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Cassell History of Warfare
War in the Air 1914-45
The first aircraft flew in 1903 and within ten years had been developed into military weapons.From World War I to World War II, pilots became exalted national heroes, gallant knights astride their iron steeds high above the skies of Europe. Far from the heroic fantasy, however, most pilots and aircrews struggled against grim odds, fighting out their frequently short lives with bravado and recklessness. This vivid account explores the conditions in which these pilots fought and the rise of air warfare to preeminence, culminating in the Enola Gay's fateful drop of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.
240 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1999
About the author
Williamson Murray
96 books51 followersWilliamson "Wick" Murray was an American historian and author. He authored numerous works on history and strategic studies, and served as an editor on other projects extensively. He was professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University from 2012 until his death.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
March 25, 2024
This book was originally printed in Great Britain in 1999 and the United States in 2005 under the auspices of “Smithsonian History of Warfare.” Besides his lengthy Introduction (10 pages), and unusually brief Conclusion (1 page), the author has collected his material into four Sections:
1. The First World War
2. The Interwar Years
3. The Air War in Europe
4. The Air War in the Pacific
In the Introduction, the author describes the theories espoused by military people, politicians, and psychologists regarding the best way to win a war using air warfare as the primary instrument. What that really means is: “Bomb them until they surrender.” They discussed its impact on a variety of targets. Some believed that air warfare would have little or no impact. They used the example of the German bombing of Great Britain in the Great War which had little impact. Others said, “The bomber will always get through.” And some felt that Battleships would be immune. Others felt that governments could not stand up to the pressure of their own citizens if bombs started to fall on their homes. Many proponents simply believed this was a better solution to reduce the mass killing in the trenches of the Great War. This is an important discussion to get right. Many governments did not study this issue seriously; they wanted aircraft that would protect their population and aircraft that would win by bombing.
In the first and second sections, the author reminds us of the aircraft actually flown and what successes they experienced. Aircraft were initially given tasks such as reconnaissance, artillery spotting and mapping. A few pilots tried to mount a machine gun on their craft and soon, the fighter was born. Some with a crew of one, others with a crew of two. Most that were agile, fast and well armed were successful. Aircraft called “bombers” were built, but not successful. Technology did not exist to carry enough bombs or to deliver them where they were wanted.
In the third section Murray compliments British fighters and large four-engine bombers. Hurricanes could shoot down the German bombers, mostly twin engine, and Spitfires could do battle with fighters over Great Britain. Neither had the range to protect British bombers over Germany. Most German fighters could catch and destroy British bombers, but they were very late developing techniques for night fighting. The Nazis started building for the war almost as soon as they took power (1933). They developed a suite of mostly good and some bad aircraft for all purposes they thought necessary. It took the first year of the war to uncover weaknesses and begin major new development, and longer yet to begin serious pilot training and replacement. Britain started building new aircraft in 1936 including four engine, heavy bombers which began to appear in 1941. When the US joined the war, their fighters also could not match the range of the bombers. They deployed significant improvements in 1942 and full coverage in 1944 with deployment of the P-51. The USAAF took their good four engine B-17 to Britain. This bomber had a pressurized cabin, no oxygen masks required. The B-17 flew in daylight and suffered seriously until long range fighters were available.
The USA and Japan had gone further than any other country in developing naval aircraft, vessels and operations and training logistics. This was a war between naval aircraft as seen in Japan’s first operation, the Pearl Harbour raid. Japan displayed its expertise in most areas. The best naval fighter, the Zero, was vulnerable without better armament and self-sealing fuel tanks. These became available very late in the war. The Japanese discovered quite late that they needed more effort on pilot training and replacement. The US learned a lot early and updated some things as soon as possible. These include better torpedoes, ground and naval aircraft security, and every ship needed better anti-air armaments.
The author gave his conclusion that both Germany and Japan were blinded by their egos. Both took too long to accept any aircraft or logistics gaps. They also learned how difficult it is to “Bomb them until surrender.” Britain refused to surrender even while Germany might win. Germany suffered the death of its leader and destruction of the Nazi infrastructure before surrendering their military. Japan suffered two nuclear strikes and the loss of virtually all its Navy with no intention of surrendering, until the intercession of the Emperor.
