why doesn't the author say anything about the history of the conflict? The author had enough time to retell the history of joint Russian-Ukrainian coexistence, starting from Kievan Rus, but did not have enough time to tell why the east of Ukraine was so negative towards Kyiv and the rest of Ukraine. Think about it - would those events have happened in 2014 if life had been prosperous in those areas? And why was it not prosperous there? Why didn't the people of Donbas and Luhansk defend their homeland? I do not have an answer. I don't know it myself. But the author doesn't explain it either. Yes, Russia actively helped the separatists of Donbas, but where did these separatists come from (how did they cross the Ukrainian-Russian border?), and why didn't the locals chase them away, since there were police in Donetsk and Luhansk? If Russia bribed everyone, why didn't people betray themselves in Odesa or Kharkiv? Is it really so easy to take over cities if it is enough to get a few hundred people across the border? I don't have any answers. I do not understand how this conflict grew to such proportions virtually out of nothing. But the author doesn't explain it either. All he says is superficial and long-known information from the media, which simplifies everything and does not clarify anything.
Fourth, speaking about the refusal to sign the Minsk agreements, the author writes the following:
«Thousands of protesters gathered on Kyiv’s Maidan Square under the slogan ‘No capitulation!’ More menacingly, several Ukrainian nationalist militias, including the Azov Battalion that was then fighting in the Luhansk region of Donbas, refused to accept the agreement. Andriy Biletsky, the leader of the far-right National Corps and first commander of the Azov Battalion, accused Zelensky of ‘disrespecting’ veterans and of acting on behalf of the Kremlin. Zelensky met Biletsky and other militia leaders in an attempt to convince them to surrender their unregistered weapons and accept the peace accord. They refused, and the referendum plan collapsed – and with it any realistic chance of peace in Donbas».
It turns out that it is not the government of Ukraine and its political elite that is partly to blame for the start of full-scale hostilities in 2022 (most of the blame lies, of course, on Russia), but some small group of radicals. I find this version very unrealistic. From my point of view, the refusal to sign the Minsk agreements was accepted by the Ukrainian authorities and not under the pressure of a small group of nationalists. Was it necessary to sign them at all? I don't know. No matter how much I tried to figure it out and how long I read Wikipedia, I never could figure out what the problem was with these Minsk agreements. In other words, I never understood why the Minsk agreements were not signed. As for this book, the author says nothing about the Minsk agreements, nor does he say anything about whether they should have been signed or not. But if we look at today, we can come to some conclusion, can't we? Maybe, knowing the consequences of not signing them, Zelensky should have signed them after all? I repeat that I do not know whether they should have been signed or not. As for armed nationalists like the Azov group and the Red Sector, who were strongly opposed to the signing of the agreements, I think the Ukrainian army had enough forces to deal with them. So, we should not shift the responsibility of the Ukrainian government onto the shoulders of the Ukrainian nationalists.
I did not read further, as the author began to recount Patrushev's biography, write something about Bortnikov, "active measures" abroad (in Britain), and in general, on topics that are not directly related to the beginning of the military conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2022.
I agree with the author's assessment of the actions of the Russian Federation, but the lack of a balanced assessment of the Ukrainian authorities looks strange because the author does not evaluate the actions of the Ukrainian government in any way.
На прочность пробуя гранитных лиц упрямства.
И выйдет зло из безумий берегов,
И ненависти воцарится пьянство.
И глядя на того, кто падал в пустоту,
Забвения больного поражения,
Увижу лишь себя, лежащим на полу,
И умоляющем о чуде воскрешения.
Главный минус книги в том, что автор не анализирует ситуацию. Вместо этого он просто пересказывает новости.
Во-первых, автор начинает свою книгу с далёкой истории - с Киевской Руси. Если бы я хотел прочитать про Киевскую Русь, я бы взял отдельную книгу по истории того периода. В итоге получилось, что первая четверть книги, это короткий пересказ совместной украино-русской истории. Зачем? С какой целью автор решил рассказать читателям такой сложный предмет как совместная русско-украинская история? Чтобы показать, что Россия всегда пыталась уничтожить Украину? Или чтобы показать, что эти две страны всегда жили вместе (Make Confederation Not War)? Продолжая пересказывать российско-украинскую историю, автор упоминает историю Голодомора. Голод в Украине был и это факт, который никто не оспаривает. Но почему автор не говорит, что голод был не только в Украине? Потому что иначе возникает ощущение, что голод был ТОЛЬКО в Украине, и он был сделан намеренно. Я не знаю, был ли он сделан специально или нет, но я знаю точно, что голод в 1932—1933 был не только в Украине. Вот цитата из Википедии: «В 2013 году Институт демографии и социальных исследований имени М. В. Птухи НАН Украины провёл международную научную конференцию «Голод на Украине в первой половине XX столетия: причины и результаты (1921—1923, 1932—1933, 1946—1947)», где были опубликованы оценки демографических потерь в результате голода 1932—1933 гг.: избыточное количество смертей населения Украины составило 3 млн. 917,8 тыс. чел., России — 3 млн. 264,6 тыс., Казахстана — 1 млн. 258,2 тыс. чел., суммарно на всей территории СССР — 8 млн. 731,9 тыс. чел. Относительные потери от голода 1932—1933 гг. были наивысшими в Казахстане — 22,42 %, на Украине — 12,92 %, в России — 3,17 %, в среднем по СССР 5,42 %».
Во-вторых, говоря об оранжевой революции и её последствиях, автор ничего не говорит о том, почему в России её так негативно восприняли. Революции были не только в Украине и Грузии, но и в Киргизии (три революции) и в Армении. В Казахстане недавно произошёл чуть ли не военный переворот. Но во всех трёх случаях Россия не вела себя агрессивно. Если оценивать ситуацию по этой книге, становится совершенно не понятно, почему именно революция в Украине была воспринята Россией так болезненно. Возможно, они сделали глубоко не политические вопросы, как например, языковой вопрос и сугубо исторические вопросы, как например Голодомор, политическими вопросами? Автор ничего не говорит о националистических организациях и их роли в современной украинской политике (при этом посвящает целую главу российским националистам, например Дугину). Возможно, их влияние на украинское общество было настолько небольшим, что не стоит этому придавать большое значение? Может быть, но почему тогда Россия постоянно о них говорит? Если Россия создала проблему из ничего, то почему автор не показал это в своей книге? Короче говоря, не получается выстроить логическую последовательность событий с целью понять, почему мы сегодня пришли к тому, к чему пришли. Другими словами, не понятно, почему Россия была настроена так агрессивно именно к Украине (начиная с 2004 года).
В-третьих, в главе посвящённой началу военного конфликта на востоке Украины в 2014 году, автор пишет:
«In Donbas a series of inconclusive military skirmishes between rebels and freelance Ukrainian nationalist militias made it increasingly obvious that the separatist areas of Donetsk and Luhansk would only be brought back under Kyiv’s rule by a full-scale military intervention».
Автор не задаётся вопросом, был ли это единственный правильный выбор. Сегодня мне уже интересно задуматься над тем, а был ли шанс отправить в Донецк и Луганск не танки, а переговорщиков, т.е. начинать не контртеррористическую операцию на востоке Украины, а сначала попытаться провести переговоры и договориться как-нибудь. Я не утверждаю, что так и нужно было поступить, ибо я и читаю книгу, чтобы это понять. Я допускаю, что это могло быть бессмысленным решением. Может быть. Я просто не знаю. Но автор не углубляется в этот важный вопрос. К примеру, автор не задаётся вопросом, почему сопротивление киевским властям возникло только в Луганске и Донецке. Автор не объясняет, почему восток Украины был так сильно недоволен лидерами Евромайдана. Чем они были так не довольны? Почему автор ничего не говорит об истории конфликта? У автора хватило времени пересказать историю совместного российско-украинского сосуществования, начиная с Киевской Руси, но у него не хватило времени, чтобы рассказать, почему восток Украины был так негативно настроен к Киеву и всей остальной Украине. Сами подумайте: произошли бы те события в 2014 году, если бы в тех областях жизнь была бы благополучной? А почему она была там не благополучной? Почему жители Донбасса и Луганска не защитили свою родину? У меня нет ответа. Я сам не знаю. Но и автор этого не объясняет. Да, Россия активно помогала сепаратистам Донбасса, но откуда эти сепаратисты взялись (как перешли украино-российскую границу?) и почему местные жители их не прогнали, ведь в Донецке и Луганске была полиция? Если Россия всех подкупила, то почему люди не продались ни в Одесе, ни в Харькове? Неужели так легко захватить города, если для этого достаточно переправить через границу несколько сот людей? У меня нет ответов. Я сам не понимаю, как это конфликт разросся до таких масштабов фактически из ничего. Но и автор этого не объясняет. Всё что он говорит, это поверхностная и давно известная информация из СМИ, которая всё упрощает и ничего не проясняет.
В четвёртых, говоря об отказе подписать Минские соглашения, автор пишет следующее:
«Thousands of protesters gathered on Kyiv’s Maidan Square under the slogan ‘No capitulation!’ More menacingly, several Ukrainian nationalist militias, including the Azov Battalion that was then fighting in the Luhansk region of Donbas, refused to accept the agreement. Andriy Biletsky, the leader of the far-right National Corps and first commander of the Azov Battalion, accused Zelensky of ‘disrespecting’ veterans and of acting on behalf of the Kremlin. Zelensky met Biletsky and other militia leaders in an attempt to convince them to surrender their unregistered weapons and accept the peace accord. They refused, and the referendum plan collapsed – and with it any realistic chance of peace in Donbas».
Получается, что это не правительство Украины и не её политическая элита частично виновата в начале полномасштабных военных действий 2022 года (большая часть вины лежит, конечно, на РФ), а какая-та небольшая кучка радикалов. Мне такая версия видится очень нереалистичной. С моей точки зрения, отказ от подписания Минских договорённостей было принято украинскими властями, а не под нажимом небольшой группы националистов. Нужно ли их было вообще подписывать? Я не знаю. Сколько я не пытался разобраться, сколько я не читал Википедию, я так и не смог понять, в чём была проблема с этими Минскими договорённостями. Другими словами, я так и не понял, почему Минские соглашения не были подписаны. Что касается этой книги, то автор ничего не говорит о Минских соглашениях, как не говорит о том, нужно ли их было подписывать или нет. Но если смотреть из сегодняшнего дня, можно же прийти к какому-то окончательному выводу, не так ли? Может, зная к каким последствиям их не подписание привело, их всё же стоило Зеленскому подписать? Я повторю, что лично я не знаю, нужно ли их было подписывать или нет. Что касается вооружённых националистов типа группы Азова и Красного Сектора, которые были резко против подписания договорённостей, то мне кажется, у украинской армии было достаточно сил, чтобы справится с ними. Так что не стоит сбрасывать ответственность с украинского правительства на плечи украинских националистов.
Дальше я читать уже не стал, так как автор начал пересказывать биографию Патрушева, писать что-то о Бортникове, «активных мероприятиях» за рубежом (в Британии) и в целом, на темы, которые не связаны непосредственно с началом военного конфликта на востоке Украины в 2022 году.
С оценкой автора, данной действиям РФ, я согласен, но вот отсутствие взвешенной оценки в отношении украинских властей, выглядит странно, ибо по факту, автор никак не оценивает действия украинского правительства.
The main disadvantage of the book is that the author does not analyze the situation. Instead, he simply recounts the news.
First of all, the author starts his book with distant history - Kievan Rus'. If I wanted to read about Kievan Rus', I would have picked up a distinct book on the history of that period. As a result, it turned out that the first quarter of the book is a short retelling of joint Ukrainian-Russian history. Why? For what purpose did the author decide to tell readers such a complex subject as joint Russian-Ukrainian history? To show that Russia has always tried to destroy Ukraine? Or to show that these two countries have always lived together (Make Confederation Not War)? Continuing to retell the Russian-Ukrainian history, the author mentions the history of the Holodomor. There was a famine in Ukraine, and this is a fact that no one denies. But why doesn't the author say that the famine was not only in Ukraine? Because otherwise one gets the feeling that the famine was ONLY in Ukraine and it was done intentionally. I don't know if it was done on purpose or not, but I know for sure that the famine in 1932-1933 was not only in Ukraine. Here's a quote from Wikipedia: "In 2013, the M.V. Ptukha Institute of Demography and Social Research of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine held an international scientific conference "Famine in Ukraine in the first half of the XX century: causes and results (1921-1923, 1932-1933, 1946-1947)", where estimates of demographic losses as a result of the famine of 1932-1933 were published: the excess deaths of the population of Ukraine amounted to 3 million 917.8 thousand people, Russia - 3 million 264.6 thousand, Kazakhstan - 1 million 258.2 thousand people, in total on the whole territory of the USSR - 8 million 731.9 thousand people. Relative losses from the famine of 1932-1933 were the highest in Kazakhstan - 22.42%, in Ukraine - 12.92%, in Russia - 3.17%, on average in the USSR - 5.42%".
Secondly, speaking about the Orange Revolution and its consequences, the author does not say anything about why it was so negatively perceived in Russia. There were revolutions not only in Ukraine and Georgia but also in Kyrgyzstan (three revolutions) and Armenia. In Kazakhstan, there was almost a military coup recently. But in all three cases, Russia did not behave aggressively. If we evaluate the situation according to this book, it is not clear why the revolution in Ukraine was perceived so painfully by Russia. Did they perhaps make deeply non-political issues like the language issue and purely historical issues like the Holodomor into political issues? The author says nothing about nationalist organizations and their role in contemporary Ukrainian politics (while devoting an entire chapter to Russian nationalists such as Dugin). Is it possible that their influence on Ukrainian society was so small that we should not pay much attention to it? Maybe, but then why does Russia talk about them all the time? If Russia created a problem out of nothing, why didn't the author show it in his book? In short, it is not possible to build a logical sequence of events to understand why we have come to where we are now. In other words, it is not clear why Russia was so aggressive towards Ukraine (since 2004).
Third, in the chapter devoted to the beginning of the military conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the author writes:
«In Donbas a series of inconclusive military skirmishes between rebels and freelance Ukrainian nationalist militias made it increasingly obvious that the separatist areas of Donetsk and Luhansk would only be brought back under Kyiv’s rule by a full-scale military intervention».
The author does not ask whether this was the only right choice. Today, I wonder whether there was a chance to send negotiators to Donetsk and Luhansk instead of tanks, i.e., not to launch a counter-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine, but first to try to negotiate and reach an agreement somehow. I'm not claiming that's what should have been done, as that's why I'm reading this book - to understand. I concede that it may have been a pointless decision. It could have been. I just don't know. However, the author doesn't delve into this important issue. For example, the author does not ask why resistance to the Kyiv authorities arose only in Luhansk and Donetsk. The author does not explain why the east of Ukraine was so dissatisfied with the Euromaidan leaders. What were they so dissatisfied with? Why doesn't the author say anything about the history of the conflict? The author had enough time to retell the history of joint Russian-Ukrainian coexistence, starting from Kievan Rus, but did not have enough time to tell why the east of Ukraine was so negative towards Kyiv and the rest of Ukraine. Think about it - would those events have happened in 2014 if life had been prosperous in those areas? And why was it not prosperous there? Why didn't the people of Donbas and Luhansk defend their homeland? I do not have an answer. I don't know it myself. But the author doesn't explain it either. Yes, Russia actively helped the separatists of Donbas, but where did these separatists come from (how did they cross the Ukrainian-Russian border?), and why didn't the locals chase them away, since there were police in Donetsk and Luhansk? If Russia bribed everyone, why didn't people betray themselves in Odesa or Kharkiv? Is it really so easy to take over cities if it is enough to get a few hundred people across the border? I don't have any answers. I do not understand how this conflict grew to such proportions virtually out of nothing. But the author doesn't explain it either. All he says is superficial and long-known information from the media, which simplifies everything and does not clarify anything.
Fourth, speaking about the refusal to sign the Minsk agreements, the author writes the following:
«Thousands of protesters gathered on Kyiv’s Maidan Square under the slogan ‘No capitulation!’ More menacingly, several Ukrainian nationalist militias, including the Azov Battalion that was then fighting in the Luhansk region of Donbas, refused to accept the agreement. Andriy Biletsky, the leader of the far-right National Corps and first commander of the Azov Battalion, accused Zelensky of ‘disrespecting’ veterans and of acting on behalf of the Kremlin. Zelensky met Biletsky and other militia leaders in an attempt to convince them to surrender their unregistered weapons and accept the peace accord. They refused, and the referendum plan collapsed – and with it any realistic chance of peace in Donbas».
It turns out that it is not the government of Ukraine and its political elite that is partly to blame for the start of full-scale hostilities in 2022 (most of the blame lies, of course, on Russia), but some small group of radicals. I find this version very unrealistic. From my point of view, the refusal to sign the Minsk agreements was accepted by the Ukrainian authorities and not under the pressure of a small group of nationalists. Was it necessary to sign them at all? I don't know. No matter how much I tried to figure it out and how long I read Wikipedia, I never could figure out what the problem was with these Minsk agreements. In other words, I never understood why the Minsk agreements were not signed. As for this book, the author says nothing about the Minsk agreements, nor does he say anything about whether they should have been signed or not. But if we look at today, we can come to some conclusion, can't we? Maybe, knowing the consequences of not signing them, Zelensky should have signed them after all? I repeat that I do not know whether they should have been signed or not. As for armed nationalists like the Azov group and the Red Sector, who were strongly opposed to the signing of the agreements, I think the Ukrainian army had enough forces to deal with them. So, we should not shift the responsibility of the Ukrainian government onto the shoulders of the Ukrainian nationalists.
I did not read further, as the author began to recount Patrushev's biography, write something about Bortnikov, "active measures" abroad (in Britain), and in general, on topics that are not directly related to the beginning of the military conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2022.
I agree with the author's assessment of the actions of the Russian Federation, but the lack of a balanced assessment of the Ukrainian authorities looks strange because the author does not evaluate the actions of the Ukrainian government in any way.
June 30, 2023
Netikėtai gera. Užbaigta kažkur 2022 m. pabaigoje, tai paskutiniai pora skyrių tokios filosofinės įžvalgos, kurios nebeaktualios. Tačiau iš esmės labai gerai sukaltas kontekstas ir giliau pažvelgiama į pirmas karo dienas, ne tik dėstant faktus, bet ir stengiantis įžvelgti minties vingius ir strateginius sprendimus.
August 31, 2024
A splendid book. Even for a reader who’s never picked up a history of any of the countries in the region and has been asleep since the bad man consolidated power in Russia, the skill with which the author crafts his narrative allows one to form a well-informed view of the current struggle and the implications for the regional and, indeed, the global order.
July 17, 2023
A good account of the build up to, and the events of, the current war in Ukraine to try to understand the long-term causes of the invasion and to understand how the future might play out around us.
Whilst there wasn’t a lot new offered in terms of analysis, looking at Putin’s position as a series of mistakes and missteps which have led to a terminal direction of no return does provide an interesting new lens through which current events can be viewed.
Whilst there wasn’t a lot new offered in terms of analysis, looking at Putin’s position as a series of mistakes and missteps which have led to a terminal direction of no return does provide an interesting new lens through which current events can be viewed.
December 20, 2022
Rekomenduoju
Daug infomacijos apie tai kas ir kodėl, tikrai gerai ir chronologiškai sudėliota.
Daug infomacijos apie tai kas ir kodėl, tikrai gerai ir chronologiškai sudėliota.
December 27, 2022
This is a brilliant book. Owen Matthews, a veteran journalist covering Russia, tells the story of the run-up to Putin's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and the months that followed. The book was completed at the end of September, which means the author managed to reach the point in the war where it first began to seem that Ukraine might actually win. Writing a work of history while the events are taking place is an almost impossible task, but Matthews does it with aplomb in this very readable book. Highly recommended.
April 12, 2023
Fascinating and frightening all at the one time. Overreach appears to be a well researched account of a war that is still raging, and so wisely, Owen Matthews spends a good 50% of the book explaining the background of the conflict, and the imperial aspirations of Putin.
It paints Putin (and rightly so IMO) as a power-hungry, war mongering dictator hellbent on destroying not only Ukraine but his own country as well to restore the USSR.
Heartbreaking, but recommended. My only gripe is the amount of typos and errors in the version of the book I read. Far too many.
It paints Putin (and rightly so IMO) as a power-hungry, war mongering dictator hellbent on destroying not only Ukraine but his own country as well to restore the USSR.
Heartbreaking, but recommended. My only gripe is the amount of typos and errors in the version of the book I read. Far too many.
June 29, 2023
Was expecting more of an explanation of why the invasion was an overreach and what the fallout will be. The book really never established this and I was left little more informed than I already was from previous reading on the subject. Also a good bit of repetition in the book. I found myself numerous times thinking, “I already read about that earlier in the book.”
January 23, 2024
Thorough explanation of the Ukraine invasion and the various factors that contributed towards it. Finished the book feeling much more informed. 3 stars is harsh but I struggled with the density of information and found it really tough keeping up with all the different names of politicians and people of interest… I was glad to finish it by the end. Would give 3.5 stars ideally.
March 30, 2023
Changed and deepened my understanding of the war. Read it NOW.
August 4, 2025
⭐️⭐️⭐️½ (3.5 stars)
A sobering and timely read, Overreach offers a nuanced and deeply informed look into the roots and early months of Russia’s war in Ukraine. As a veteran Moscow correspondent with personal ties to both Russia and Ukraine, Matthews brings clarity, pace, and lived insight to an immensely complex and tragic geopolitical crisis.
This is not a book of easy answers or binary heroes and villains. Instead, Matthews charts the path from Putin’s rise to the miscalculations and paranoia that led to war, situating the invasion within the broader arc of post-Soviet disillusionment, NATO expansion fears, and domestic power plays. His portrayal of Putin as both calculated and increasingly isolated is particularly compelling—and disturbing.
The book is neatly split: the first half delves into the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations, while the second tracks the 2022 invasion and how the war unfolded. While the historical context is vital—especially for readers newer to the topic—if you’re already au fait with Russia’s post-Soviet military exploits, Part One may feel a touch repetitive. Personally, I found myself wishing for more focus on the current conflict itself, as that's where Matthews' on-the-ground experience and sharp analysis truly shine.
Still, this is a powerful, clear-eyed account from someone uniquely positioned to tell it. Balanced, well-paced, and never sensationalist, Overreach is an unmissable read for anyone wanting to understand how we got here—and why it matters.
A sobering and timely read, Overreach offers a nuanced and deeply informed look into the roots and early months of Russia’s war in Ukraine. As a veteran Moscow correspondent with personal ties to both Russia and Ukraine, Matthews brings clarity, pace, and lived insight to an immensely complex and tragic geopolitical crisis.
This is not a book of easy answers or binary heroes and villains. Instead, Matthews charts the path from Putin’s rise to the miscalculations and paranoia that led to war, situating the invasion within the broader arc of post-Soviet disillusionment, NATO expansion fears, and domestic power plays. His portrayal of Putin as both calculated and increasingly isolated is particularly compelling—and disturbing.
The book is neatly split: the first half delves into the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations, while the second tracks the 2022 invasion and how the war unfolded. While the historical context is vital—especially for readers newer to the topic—if you’re already au fait with Russia’s post-Soviet military exploits, Part One may feel a touch repetitive. Personally, I found myself wishing for more focus on the current conflict itself, as that's where Matthews' on-the-ground experience and sharp analysis truly shine.
Still, this is a powerful, clear-eyed account from someone uniquely positioned to tell it. Balanced, well-paced, and never sensationalist, Overreach is an unmissable read for anyone wanting to understand how we got here—and why it matters.
October 14, 2023
So Ukraine and Russia were separate people, with their own languages. But Putin posited that it should be one. But at the same time he said that Russian speakers should be protected by Ukrainian facists. So are the two actually one people?
Putin attached Ukraine without telling many people, including his troops. He did lose in the battle of Kiev. But he has learnt. Whatever land he has occupied is going to be hard to be taken back by Ukraine again. He is also conscripting from the occupied Ukrainian territories.
Even Ukrainian Russian speakers do not like to join Putin’s Russia. After all, they are much richer than the Russians.
As the war drags on, both sides think they can have complete victory. Putin still thinks he can win, especially if he use tactical nuclear weapons. Zelenskyy thinks he can take back all his old territories especially with Western arms and planes. So the war is likely to drag on.
Addendum: one wonders what happens now with the implosion of the American congress when funds to Ukraine is halted. This may well change the course of the war.
Putin attached Ukraine without telling many people, including his troops. He did lose in the battle of Kiev. But he has learnt. Whatever land he has occupied is going to be hard to be taken back by Ukraine again. He is also conscripting from the occupied Ukrainian territories.
Even Ukrainian Russian speakers do not like to join Putin’s Russia. After all, they are much richer than the Russians.
As the war drags on, both sides think they can have complete victory. Putin still thinks he can win, especially if he use tactical nuclear weapons. Zelenskyy thinks he can take back all his old territories especially with Western arms and planes. So the war is likely to drag on.
Addendum: one wonders what happens now with the implosion of the American congress when funds to Ukraine is halted. This may well change the course of the war.
January 10, 2024
A strong writer, deeply familiar with Russia and Ukraine and with a high level of access, which makes this a colourful account. I am not sure there are any great revelations; I was struck by the argument that a prerequisite for the war was that Putin’s advisers had shrunk from a group that, however amoral and vicious, had a worldly understanding of cosmopolitanism and ‘the West’ (e.g. Vladislav Surkov) to a hardcore of old, paranoid ex-KGB men (Nikolai Patrushev, Alexandr Bortnikov).
March 27, 2025
Matthew’s gives a great understanding of the Russo-Ukrainian war from multiple perspectives. NATO, Ukrainians, Russians, Kremlin etc. He provides a great timeline of what drove Putin to his invasion of Ukraine and how Zelenskyy gained support of the West. Matthew’s has 25 years experience as a correspondence in Moscow and family ties that give him a first hand experience of russian residency during the start of the war.
July 17, 2023
A political overview of the Ukranian invasion. I like how the author goes back on time to Crimea’s invassion on 2014 to give further context of the conflict.
The heartbreaking testimonies on both sides (Ukrania and Russia) helps to build a complete story, as well as it humanizes the war with real people.
The heartbreaking testimonies on both sides (Ukrania and Russia) helps to build a complete story, as well as it humanizes the war with real people.
January 15, 2024
A great overview of the Russia/Ukraine relationship
This book was well written and east to follow, even for those not well-versed in Russian history, military lingo, and the layout of Ukraine. It gave a fantastic explanation of how this war came about, and the catch-22s that exist today if and when this war comes to an end. It also painted a great picture of the inner workings of Putin and his small group of advisers. It also gave the reader insights into Putin’s flawed rationale behind the war. Overall, I highly recommend this book to anyone and everyone looking to understand how this conflict came about.
This book was well written and east to follow, even for those not well-versed in Russian history, military lingo, and the layout of Ukraine. It gave a fantastic explanation of how this war came about, and the catch-22s that exist today if and when this war comes to an end. It also painted a great picture of the inner workings of Putin and his small group of advisers. It also gave the reader insights into Putin’s flawed rationale behind the war. Overall, I highly recommend this book to anyone and everyone looking to understand how this conflict came about.
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March 3, 2024my mom got this for me as a christmas gift and honestly i really enjoyed it :) (not to sound like a massive dork). tbh the analysis was really comprehensive and easy to follow! i especially liked the parts on ideology/propaganda and the economic implications of the war. i’m surprised bc i swear this was written the same year the invasion started.
unrelated but if natalie ng/tienne is reading this i hope ur having a wonderful time in shenzhen
unrelated but if natalie ng/tienne is reading this i hope ur having a wonderful time in shenzhen
June 1, 2024
Good book, very informative and interesting to read. I have learned a lot while in the back of my chair reading ascary story that actually happened.
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