This book is just what it purports to be: a history of air warfare 1914-1945. It covered mostly Great Britain, United States, and Germany. Japan was covered primarily regarding naval air warfare and Russia had little coverage, and none naval. Other countries such as Italy and France were covered with their philosophies rather than their practices. It is a high-level history, consequently, a lot of material is excluded. Near the end of the book, Murray suggests the adage become “Bomb them to surrender is obsolete unless you go nuclear.” If you have an interest in a specific battle, aircraft, unit, theatre, or other topics, you should look for more specific material. This book is well written. Four stars for persons specifically interested in this high level of detail.
1. The First World War
2. The Interwar Years
3. The Air War in Europe
4. The Air War in the Pacific
In the Introduction, the author describes the theories espoused by military people, politicians, and psychologists regarding the best way to win a war using air warfare as the primary instrument. What that really means is: “Bomb them until they surrender.” They discussed its impact on a variety of targets. Some believed that air warfare would have little or no impact. They used the example of the German bombing of Great Britain in the Great War which had little impact. Others said, “The bomber will always get through.” And some felt that Battleships would be immune. Others felt that governments could not stand up to the pressure of their own citizens if bombs started to fall on their homes. Many proponents simply believed this was a better solution to reduce the mass killing in the trenches of the Great War. This is an important discussion to get right. Many governments did not study this issue seriously; they wanted aircraft that would protect their population and aircraft that would win by bombing.
In the first and second sections, the author reminds us of the aircraft actually flown and what successes they experienced. Aircraft were initially given tasks such as reconnaissance, artillery spotting and mapping. A few pilots tried to mount a machine gun on their craft and soon, the fighter was born. Some with a crew of one, others with a crew of two. Most that were agile, fast and well armed were successful. Aircraft called “bombers” were built, but not successful. Technology did not exist to carry enough bombs or to deliver them where they were wanted.
In the third section Murray compliments British fighters and large four-engine bombers. Hurricanes could shoot down the German bombers, mostly twin engine, and Spitfires could do battle with fighters over Great Britain. Neither had the range to protect British bombers over Germany. Most German fighters could catch and destroy British bombers, but they were very late developing techniques for night fighting. The Nazis started building for the war almost as soon as they took power (1933). They developed a suite of mostly good and some bad aircraft for all purposes they thought necessary. It took the first year of the war to uncover weaknesses and begin major new development, and longer yet to begin serious pilot training and replacement. Britain started building new aircraft in 1936 including four engine, heavy bombers which began to appear in 1941. When the US joined the war, their fighters also could not match the range of the bombers. They deployed significant improvements in 1942 and full coverage in 1944 with deployment of the P-51. The USAAF took their good four engine B-17 to Britain. This bomber had a pressurized cabin, no oxygen masks required. The B-17 flew in daylight and suffered seriously until long range fighters were available.
The USA and Japan had gone further than any other country in developing naval aircraft, vessels and operations and training logistics. This was a war between naval aircraft as seen in Japan’s first operation, the Pearl Harbour raid. Japan displayed its expertise in most areas. The best naval fighter, the Zero, was vulnerable without better armament and self-sealing fuel tanks. These became available very late in the war. The Japanese discovered quite late that they needed more effort on pilot training and replacement. The US learned a lot early and updated some things as soon as possible. These include better torpedoes, ground and naval aircraft security, and every ship needed better anti-air armaments.
The author gave his conclusion that both Germany and Japan were blinded by their egos. Both took too long to accept any aircraft or logistics gaps. They also learned how difficult it is to “Bomb them until surrender.” Britain refused to surrender even while Germany might win. Germany suffered the death of its leader and destruction of the Nazi infrastructure before surrendering their military. Japan suffered two nuclear strikes and the loss of virtually all its Navy with no intention of surrendering, until the intercession of the Emperor.
This book is just what it purports to be: a history of air warfare 1914-1945. It covered mostly Great Britain, United States, and Germany. Japan was covered primarily regarding naval air warfare and Russia had little coverage, and none naval. Other countries such as Italy and France were covered with their philosophies rather than their practices. It is a high-level history, consequently, a lot of material is excluded. Near the end of the book, Murray suggests the adage become “Bomb them to surrender is obsolete unless you go nuclear.” If you have an interest in a specific battle, aircraft, unit, theatre, or other topics, you should look for more specific material. This book is well written. Four stars for persons specifically interested in this high level of detail.
November 3, 2019
I found this a bit heavy reading but I did learn more than I knew about the development of war in the air of which I have read a great deal. I'm glad it finished in 1945 at the end of WWII and that it covered in great detail, the Pacific war of which I knew little.
October 6, 2014
An excellent short history that manages to capture the many and varied aspects of a hugely complex subject in a single volume. Works well both as a primer and a general guide for more experience students of the subject.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews